NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard

This document is important for describing the clear message in 1991 from the highest levels of NATO – Secretary General Manfred Woerner – that NATO expansion was not happening. The audience was a Russian Supreme Soviet delegation, which in this memo was reporting back to Boris Yeltsin (who in June 1991 had been elected president of the Russian republic, largest in the Soviet Union), but no doubt Gorbachev and his aides were hearing the same assurance at that time. The emerging Russian (as opposed to Soviet) security establishment was already worried about the possibility of NATO expansion, so in June 1991 this delegation visited Brussels to meet NATO’s leadership, hear their views about the future of NATO, and share Russian concerns.

Woerner had given a well-regarded speech in Brussels in May 1990 in which he argued: “The principal task of the next decade will be to build a new European security structure, to include the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. The Soviet Union will have an important role to play in the construction of such a system. If you consider the current predicament of the Soviet Union, which has practically no allies left, then you can understand its justified wish not to be forced out of Europe.” Now in mid-1991, Woerner responds to the Russians by stating that he personally and the NATO Council are both against expansion—“13 out of 16 NATO members share this point of view”—and that he will speak against Poland’s and Romania’s membership in NATO to those countries’ leaders as he has already done with leaders of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Woerner emphasizes that “We should not allow […] the isolation of the USSR from the European community.” The Russian delegation warns that any strengthening or expanding of NATO could “seriously slow down democratic transformations” in Russia, and calls on their NATO interlocutors to decrease the military functions of the alliance.

This memo on the Woerner conversation was written by three prominent reformers and close allies of Yeltsin—Sergey Stepashin (chairman of the Duma’s Security Committee and future deputy minister of security and prime minister), Gen. Konstantin Kobets (future chief military inspector of Russia after he was the highest-ranking Soviet military officer to support Yeltsin during the August 1991 coup), and Gen. Dmitry Volkogonov (Yeltsin’s adviser on defense and security issues, future head of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW-MIA, and prominent military historian).

This document speaks to how much had changed from 1991 to 1993 – not only the end of the Soviet Union, but also the replacement of the Bush 41 administration with the new Clinton appointees. Relatively few Clintonites at this point apparently favored NATO expansion, but they were highly placed, such as National Security Adviser Anthony Lake (who would try to define Clinton foreign policy as “democratic enlargement”) and Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs Lynn Davis.

This memo for Secretary of State Warren Christopher from Davis and her co-author at State’s Policy Planning shop, Stephen Flanagan, provides a detailed look at the “fast-tracker” point of view inside the Clinton administration as of early September 1993. The memo includes a specific calendar for expansion of NATO and groups of countries to be admitted, with the 2005 group even listing Russia and Ukraine. Flanagan, a Bush 41 veteran who stayed on into the Clinton administration, had already published a journal essay in 1992 floating NATO expansion ideas. Here, Davis and Flanagan argue for urgency in transforming and expanding NATO, so as to buttress “Western-oriented reformers in central and eastern Europe.” Interestingly, they say: “The challenge for NATO over the next generation – containing and coopting Russian power – is similar to one of NATO’s core purposes in the last generation – integrating Germany as a responsible leader of the trans-Atlantic community.”

According to James Goldgeier’s account in Not Whether But When, Central and East European leaders had pressed President Clinton on NATO membership as early as April 1993 at a Holocaust Museum event in Washington, but U.S. policy development really began that summer after Secretary Christopher announced there would be a NATO summit in January 1994. Here, Davis and Flanagan are optimistic that NATO expansion could be done with “Russia’s OK too” given Yeltsin’s remarks in Warsaw about the Helsinki Final Act and nations choosing their own alliances. “Clearly, if Russia reverts to totalitarianism or otherwise emerges as a threat to states in the region, NATO might stop its expansion at phase III [Romania, Albania and the Baltics]” but “here again, this need not be seen as a threat to Moscow.” Need not, but likely would be.

