• • 131-f Novc- ber TQF SEGiGrl' 9 1962 1 @10RANDlM TO S • Tho Socretary TI-m OUGH G - FRQ t EUR• William R Tyler SUBJECT Turkish and Italian tr •s 1 S S u Alexis Johnson Stimulated by your expressions regarding the limited military utility and the un•c t£Jin political V'1lue of the Turkish nnd Italian t•s I have had this lllatter subjected to a fresh review 2 The conclusion may be suIIClB izod as foll s a From a military point of view though tho missiles are obsole cing Dnd in certain respects vulnerable they remain a signific nt military asset of NATO in fact you y be surprised to learn as I was that contrDry to pravious reports 807 of those missiles tand at a 15 minute alert and could be fired at Soviet targets within that period and b · Regardless of-their military importance from a political point of view it would be hichly i1wdvis ble for the US to aasociate itself rl th a movement for removal of these missiles nt any time within the nenr future l-lhen the time is ripe for an appro cb wa must be able co o fer the Turks and Italians immediate p rticipotion in a force in being 3 This t Ultter ta es on a pnrticular urgency in the light of information just received from Defense to the effect that Mr r cNnmara has directed that the missiles should be re ved fr0t 1 Italy and Turkey by no lator than May 1963 DOD tells us this ' would require that initial approaches be m sde to A TO and prepDr torJ ctcps bo taken with the Italians and Turks almost rr rn dintely Paul Nitze is vigorously opposed to this approach but feels he is under direct orders from Mr Met-Tamara For· the preceding reason as well as the-keen interest of the President in this matter 1 suggest wa send the President a c emo andum •• I r DECLASSlFlEO e o 12356 Sec 3 4 ------------ - NJ- K-C t- 33 • ' -- - 2 - containing detailed analysis of this eubject - Such a m-e norandum ia at Attacbmant A Roc ndation the fresiacnt 1'hat you sign the attached Memorandum to Attaclmaot --· Clee s ancea s G PH • Mr Eitcben C FM Weiaa vl BlDl • HI Scbaetzel S P • Mr O isn 'POP SECRE f _ __ __ _ _ ' · Novembe - 9 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR Tim PRESIDEtn' Subject Political and Military Considerations Bearing on Turkish and Italian mm-i's Thoush I share your concern about maints 1 o1ng the Turkish and Italian Jupiter IRm1 missiles I have concluded that 1n balance it would be undesirable to undertake action le ding to tbf ir being phased out in the near future 7be political and military reasons which have led ma to this conclusion are set forth in the actacbment to this me1110 'andum Attachment ' ' - ' J DEC _ ·· Jo _#· ' __ 4 • • 12 - J ' • r Eo By ·- cat• ct -- c--e a i • i to t'1 e ur -e a Si •• 1 r 1 In tbia p cr OT lJ --' t -1 ·-' J I n _ •U lt- 1 - 1 c ·a A g Tn7 t ' • • c q1lore tho siz11ifieonco of Turkish ancl Italian Ir'loJ ' s frcxn tho point of vi 1 of US policy intcrccta II l1i itm x Consi d rt1tions t cc rim on the Prob The Jupiter a o ployed· in Turkey oiie squadron of 15 m isoilca and Italy two squadrons totalling O missilea • tro et1 teclmically ob1olcscent and vulnerable remain• mi11Ury asset Although these missiles aro bight wlner ble to a Soviet first st Tllta due to their usoft ' configuration t1 GY tJOUld bo cffeccive 1n a NATO initial nuclear strike They are ccp ble of· delivcrir a 1 45 megaton warhead ap1 1 ·ox1motely 1 500 miles · oT o ·t r 1 3 % of tb se f-4ssilcs nrn no 't lly n nintained iq a stJlte rendz for cmplo mffit on a 15 minute t-mr i'ing In the event th it tacticni waru1ng of an impcadi ng Sovlet attack miasUoa c ld be l auncbed SincG they was available those are targetted on s of the 129 Soviet l mm-E-IRE·t sites facing Europe tbey represent a - •ignj fic ant military tbreat to tboso Sovlot iq l acE ents Tbs other side of the military coin 1141 be equally importsnt 1'bey presumably are t m getted by Soviet- - RBM'a and consequently divezt t misailea which would othcarwi•• be a1JZlQd at otbff tart eta in Weatem Europe ionably • mere modern _ DECLASS FIED E O 12356 So 3 4 J ' - ' -q r • By S - NARA Cate 2 '4Ei - 2 ballistie iiissile p rticularly one 1 1ith more rapid re lction ti x md superior eurri vability l 10Uld be militarily prcfer bla Fm ever1 frO'Jl a m tli poi 'lt of vic- 1 tmtil such a missile is vr ilablo tbe romaval cf the -f'Jl-1 1 s would materially vca't- an liATO s i roved nuclear stritte plans 11 csc lATO plans are of course fully coordinated vith US SIOP t- cre the Turldeb and Italian lw -EM•·• not available a targota hich t be T cover· presumably could be embracod by tJS external forces but thla WOt Jld represent - a divorsion of ev ilable US forcoe III Politic l Implications in Europe Free world political implications of p xoposals far tr o e rly attrition of these missiles are more in port than the_it plicot iana ana1ng f m their milttirry utility be IRBM requireoent bas a conairlarable degree of P ATO sanet1f1cation The Council 1n 19S7 ''decided tlaat intermediate rmige ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the SUpreme Allied Ccmnander Europe_ SACEUB waa to cletermincl sitlag s a ·euphcm1 ma to tbara Ct1'1f1r Thia W3a SACmm1 s finding aaneOM who would accept Be found Turkey and Italy and aalced the IJS to negotiate appropriate a rangesne llta · Ar raagemaate for -ccual deployment ·- • bilateral borefore 1f Ital and 1 D key uste ap aaablo it would bo t ochnically posdhle f« SACEGl to a ow dG mJae that the j I I I II I - 3 - at aaa was desirable - In practical poli ic Jl tc1 it ii ot1ld b ly be-fc 1eible ·for this matter to be ne oti lt ed vithout layi11g the eueire subject before ll of the Allianco for its conaidoration The fact tbat tbe J -pite - macile is not only of US origin• but indocd represented the cul d Nltion of an effort on the part of tho US to persuade 1 s N ii TO Allies to accept eucb mi siles at a timo when d1cra vaa eonsiderable -reluctance f7itl1in the '11 iance to talta 011 tbis a itional burden is pertinent Despite thu rclucta tce co$pite in Italy con- ' • siderable internal political resistance and in Turke7 Soviet external political pressure our Nt TO Allies wre persuaded to accept these missiles The Turkish end Italian llm·l' s have since talrea on a bolic and psychological q artance They represent a capability for atr1k1ng back 1n kind Gt Cbe Soviet MRBM threat It is this threat which accounts for much of the polit tcal pressure for a larger and tr-ore effective Europe an-based nuclear force mder an increased ck gJ dO of European control Had the CUban cr iaia not occurred it is noaetheletta likely that over a f-1%1y abort p d ad of time KATO c»uld have accepted tba phasing out of these missiles %he It aliRM bad already givea fndicac1ons of- disposition to wo1 k toward tho eventual nmova1 of i tbCI 3bpltcra provided the 1ntffDlt1 polftj cal problems - lfOP 65GR£T I ' I I II I I i - 4 this '1oula crc lto could be su untod Th l Q would» l o i· 'CVe h ve been ver ctrons prcss re for rcplacc cnt 11th a milit rily ' effective altcrrw-tiva 4nd clc rly ci is would have ccant some thing based in Europe-·and ·under an increased degree of European It eon rol _With the · Cuban cris a NATO Gr d especially host I country rcluctDnco to accopt a pbas tnz out of these missiles II I within the near future can be expected to reach sorious proportiona Clearly no matter how vi3orouc the US denials trJcb a -- proposal would give rise to suspicion of existence of r s crct us-Soviet deal It ·ltfl Uld in broader context raise tl1e specter of the v Ulingness of US to trade off Euro oan Allicnca soots wen undar Soviet pressure It co ld far example loz tcally raiae the question of wbo hcr other AlliaJlce aaseta might not similarly be subj a cted to trading o£f at a later point in Finally the IrJ3l'11 s in quastion do not belong to the us 'Dorship resides with tbe host country Ind major costs of installation were boxue by tbe us these countries have aade a f1nanc1a1 r 0ntributiOD to tbe cst4bUsbmene of the misaile cocpleltoa Also