
Виртуальный Читальный Зал

This summary included several intercepted messages from Sato, who conveyed his despair and exasperation over what he saw as Tokyo’s inability to develop terms for ending the war: “[I]f the Government and the Military dilly-dally in bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes.” Sato remained skeptical that the Soviets would have any interest in discussions with Tokyo: “it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Three Power Proclamation and then engage in conversations with our special envoy.”
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, Files no. 5b and 5e (copies from microfilm)
RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 20, Envelope G Tinian Files, Top Secret
RMI Nuclear Justice Documents
RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6
Nuclear History Collection, box 97
RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6
RG 59, Subject Numeric Files, 1967-1969, BG Moscow 13
Nuclear History Collection, box 97
Nuclear History Collection, box 97
RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1967-1969, DEF 12-1 CHINAT
RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1967-1969, box 2460, POL 19 RYU IS
Drosnin FOIA, DOD Reading Room
Digital National Security Archive by ProQuest.
RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6
RPNL, NSF, box 123, Vietnam - Operation Pruning Knife [2 of 2]