Even before the Yeltsin letter arrived on September 15, 1993, the Defense Department was pushing back against the fast-trackers inside the Clinton administration. This briefing memorandum for Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff, from Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Stephen Oxman, gives a candid account of the internal Clinton administration debate over NATO expansion, and how the inter-agency process was “short-circuited” by the Defense Department, particularly Assistant Secretary for Regional Security Affairs Charles Freeman Jr., a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Oxman is writing to prepare Tarnoff for a deputies’ committee meeting that would include key Defense Department and National Security Council officials. Oxman reports that “OSD argued that consideration of NATO expansion had to date focused on the interests of the Central and East Europeans, rather than on USG interests.” Defense proposed instead that discussion focus on the “Peacekeeping Partnership” (later called Partnership for Peace once “peacekeeping” fell into disrepute after the Somalia debacle). So State’s goal should be a NATO Summit announcement of expansion “that also leaves the membership door open to Russia, Ukraine, and other[s].” Oxman writes, “Through Summit language on membership – and through intensive consultations with Russia and Ukraine – we will need to ensure that they perceive our approach to NATO as one that also serves their security interests and reinforces their sense of belonging in Europe.”

This letter is written soon after Yeltsin returns from Poland, where he agreed with President Lech Walesa that Poland had a right to join NATO, which was reflected in a communiqué and press conference on August 25.[13] There is some ambiguity as to the conditions under which Yeltsin made such a statement, but Walesa told U.S. officials later that he had written documents signed by Yeltsin that confirmed his words. According to Yeltsin, however, he only expressed “understanding” as part of reaffirming his commitment to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, which stipulated that every country was free to make choices regarding politico-military alliances. 

This Yeltsin letter to Clinton lays out Yeltsin’s strong stance against rapid expansion and his concern about NATO’s apparent path of geographical and numerical expansion rather than transformation into a political organization. Russian leaders, based on their understanding about the post-Cold War settlement in Europe, were eager to be integrated into a pan-European security system. The letter defines the Russian position clearly: “Security must be indivisible and must be based on pan-European security structure.” The letter cites the security assurances that the Russians thought they received during the negotiations on German unification: “the spirit of the treaty on the final settlement … precludes the option of expanding the NATO zone into the East.” Acknowledging legitimate security concerns of East Europeans, Yeltsin suggests that there are other options to satisfy their concerns short of joining NATO such as “official security guarantees to the East European states with an accent on ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and maintenance of peace in the region.”

Within three weeks of the deputies’ meeting (see Document 3), the principals would discuss NATO expansion, in preparation for Secretary of State Christopher’s trip to Europe and Moscow later that month. This October 5, 1993, briefing memorandum, written by Assistant Secretary Robert Gallucci and sent through Undersecretary Davis, defines the NATO expansion debate for Christopher as the main topic for his next-day lunch meeting with National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. Gallucci writes, “The primary difference is over whether NATO would commit at the January NATO summit to expansion, or simply hold out the vague possibility.” The former is State’s view, the latter Defense’s, and the difficulty of combining them would seemingly contribute to the tangled Christopher presentation to Yeltsin on October 22 (see Document 8).

This briefing memo cautions, “Opening up the possibility of NATO membership would represent a significant change, and will require an approach which will need to be seen to provide strong support for reform in Russia as well as in the Central and East European states.” This publication omits a 7-page section elaborating State’s views and a 3-page section on OSD’s position in favor of Tabs C and D on “Eastern and Allied Views” and “Managing the NATO Expansion Issue with the NIS.” Tab C describes Yeltsin’s “green light” in Warsaw and the subsequent pullback by Moscow, including Yeltsin’s letter (see Document 4) and its claim that the German reunification treaty “excludes by its meaning the possibility of expansion of the NATO zone to the East.”

The memo also analyzes Yeltsin’s opposition: “Yeltsin’s entire reformist platform is based on the assumption that Russia’s relations with the West have turned a corner and Cold War antagonisms have been put aside. If this assumption were called into question, NATO expansion could damage the foundation of Yeltsin’s policies.” On the Newly Independent States (NIS), the memo notes it is “important to find ways to bolster their sense of security, too, and prevent a perception among them that they have been excluded from the new European security architecture.” The final section of the NIS Tab recommends what would become the Christopher trip to Moscow, “an ideal opportunity to engage the Russians and others on this issue, and assure them that our initiative offers enhanced security for all.”

