Tracking the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

The “Friends of the NPT” was an informal, Vienna-based group consisting of the heads of IAEA missions of NPT signatories who met periodically to share and coordinate their thinking. Believing that the group could play an important role in shaping the 1995 extension conference, the State Department provided the U.S. mission with talking points about the importance of securing the Treaty’s indefinite extension. That would be the “principle purpose” of the 1995 conference “not tied to or dependent on any other action the conference might take.”

At this meeting of “Friends of the NPT,” the participants agreed that indefinite extension of the Treaty was the preferred outcome of the 1995 meeting and that this should be the “primary goal.” They mainly discussed procedural issues, for example, when the Australian representative noted that the United Nations General Assembly would have to consider a resolution concerning preparations for the 1995 meeting, the British representative, Ambassador Clark stated that his government would present a resolution and collect the “widest possible number of cosponsors.” The participants also agreed that there should be three Preparatory Committee meetings prior to the 1995 conference and that the first one should consider “substantive” not procedural issues given that the chief subject was the Treaty’s extension.

Concerning conference “office holders,” there also was agreement on the relevance of “past practices regarding geographic distribution.” On the conference president, no one dissented when the Australians declared that it should be “a person of ‘substance,’ with the capability of intervening effectively at critical junctures of the discussions.”

Periodically, the three Treaty-recognized nuclear weapons states, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States, where the signed treaties were deposited, met to discuss current NPT issues. For the mid-July meeting, to be held in Moscow, the State Department sent detailed talking points concerning the 1995 extension conference. The international situation made the NPT’s indefinite extension feasible because the Cold War had ended along with the superpower arms race, France and China had signed the Treaty, long-standing “holdouts” (Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa) had signed the Treaty, and the IAEA was taking steps to strengthen safeguards. While there were problems that might complicate indefinite extension, e.g., the status of Israel, the United States believed it was a feasible undertaking. Nevertheless, thorough preparations were essential, including the drafting of a U.N. General Assembly resolution, the convening of a Preparatory Committee (PREPCOM), the organization and management of the extension conference itself, and consideration of extension options and why indefinite extension was the best choice, among other issues.

On possibilities for the conference’s president and secretary general, the U.S. was interested in someone like the Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekéus for president and the UN official Prvoslav Davinic (former Yugoslavia) for secretary-general. The State Department had heard that Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) was “lobbying for the position.”

According to this reporting telegram, on 13-14 July the depository representatives had a “friendly, frank, and constructive” discussion. They agreed that the “desired outcome” was indefinite extension and that “every effort” should be made to assure a “strong majority” in favor of that outcome.” They agreed that a venue in New York City “might facilitate that” outcome. It was also necessary to “identify early on those states party that would constitute the necessary majority for the extension decision.”

Also discussed were the schedule of PREPCOMs, NPT safeguards, peaceful nuclear cooperation, disarmament, and a U.N. General Assembly resolution (which the British volunteered to submit), among other issues. With respect to the problem of nuclear cooperation, Russian delegate Boris Mayorski predicted “serious criticism” of export controls from non-aligned states and that it would be necessary to explain how the controls contribute to nonproliferation. On disarmament, the participants agreed that recent U.S.-Russian strategic forces cuts would have a positive impact on the 1995 discussions but suspected that there might be attempts to focus on the “willingness of the nuclear weapon states to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.”

On the 1995 conference itself, they agreed that the outcome of the NPT review should not be linked to an extension decision: “it was crucial that there be a clear majority for an acceptable extension outcome at the onset of the conference.” Excised from this version of the telegram was the discussion of conference management, which probably focused on particular candidates for the top positions of president and secretary-general.

British diplomats had provided two papers on NPT extension and the State Department responded with generally appreciative comments that, for the most part, were not detailed enough to give a sense of their specific contents. On one point, however, the U.S. dissented from the British position that the NPT “terminates if the extension conference fails.” The Treaty gave no authority to the extension conference to terminate it but only to extend it indefinitely or for a fixed period of time. Even if the conference agreed on a very short extension for the Treaty it would remain in force for that period of time after the conference.

During this dinner, the Americans, British, and Russians briefed the Chinese and the French on the plans for the 1995 extension conference. French views are reported in a separate document not yet available to the editor, but Burk provided detail on the dialogue with the Chinese. Russian Federation representative Boris Mayorski “pressed” the Chinese to support indefinite extension but they responded in an “obviously irritated fashion” that indefinite extension would be “tantamount to continued maintenance of discrimination between the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states.” To attract the threshold states, it would be necessary to amend the NPT, but ACDA official Norman Wulf argued that any attempt to amend the Treaty would “seriously risk its unraveling.” Burk commented that the Chinese would be hard to persuade on indefinite extension if it pitted them against “most developing countries.”

According to U.S. Representative to the United Nations Edward Perkins, the “Western Group” had “substantive and constructive” discussion of preparations for the NPT extension conference. On the disarmament/Article VI issue, one concern was that developing countries will “move the goal posts” – the Comprehensive Test Ban might not be an issue in 1995 and there might be a move to ask the nuclear weapons states to “commit by a date certain to move to zero nuclear weapons.” British Ambassador Brian Donnelly observed that there may be more discussion of “access to and supply of nuclear technology.” Since the NPT was negotiated in 1968, thinking about “peaceful uses of nuclear energy” had changed with the emergence of nuclear supplier regimes. The French representative, Gerard Errera, agreed that “the bargain of 1968 is no longer there” because “nuclear commerce had not developed the way states thought it would.”

