Date

Nov 9, 1962

Description

Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his general counsel, John McNaughton, to take the lead). Nevertheless, Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or to at least postpone their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it, and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

Source

Declassified Documents Reference Service (original from John F. Kennedy Presidential Library)

Document published in following posting(s):

The Jupiter Missiles and the Endgame of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 60 Years Ago

Feb 16, 2023

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler to Secretary Rusk, “Turkish and Italian IRBMs,” 9 November 1962, with Rusk Memorandum to the President attached, “Political and Military Considerations Bearing on Turkish and Italian IRBM’s,” Top Secret