Chargé d’Affaires and future Ambassador to Russia James Collins sends Secretary Christopher a briefing cable in advance of his visit to Moscow where he is expected to meet with Yeltsin and Kozyrev. This is the first visit of any Western senior official to Moscow after Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Parliament and October confrontation with the hardline faction of the parliament that resulted in bloodshed in the center of Moscow. New elections are scheduled for December and Yeltsin needs all the support from the West he can get. Collins advises the secretary of state to be sensitive to Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s need for Russia to be seen domestically as a partner with whom the West consults and does not just take for granted, and he lists some controversial issues: NATO expansion, the post-Soviet space, and Ukraine.

On NATO, Collins notes that the Russians are aware that the U.S. internal debate is reaching a crucial moment about expansion and want to be assured that the door is open to Russia, not just to East Europeans. In Collins’ view, “what the Russians hope to hear from you is that NATO is not moving precipitously and that any policy NATO adopts will apply equally to them.” Their “neuralgic” attitude stems from the fear that they will “end up on the wrong side of a new division of Europe.” Therefore, Collins counsels Christopher to make sure the Russians know that the U.S. is actively promoting Russia’s "complete reintegration into the family of Western states.”

On his trip to Europe to explain the U.S. position on NATO expansion, Secretary Christopher comes to Moscow after meetings in Budapest. He and special ambassador Strobe Talbott meet with Foreign Minister Kozyrev and his deputy, Yuri Mamedov, before they visit Yeltsin at his country residence. In his memo about the Kozyrev meeting, Christopher is very brief about the NATO discussion. He tells Kozyrev that the U.S. is sensitive to the Russian position and has developed a new proposal as a result: the Partnership for Peace, which would be open to all countries on an equal basis. Kozyrev is concerned about any expansion, and he “asked pointedly, whether there would not be two or three new members now?” Christopher says “no” and only talks about an eventual new NATO membership as something that would happen in the distant future. The secretary tells Kozyrev that “he believed that this met Russia’s requirements.” Christopher does not directly address Kozyrev’s concern about the decision about the expansion, but, misleadingly, lets it sound as if PFP is the alternative for the time being.

Christopher is taken to Yeltsin’s country house, Zavidovo, for a meeting that lasts only 45 minutes.  Yeltsin has most likely already been briefed by Kozyrev about his conversation with the secretary of state and his assurance about PFP and not membership.  Christopher starts with strong praise for Yeltsin’s handling of the constitutional crisis with the Parliament, passing on “high appreciation” and emphasizing that Clinton is “extremely supportive” of his actions.  For most of the conversation they talk about the upcoming elections, which Yeltsin calls “the first free and fair election for the parliament since 1917,” and the Clinton visit to Moscow planned for January 1994. 

In the last part of the conversation, which appears somewhat rushed—Christopher repeats that he does not want to take up more of Yeltsin’s time—they turn to the most sensitive issue—the expansion of NATO.  Christopher tells Yeltsin that his letter on NATO expansion (see Document 4) “came at exactly the right time and it played a decisive role in President Clinton’s consideration.” As a result, according to Christopher, the decision has been made to press ahead with the Partnership for Peace, which would be open to all and without pushing some countries ahead of others.  Hearing this statement as a response to his concern about expansion, Yeltsin quickly asks Christopher to confirm his impression—“Yeltsin […] asked if he understood correctly that all countries in CEE and NIS would be on equal footing and there would be a partnership and not a membership.”  Christopher replies, “Yes that is the case, there would not even be an associate status.”  A relieved Yeltsin exclaims, “This is a brilliant idea, it is a stroke of genius.”  

Yeltsin talks enthusiastically about how this “brilliant stroke” solves all tensions between Russia and the Eastern European countries, how it ensures that Russia will not be a “second-class citizen” and will be an equal partner.  He asks to convey his gratitude to Clinton.  After this explosive approval, Christopher adds that the question of membership will “in due course” be considered as well, but “as a longer term eventuality.”  Christopher in his memoirs portrays Yeltsin in this meeting as unfocused and recovering from the stress of drinking, immediately interrupting him calling the PFP a “stroke of genius.”  In fact, the memcon shows that Yeltsin was keenly focused on the distinction and asked a pointed question to confirm his impression.  No wonder the Russians later found this conversation misleading and felt betrayed when Clinton said “not whether but when.”[14]