On the conference venue, the U.S. representative, ACDA Assistant Director Bradley Gordon, said he was “not advocating” New York but the “prospects for participation by a larger number of parties seemed better for New York which could be useful if we had lined up a sizable majority in favor of an acceptable extension decision.” He also noted that the nonaligned states had called for one of their own to be conference president and that the names of Jayantha Dhanapala and Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas were circulating, but the “rule of geographic rotation” should apply and it was Eastern Europe’s turn to provide a president for the meeting.

A new administration is in power. To help the U.S. delegation prepare for the 25 February depositories meeting, the State Department sent instructions. Topics covered were the PREPCOMs for the 1995 extension conference and the conference itself. On the prospects for indefinite extension, sentiment among the Eastern and Western European parties to the NPT is favorable but most of the nonaligned states are “unwilling … to commit themselves to a specific outcome,” except for Mexico, which supported a 10-15-year extension. Otherwise, no party “has completely rejected indefinite extension as an outcome.” It is “premature” to attempt to negotiate alternatives to indefinite extension but the U.S. will “explore with the other depositories the range of legally and politically acceptable outcomes.” Of the NPT articles, the U.S. “expects compliance with Article VI again to be a major preoccupation of many states,” with significant pressure on the nuclear weapons states to make progress toward a comprehensive test ban, “binding positive and negative security assurances,” a fissile material production cut-off, and cuts in nuclear forces. Washington will be looking into all of those issues as part of a policy review by the Clinton administration.

The depository states continued their discussions of the 1995 extension conference and plans for the first PREPCOM. Brian Donnelly, the British representative who chaired the meeting, stated that prospects for indefinite extension were growing in light of EC, NATO, and Group of 7 endorsement. Noting the Organization of African Unity’s interest in a nuclear free zone, one of the U.S. representatives suggested that if the juridical basis for the zone was the NPT, that would “provide an opportunity to promote indefinite extension.” All agreed that there should be no sign that the depositories “were not completely determined” to secure indefinite extension.

On the conference presidency, Russian representative Sergei Kislyak stated that the Polish government was willing to put someone forward. Michael Rosenthal, who led the U.S. delegation, rejoined that the U.S. was willing to support a Polish candidate, but that Warsaw needed to identify someone for the position “as soon as possible.” Once that was done, the Poles needed to develop Eastern European support. Dhanapala’s name was mentioned; future declassifications will likely shed more light on the selection process.

In the months before the conference, CIA analysts were not sure what direction it would take. With no consensus for indefinite extension, a simple majority vote was achievable but so was another outcome: a 25-year extension. A “slim” majority vote was far from desirable because it could “undermine international confidence” in the NPT whose signatories numbered 178.

Complicating matters were “longstanding and widespread grievances” that the nuclear weapons states had failed to meet their disarmament obligations under NPT Article VI along with doubts that the Treaty could meet the security needs of non-nuclear weapon states and concern about the “NPT's unsatisfactory mechanism for ensuring compliance.” Another sign of trouble in securing indefinite extension was a document prepared by the 95-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) spelling out a number of grievances, including the world community’s failure to provide universal adherence to the NPT (prominently the Israeli case) and the discriminatory export control and nuclear technical assistance practices of the nuclear suppliers.

An analysis of the prospective vote count indicated core support by 60 countries for indefinite extension, with another 40 to 45 countries leaning in that direction, but whose positions were “highly fluid,” while some 25 countries either opposed or leaned against indefinite extension. The position of another 35 or so countries was unknown. Complicating matters was the “perceived backsliding” by certain countries, whose identity has been withheld from the CIA release.

With all the uncertainties, getting a majority vote would require a “high-level diplomatic effort” by the United States and its allies, and doing even better, a two-thirds majority, would require progress on the arms control and regional security issues that concern the non-nuclear weapons states. That, however, would be difficult, for example, the comprehensive test ban treaty would not be ready for ratification for another year. The report includes an inset outlining the problems involved in reaching final agreement on the CTB.

A few weeks before the Review and Extension Conference began on 17 April 1995, the Western Group had the support of 92 members, giving indefinite extension a clear majority. The majority of the support came from the members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (NATO, Western and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Republics) with “pockets” of support among NAM member. Nevertheless, opposition by the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab League created the “risk of a bandwagon emerging at the Conference against indefinite extension.” Toward that end, NAM members were trying to influence countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. In the latter, for example, “troublemakers” such as Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador supported limited term extension because of the poor record by the nuclear weapons states on Article VI.

Other variables that could influence the outcome included “longstanding linkage issues,” such as that of nuclear disarmament or the CTB to the conference’s outcome, conference procedure, and the personalities of delegates. On the linkage problem, to keep majority support for indefinite extension, the U.S. may have to convince NPT parties of its “good faith” in making progress on disarmament so that they have “political cover” for supporting Washington. Another uncertainty was the position of Conference president Dhanapala, who had “pledged neutrality,” in view of recent comments by a senior Sri Lankan diplomat opposing indefinite extension. In fact, according to the recent NPIHP study, Dhanapala favored the latter but only if a consensus could be established; otherwise he supported a 25-year extension.

The CIA withheld the last 3 or 4 pages of this report in their entirety; they include the “matrix of estimated country positions” mentioned on the first page. It is worth noting that the German government prepared a similar list, which has been declassified and is available on the Web site of the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.