MORI DocID 1108245 AP PROVED • FOR RE LEASE ·· PATE UN £004 · 1 i 3 • - ·- - ·· ·· ' · · ' · · CONFIDENT THE DIRECTOR OF • QNTRAL INTELLIGENCE - Deputy Director for Nationol Foreign Assessment 2 i A fft e 80 NOTE FOR The Honorable Ralph Earle II Director US Arms Control and Disarmame Agency SJ - - - The Interagency Intelligence Memorandum nThe 22 September 1979 Event attached was prepared in response to a request of the NSC Its conclusions rest largely on circl JllStantia 1 evidence_and o th assumption that there was a nuc1ear explosion on 22 Sept ember 1979 - C c GXBLtce_ JLe Attachment NI IIM 79-10028 I ZCV A Jan c - au CONFIDENTIAL ······•• '• ' · ····-· • - · • - • - i3 9 -t 1s•i i i Ft i 1 k J sYK · · - · - •· I · •• MORI DocID 11082 46 I •'- i Director of Central Intelligence b 1 b 3 • • • Se t I APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE JUN 2004 JAN 2 5 1980 MORI DocID 1108246 - 4 « ' ' · •·· ·' i •I Warning Notice '-----------'l NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subjed to Criminal Sanctions DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS NOFORN- NOCONTRACT- • PROPtN- · NFIBONLYORCON- REL ••- Not Refeasoble to Foreign Natiom ls Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor Consultants Caution-Proprietary Information fnYOlved NFIB Deportments Only Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator Thi lnforina1ion Has Been Authorized for Release to ••• I • i t- I -- -· 1- 'I' •' - · - ·- J ' fr £ • ofiche copy of thil document is available printed copies from receipt eports in either miqofkhe or printed form can also be arranged through l I I 7R I I i # f I' ·· I' I' · - MORI DocID 1108246 ' - THE 22 SEPTEMBER 1979 EVENT Information available as of December 1979 was used in the prt paration of tlds memorAndum • · ·i • - - - · · · · ·-- MORI DocID 1108246 FOREWORD l On the basis of avaiJabJe information we cannot determine with certainty the nature and origin of the event on 22 September 1979 The conclusions reached in this memorandum rest largely on circumstantial evidence and on the assumption that there was a nuclear explosion ' I I This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation in response to a National Security Council request It was coordinated at the working level with NFIB repre se tatives in the lnteragency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear roliferation I -· • I MORI DocID 1108246 · ' EY JU DG ENTS • - - t ' - ·r1• •• MORI DocID 1108246 DISCUSSION 1 As requested by the National Security Council this assessment is based on the assumption that the event detected over a Portion of the southern hemisphere see map on page 12 by optical ·sensors on a Vela satellite at about 0100 GMT on 22 September 1979 was a nuclear explosion Given the assumption that a nuclear explosion occurred the purpo_se of th is• paper is to estimate what countries ·ma blve been I iespp Wbl f r volved in the eventj 2 Technical information and analyses suggest that - An explosion was produced by a nuclear device detonated in the atmosphere near the earth's surface - It had a yield equivalent to less than 3 ·kilotons - Jt took place within a broad area primarily _ oceans that was generally clo dy • 8 Various types of nuclear devices could have yielded the equivalent of less than S kilotons of high explosive Such yields could have been obtained either by careful design of a weapon with that yield through intentionaJ reduction of yield of a higher yield device I I or by partial failure of a higher yield device Jn practical terms the testing· of a nuclear device at sea would not have needed to JnvoJve more than two or three ships or aircraft including several dozen crewmen and technicians £quipx ed with appropriate diagnostic instruments they could have set up the test within a few hours detonated the device obtained nuclear-weaJ On states such as West Germany have possessed both the materials and the technicaJ expertise none of them however has had an incentive on balance to deve op nuclear weaJJOns much less to test a device Other states that might have nuclear ambitions-such as Brazil Argentina and Iraq-aim certainly lacked the fissile material and nonfi ile components required to fabric ate and test ·nuclear· China has explosive devi Neither Fraatie agreed to refrain from testing in the atmosphere but they have recently had no lm6wn tech ical or political motivation to test clandestinely in the ·southern Indian -n·o or Atlantic Ocean 'The Soviet Union ouid 'iia d to assume inordinate political rlsb in 'its · elations with · the·Unitecl States t have'mnd cted a 'c6vett uclear explosion' in violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty LT T for· any ·pumose __J 5 The Defense Intelligence Agency believes however that if an atmospheric test were in the technical interest of the USSR an anonymous test near an unwitting proxy state such as South Africa could have provided an attractive evasion method The Depart- ment of Energy believes that while the Soviets have had the capabJlity to t t clandestinely they have recently had no technical reason or motivation to do so The Department further speculates that such a test could have been seen as serving Soviet J OliticaJ inter ests by disrupting peace efforts and further polarizing m erate elements in southern Africa I I 6 An unintended firing and near-surface detonarequired data within minutes after the exp osio and tion of a nuclear weapon during a military exercise dispersed thin another few houn j could also have produced the signals that were de4 In addition to the five countries that are actected 1 The multiple safety measures that would have lcnowJedged nuclear weapon states we believe that had to be negated however and the absence of any there are five other states that have in the 1970s known weape ns carriers in the area on 22 September designed devices suitab e for nuclear testing Of these would have made such an event quite unlikely The we believe that only Israel India and South Africa explosion of a nuclear weapon aboard a weaJ Ons have recently had the fissile material as well as the carrier would have been even less likely because the other coinoonents needed to fabricate nuclear explo- yield of an' accidental detonation almost certainly sive devices In contrast Pakistan and Taiwan have would not have been sufficient to produce the deprobably Jadce suffJcient fissile material for even a tected signals Moreover no nuclear wea1 ns carriers single nuclear explosive device Several advanced nonare known to have been missing and no associated I 1 See pap J3 for an assessment by the Joint Atomic Energy lntellismce Committee of all teehnical information received and analyse$ performed to date C J 1 The c oaibilitv raised in public spec11Jations that a re»clor accident might have cauied the sipals that were detected c in c omr lete y ruled out on technical pounds CJ MORI DocID 1108246 • I foreign respect for South Africa's mjlitary strength in search-and-rescue operations have been noted Finally it is very unlikely that any known subnational enUtr could have conducted a nuclear explosion or would have been motivated to do so i So the foUowin assessment considers the capabilities and motivations of only those five · non-nuclear-w pon states·• that might have attempted to test secretly in a remote aJI Ji keJihood would have resonated wJth Prime Mfoister Botha and other South A frican officials Botha had overseen a substantial buildup of South Africa ·s defense for in the late 1960s and 1970s following a decision in the early 1960s to achieve self-sufficiency in arms Because of his personal convictions as well as his official responsibilities he has advocated more than any other Cabinet officer the military coml O1979 nents of South Africa·s strategy for coping with posA Secret Test by' South Africa $ible external threats He has regarded the West as - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - unwilling to support South Africa against foreign threats that he has perceived to be growing Moreover he has probably srmpathized- ith views that nuclear weapons might ultimateJy be needed Howeverp he ocean area of the southern hemisphere during Seotem- ber - I _ ___ probably has not foreseen any imminent military reauirement for nuclear weapons or any political advantages to disclosing particular elements of South Africa's nuclear weapons capabilities at this time Nevertheless he ay have been persu ed-that undeclared but undenieci nuclear weapons would have an important psychological d terrent effect· ·that South Africa- could better a hieve t iough testi - ' I ftAi f 4 o IU _ li7J I 1 11 - • ua nc a _ _ _ • suspended preparations to test Strong US pressure and other international reactions appeared to have deflected South Africa at least tem1 0rarily from testing The setback probably compelled Vorster and the key officials in the nuclear weapons program to review their whole approach toward weapons development and testing Statements made by the Vorster covernment at that time did not permanently foreclose future options for testing Rather than completely stODJ ing their weapons program the South Africans could then have decided to prepare for a future nuclear test more securely In any case riuclear testipg was almost certainly not feasible