This report, issued by the SVR and presented publicly by Evgeny Primakov (then the SVR director and later foreign minister) shows the awareness of Russian intelligence services about active discussions in the Clinton administration concerning options for NATO expansion. The report points to the geostrategic, military, and psychological implications for Russian security. Psychologically, expanding NATO rather than building a new security system would prolong the existence of Cold War bloc thinking and mistrust. Geopolitically, Russian experts do not discern an intention on the U.S. side to build an institution for European security that would be adequate for a post-confrontation situation in Europe. How NATO transforms itself would be of crucial importance to Russia. And militarily, the fact that the largest grouping of military forces in the world would advance to within close proximity of Russian borders “requires a cardinal reconceptualization of all defense conceptions, reconfiguration of the armed forces, reconsideration of all military theaters (districts), deployment of additional infrastructures, re-deployments of large military contingents, changes in contingency plans and of the character of the military-educational preparations,” even though the report says it is understood that the alliance does not intend to launch a strike against Russia. Such reconceptualization would lead to a significant strain on the budget at a time when Russia is trying to reduce its armaments.

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin places the first phone call using the “Partnership line” to his Russian counterpart, Pavel Grachev. Aspin’s first question to Grachev is about Russian reactions to the upcoming NATO summit. Aspin states that “the main focus will be on NATO expansion since a number of countries were pushing for NATO membership.” He also affirms the Clinton administration’s support for the Partnership for Peace program. Grachev expresses his full support for PFP and opposition to NATO expansion. He says that although every country has the sovereign right to choose its political and military alliances, “Eastern Europe and the Baltics should not speculate about the mythical Russian threat.” In his opinion, “European security should be collective, not bloc-oriented, relying instead on all-European structures.” They talk about Russia-NATO cooperation, joint work on non-proliferation, and bilateral military-to-military relations. At the end of the conversation, Aspin says “that he and Grachev seemed to be in total agreement, and he thanked Grachev for his views on NATO and ‘Partnership for Peace’ program.”

On the second leg of his Europe trip, after the NATO summit in Brussels, President Clinton stops in Prague where he meets first with Czech president Vaclav Havel, then a larger group of Czech officials, and on the following day, with the leaders of all the Visegrad states. The Clinton conversation with Havel is particularly important for illuminating Clinton’s sincere attempts to square the circle, both promising that the Partnership for Peace is “a track that will lead to NATO membership,” and that the U.S. does not intend to “draw another line dividing Europe a few hundred miles to the east.” Clinton candidly describes to Havel the attitudes of NATO members about expansion, that “there is no consensus now among NATO allies to extend formal security guarantees” because they are not at all certain which of the new countries could actually contribute to security, and because “the reaction in Russia could be the reverse of what we want.”

Clinton provides the insurance policy argument for the Partnership, saying “Russia is not a near-term threat … But if historical trends do reassert themselves, we will have organized ourselves so that we could move quickly not only to NATO membership but other security relations that can serve as a deterrent.” Havel matches Clinton’s candor, agreeing with his points, “But given sensitivities of the population here, he [Havel] said, he must emphasize that the PFP is a first step leading to full NATO membership. The President expressed full agreement.”

The day after his discussions with Vaclav Havel and the Czechs, President Clinton meets with the larger group of leaders of the Visegrad countries, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, to inform them about the results of the Brussels discussions on NATO, especially the Partnership for Peace program. The conversation shows the Visegrad leaders’ dissatisfaction with what they consider an insufficient step toward protecting their security, and their active lobbying for full NATO membership and security guarantees against the potential Russian threat. Poland’s Lech Walesa argues that they have to seize the moment of opportunity while Russia is weak, and says he frankly doubts the validity of Russian pledges and assurances. Walesa emphasizes that the Visegrad countries “had a Western culture. Russia did not.” Havel quickly expresses concern that it is not “possible or desirable to isolate Russia.” Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski articulates his worries that the U.S. might be “cutting a deal” with Russia by establishing new spheres of influence. All participants agree that they will join PFP but only if it is the first step to full NATO membership, and Clinton confirms this understanding. Right after this meeting, in his prepared remarks at the press conference in the Prague Castle, Clinton utters the momentous phrase: “now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how.”