while the mtrbaada ai w retained in ·us custody the US bas assured tbe Italiana Qdequate warbc ids will be maintained to support weapon - ystmna and they will be informed of any proposed romoval A •ud lm • though moz a impJSc tt OP SEGRBW • I • sagr1 ca•w»nt o- uts m tb tho 1 ''-1 1 S In practical polltici ll te1 - we C3 not therefore phase out t 'lc c issilcs without a general All tance •zrocmcnc which of course m t include i cpecific Turkish ad Italian agrocment unlc a c w are p apw cd to lay oursolvoa open to the charge of abroattt1cn of plied or specific ca d t c ents Sovi t P cnctions IV Thoush the Soviets att rue that t -rt b and It Jlitm clssiles are pravoc rd vc thia io a poGtU e t bicb tbe Soviets 1- ascumed 1n retertl to all PATO m111usry preparations fact once bav11J3 cauceded • even In by 1 i cation - th' oocd to oect Soviet coneuna on tbia score it u_zl1t b difficult to drmr a dist tnet1on in-te ma of tbe m1JitarJ tbre nt to Soviet i n t • of tbe·se miasUea as_ against other Clilitury p cparccir ess measures 1nclud1Dg later generat Joii missiles • f avorite Soviet tactic to seek It bas long bce 'l a easecm concession on one ostensibly l i m1 tod probka area pcmittins subsequent use of • the ptecedent Thia baa conaidei able relcvnnca in the Tt x Jtish all' Itdlian Dm-t caae v Imligtiona tr Other US Securltz Coami ts Quite aside fzua tbe NA'I'O area the- tJS dupo idcm to deal off TurUim and ltaliai 11 11 ' s or at loaat to pes ad t sudl an iAterprctation haa1u mncb tbis s Jigbt be juat ified Oil purely military bsoleaee ace gw mdc would bo ic -1 witb aJ arn by - ' • 8 @ 5 i i - 6 - us other Allicc of the In al lost all instances i dizc 1ous forces allied to the US ue 1n tl' cmsclvcs incapable of ' dtl1- etandin Soviet aggrossiou -dcspit a military assistcncc provided by tho us Tho security of such countries as Iran Kore TaiYaD etc is dependent upon the QX licit or presua d willingness of the t1S to-stand with tbesenations if aubJected-to Coimumist tbre n Wbilo tba US may resent any 1nfm anca tbat wa bad not fulfill our COii@liftzner t with Sovi lt pressure t i e apparently willing c ly for re wal of Che m Uab end Italian mis sf lesJ such an inference is 1 ikely to be drawn mid may well 11 into qt1ostion t 1S fortitude For example if we argue thaC -Turkiab missilaa m o 120t militm i ly vital and o Ccltl be aacrif1ced tbi• may raiSG a queat1Qn aa to whetbez e other instal• 1admu or territory els 1ere 1n tba world• which may be of admittedly limited military value may not be sacr1f1cod under Soviet pressure Fz om a stratogio-military point of v tev Korea ia • Uabilit y and sou Berlin In thue end otber instancea whJ ch could ba· cited tbe US posit ion la not based upon a bigb priority mil itfty juetWcation _1-Jhile the aaa1og1es are by no mean• a zact tbi • will oot preclude doubcs f1m bet raised in ·· the minds of our A111d 1n aucb tal Ces •• those identified We can not lose sight tbe fact that almost all of our Allies the Tu ka Gnd Itl-11ana included• have been blatantly C'hreatened - 7 - by the ussn for harboring us cJ rrcscive bases -- tbrc Jt wbict1 in every ca le have been tur11ed as de t e could not e - pcct such sta as in tbo future if the US pressas for rcmov l of the Jupiters soon after a Soviet tlirci t directed azainGt tho us • llsa uc cannot c pect future ace concessions of security instnllationG if they aro required e g fr0 it Spain if -r position sac is equivocal C onclusion Toe foregoing c nsiderations cueecst t t for political nd psychological reasons tr portcd by less si£ nificant but real m fl1t ary reasons as l it t-1ould not be in the U 3 interest to propose the rc nov 11 of 'l'urkisb end ItalLOn mm- •·s in tbe 1m r iate future - As core modem and effectivo veapons systems multilateral or otber m Lcsile forco is brought into e d stence and aa tbo CUban m1asi1o 1ais recGdea tbe plissin$ out of the 1 irld sb eel It alum m1ssiles would at a later time be entirely -- feasibla G l ise vl 11 9 -62 ta Carthoff •