until late 1978 at the earliest when sufficient quantities of highly enriched uranium could have been expected to become available In short the Vorster administration may weJI have deferred any decisions on whether or when to test j 11 If P W Botha had decided jn favor of a nuclear test he would have evaluated alternative options for conducting it in terms of their eXJ eCted effectiveness risks and costs To minimize adverse foreign reactions he wouJd have had to assess both the chances and the conseo uences of discovery While an atmospheric test over unfreQuented JntemationaJ waters presumably would have been seen to entail some risk of being 0 found in violation of the Limit T 8ap Treatyt to 9 BotAa't Polici Arguments that nuclear testing which South Africa a P •rty it also would have could make an important contribution to technical offered a relatively quick safe and easy way for South confidenc in and to the extent it was disclosed African weapon s esigners to prove a nuclear device without creating unambiguous evidence that South • See SNIE 6-78 Llktlihood of Attempted ACQidrUfon of Nuclear w van or Materials 1 v Foref n Tenoriit Groups for u e Again Africa was responsible for a ri clear exp cwon In · the Vnlllll s1a1n ially the section on °'Acqulsltion and contrast 'an atmospheric or underground test in South Exploitotion of Nuclear Wcaa ons·· 12 December 19781 _ _ _ _jAfrica probably would have entailed hig r risks of js 6 se 1er MORI DocID 1108246 ET S prior detection and ultimate proof by foreign _intelli- · 1ence because it 1 robab y would have required sit«f-' preparations and left tangible indications of a nucJe r exp osio Botha's security advisers might have warned hiin that• if South Africa were discovered to ha ie violated the LTBT it might suffer more· serious sanctions than if it tested underground On the other hand they wo ld have raised the possibility of another · international uproar and more serious threats underground test preparations were detected nd the·· likelihood of more serious sanctions if South Africa· u· new proceeded to test under such ·circumstances ' Thus - · Botha probably would have decided to minimize the risks of · prior detection and certain attribution by · testing secretly at sea rather than within South Afri I f- j I 12 As· Defense Minister since 1966 P W Botha very Jikely supported the development of a nuclear weapons program including military preparations for nuclear t tinii As Prime Minister Botha has retained the Defense portfolio and has continued to keep closer counsel with senior military officers than with other gover-nment officials We have no specific evidence · that senior miJitary officers perceive any imminent or an even tu all im rtant role for nuclear wea • ' •• t •I•••• • - ·• MORI DocID 1108246 18 In September 1979 some si ecial security mea$ures were put into effect which indicate that certain elements of the South African Navy ere exercising or on alert on 22 September The harbor and nav af base at Simonstown were decLued in· a public announcement on 23 ·August to be· off limits for the period 17-23 September The US defense attache gathered from several reliable sources that harbor defense exercises took place there during this period 5 Athough such a closure might not be reQuired f r a nuclear test at 1ea it could have screened sensitive loading or unloading operations as well as ship movements Also · the Saldanha naval facility which includes a n val search-and rescue on alert unit was suddenly placed - for the period 21-23 Septemlier The alert was nqC publicly annou explanation for it was gjVf D p nava personnel and no activity was observed in bi around the Porl While the Salcfanha naval alert appears unusual we are unable to state with nfidence whether such an alert has ever hapoened J e gre Furthermore at the same time Gener I Malan Chief of South Africa s Defense Force was re • t t 4 6 i 1 ' •91 • •• ·--·- i • '- -- · _ _'v- rted to be touririir South America hen he migh have been expected to be in South Aftjca or at the test observation point during such an imtx rtant even I D I 19 Prime Minister Botha has avoided public com• ment on the i ue since the US disclosure of the Vela indications However on 25 September-three days after the nuclear event-he told a provincial congress of the ruling National Party that South Africa •s enemies ·might· find out we have military w eapons they do not know about •· His enigmatic· remark prompted speculation in the South African press that he had undeclared nuclear weapons in mind I 20 On 24 October-before the VS disclosures of the technical indications o f a test-the Prime Minister