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“Magic” – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1228 – August 5, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source

This summary included several intercepted messages from Sato, who conveyed his despair and exasperation over what he saw as Tokyo’s inability to develop terms for ending the war: “[I]f the Government and the Military dilly-dally in bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes.” Sato remained skeptical that the Soviets would have any interest in discussions with Tokyo: “it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Three Power Proclamation and then engage in conversations with our special envoy.”

02b
1942-12-16
Source

Bush-Conant papers, S-1 Historical File, Reports to and Conferences with the President (1942-1944)

19_1
1977-04-06
Source

The Mission reported that a “large majority” of NATO political advisers accepted August 31 as a “target date for completion” of the MC study. The U.S. and Norwegian representatives “expressed reservations about [the] desirability of such an early date.” The “draft mandate has been forwarded to North Atlantic Council for final approval under silence procedure, by April 13.”

Doc 15 EBB 861
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Zbigniew Brezinski, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 18 October 1977, Top Secret
Source

President Carter’s dissatisfaction with the number of people on the line during the Ivory Item exercise is reflected in this directive from Brzezinski ordering that “unnecessary people” be excluded from the next simulation. He also asked that “standby communication” lines be made available with one being secure and the other open. Brzezinski also wanted to review with Brown the “new SIOP instructions format” before it went to the President.

Page 468 of 67313455 document(s) found