addressing an anniversary dinner attended by past and present members of the AEB as well as members of the local diplomatic corps reDOrtedly paid tribute to the South African nuclear scientists who had been eniaged secret work of a strategic natqre He reportedly said that for security reasons their names could not be mentioned and that they would never in gain the recognition in South Mrlca or abroad that they deserved •• • 'i J 21 South African Re 1Ponte• to Nuclear Te•I · Allegation South African official commentary since the United States disclosed the Vela indications of a nuclear event have been consistent with Pretoria s longstanding practice of cloaking its nuclear intentions in ambiguity-intimating a weapons capability without saying anything that would prove a case for tightening international sanct ons against South Africa I I 22 Only one officla has categoric Hy denied South Africa·s·-· invoivement On 26 October immediately following the annoti cement in Washington of the Vela indications Jacobus de· Villiers President of South Africa•s Atomi Energy ac rd told the press there was anything of the sort my first reaction would be that some other Power might have undertaken a test 1 but ft was definitely not Soutp Africa De Villiers who had been directly involved in·weapons design work at the PeJindaba nuclear research ter before his promotion to President of the AEB in July 1979 a most certainly would be witting if South Africa had conducted a test explosion-and preOAred to parry press -queries If such a test were detected On 6 November De Villiers issued a re1 0rt of periodic atmospheric samplings that had been conducted by •·n the AEB the report concluded It is considered most unlikely that an atmospheric nuclear test has recently been conducted in this region ' I I 2S On 25 October the Commander of the South African Navy made allegations we believe to be fahe - - - - •The US defense altache s report played down the si nificance of' the Simonslown clos noting that it was a regular practice linked to internal defense I · ·• · MORI DocID 1108246 s that a Soviet nuclear submarine had been in the vicinity of the Cape in late September implicitly denying that the South African Navy was involved in a nuclear test conducted at sea j I I lBevond this the Israelis might· have conceivably torbeen needs for more advanced · · weaPons such low yielci uclear weapons that' could ·i be used on the battlefield Or they might have considered desirable a small tactical uclear warhead for lsrael•s short-range Lance surface-to-sudace missiles • ·· Israeli strategists midit even have been interested in developing the fission ti iuer for a thermonuclewweapon If they were to have developed reliable nuclear devices for any of these weapons without a to tested desi moreover Israeli nucl r · weapons de$igners would probably have wa ted to t · prototypes A low-yield nuclear test conducted clan destinely at sea could' have enal led them to make baste measurements of the J evice s performance L ·as 24 Foreign Minister Roelof Botha's public statements have been especially ambi1t1ous For instance on 2 5 October he ridiculed $peculation that South Africa had conducted a nuclear explosion but also declined under questioning to say unequivocally that South Africa had not done so and that it did not ·intend to acquire nuclear weapons On 6 November the Foreign Minister in a discourse on South Africa's foreign J OIJcy presented to all the foreign ambassadors in Pretoria said he was dismayed by allegations in the UN General Assembly that South Africa had violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty and distributed the AEB 27 However Israeli authorities could not hav report on atmospheric samplings as evidence to the ignored· inevitable security risks The dangers of being contrary But he did not take the opportunity to deny that South Africa had a nuclear weapons program O discovered would have PoSed for them serious liabilities particularly a adverse US reaction ·which could £· damage the special relationshio between Tel Aviv a td A Secret T t ii eL_' Washington The Israelis a1so would have had lo · a e a nt of possible Soviet reactiQns in9luding steppedup military assistance to Arab states the likelihood of serious damage to the peace treaty with Egypt and an erosion of suop0rt among traditionally friendly West European states The Department of Energy believes that for Israel to explode a device off South Africa•s shore and allow South Africa to take the blame is not consistent with Israei s J O icy or attitude toward Pretoria j 1 D by I 28 In short Israel may well have 1'a d requirements to test that have been in conflict with Us basic policy of avoiding any overt demonstration of a nuclear capability We believe this Policy has been very important to Israel and we doubt that its incentives to test would have been sufficient to overcome its disincentives as long as the leadership oerc eived any substantial probability of unambiguous attribution to Israel However this· consideration would not have ruled out the pcmibility of a clandestine test conducted in a remote ocean area Indeed of all the countries which mi ht have been responsible for the 22 Septem• her event Israel would probably have been the only one for which a clandestine approach would have been virtually its only option I - -· · ····· l MORI DocID 1108246 - A Secret Test by South Africa and Israel 29 1f the South Africans had considered testing ·· • Israeli designs in exchange for Israeli technical assistance the benefits of cooperation would have been carefully weighed by both parties against the security risks inherent in such joint operations On the one hand the Israelis would have calculated that South Africa as a pariah state in need of reliable frjends would have had every reason to preserve security and to remain silent in the face of inevitable speculation about its complicity with Tel AtJiv The Israelis also could have counted as a high probability that responsi- bility for any nuclear test in the area under investigation would· be attributed to South Africa On the other band unless the Israelis had offered advanced weapons technology South African weaPons developers would probably have preferred to test their own design before incurring security ris'ks in testing a foreign design The Defense Intelligence Agency believes that South Africa would probab y have had enough confidence in Israeli security to consider conducting a joint test j so lsraelis have not only participated Jn certain South African nuclear research activities over the a st few years but they have also offered and transferred various sorts of advanced nonnuclear weapons technology to South Afriea So clandestine arranriements between South Africa and Israel for ioint testing operations might have negotiable I ·· ·- -- • • •• - • I• • • i - MORI DocID 1108246 t ·• risks of detection attribution and sanctions by foreign powers I 39 Th _e_B_u_r-ea_ u of lnteJligence and Research Department of Sfate believes that while South Africa is in all probability embarked on a nuclear weapons 1 rogram has by this time acquired sufficient fissile material for the fabrication of several nuclear devices and may be willing to take th risk$ of testing eventually there are sufficient political m tivations to deter the Botha ic veininent' from undue provocation· international criticism· at tJtis thne The arguments · which the United States and other Western powers advanced to deter South Africa from proceeding with construction operations at the -Kalahari site are still · · valid unless South Africa il willing to re1inquish a c andestme as well as overt' uclear weapons option its access to Western technology and uranium enrichment services might be termfnated · 1 ___ __ 40 State lNR differs particularly with the premise that Prime Minister Botha s government has been more ready than its predecessors to develop nuclear weapons It points out that all South African governments have sought this option but that until recently South Africa lacked the relevant technology and fissUe material Even now the political -constraints wouJd outweigh technical incentives' in Soilth Africa s calcu- lations 'a ad therefore· it is -unlikelv that South Africa · elected to test a nuclear device Tlie ambiguity that t surrounds· South Africa s nucl situation ·has provided it with-·s bstantiall the sa e benefits-without the opprobrium-as ff it had i fact tested El ven serves South Africa best at this Juncture and is in line with its previous behavior-neither to confirm nor to deny allegations about its nuclear-weapons related ac tivities j l •1 In sum State lNR finds the arguments ·that South Africa conducted a· nuclear· test on 22 September inconclusive even though if a nuclear e plosion - urred oii that date South Africa is the most likely candidate for responsibility I sea 38 The purposes in conducting a test at under cover of clouds and darkness would have n to maximize pretest security and to reduce the presumed I 42 The Defense Intelligence Agency believes that the avaiJable evJdence is Jnsufficient to estJmate how top South African officials have balanced the incentives and disincentives regarding a nuclear test I ___ __ -- s S - -• ' - MORI DocID 1108246 - 12 s MORI DocID 1108246 J I 13 - s •