On the eve of Budapest CSCE meeting, Yeltsin sends Clinton a letter addressing Russian view of European security and warning against a rapid NATO expansion. In many ways, the letter is a concise preview of Yeltsin’s “cold peace” speech that would shock Clinton and the media only days later at the Budapest meeting. Here Yeltsin writes that Russians see the institutionalization of OSCE as a major step toward making it a “full-fledged all-European organization with a sound legal basis,” and the main structure dealing with security and peace-keeping in Europe. This organization lists all the aspiring NATO candidates as its members, as well as the United States and Russia on an equal basis. The Russians see OCSE as the only fully integrative post-Cold War structure, which should be developed and strengthened by joint effort. In this scheme of priorities, expansion of NATO would divert energy and attention from the all-European project. Referring to their last conversation during the late September summit in Washington, Yeltsin writes that “we have agreed with you that there would be no surprises, that first we should pass through this stage of partnership, whereas issues of further evolution of NATO should not be decided without due account to the opinion and interests of Russia.” The Russian leader warns that discussions with prospective members and developing timetables “will be interpreted and not only in Russia as the beginning of a new split of Europe.”

Gore is in Moscow for the fourth semi-annual meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the high-level group intended to regularize the bilateral US-Russia relationship and agenda, from space to nuclear weapons to environmental issues. After Yeltsin’s unexpected “cold peace” speech at the Budapest CSCE summit on December 5, blasting NATO expansion as ending the era of cooperation in Europe, Gore is trying to repair relations and explain the state of NATO discussions on enlargement, saying the Russian reaction is based on a misunderstanding and on “the inability on our part to clearly convey to the Russian side what we are talking about.” He repeats during the conversation that “[t]he expansion process will not be rapid. On the contrary, it will be gradual, deliberate, absolutely open and transparent, without surprises. We plan to have full and frank discussions with Russia at every stage of this process.” In response, Rybkin stresses that [t]he assurances you gave regarding NATO expansion are very important,” and implicitly links the process of NATO expansion with ratification of START II.

During the Gore mission to Moscow, Talbott visits the influential former ambassador to Washington, Vladimir Lukin, to clarify the misunderstanding that the U.S. leaders believe led to Yeltsin’s “cold peace” speech. He “emphasized that the decision to expand NATO was not taken at the expense of the relationship with Russia” and that all channels were used to keep Russia informed. Talbot assures Lukin that “the U.S. will adhere to the following principles: 1) no hasty decisions; 2) no surprises; 3) no exceptions” in formulating its NATO policy and calls NATO “a universal structure of European security.” In response, Lukin cautions against rapid expansion, mentioning the need to maintain a “delicate” balance in Europe and the “negative symbolic significance” of NATO’s moving toward the Russian borders. Instead, he proposes to convene an international conference on alternative solutions for European security that would focus on alternative ways to achieve security and cooperation, where the emphasis would be “not be on the timing parameters of NATO expansion, but on specific concerns of Eastern European countries in the sphere of security and ways to eliminate these concerns.”

The most important meeting of Vice President Gore’s repair work in Moscow takes place in Boris Yeltsin’s hospital room, where the Russian president is recovering from what was officially described as a “nose operation” while Russian troops are pouring into Chechnya in the early stages of a brutal war. The talking points prepared for Gore explicitly say they “[h]ave only one issue to discuss – President’s wish that we overcome disagreement in Budapest.” Gore has two assurances to make, that Clinton is personally committed to partnership with Yeltsin, and that any NATO expansion would be “gradual, open” and not in 1995 “when you’ll have parliamentary elections.” The dates would subsequently include 1996, when both presidents would face re-election campaigns.

This State Department cable provides briefing points to use with allies in describing Vice President Gore’s trip to Moscow, and contains several striking passages on what the Russians said to the Gore group about NATO expansion. The American message is that there was a misunderstanding about how rapid expansion would be, that it would not happen in 1995, that there was no timetable for new members, and so forth. “The Russians said they had interpreted pronouncements since the September Washington summit to mean that the United States and NATO were subordinating, if not abandoning, integration to NATO expansion.” The next sentence reverses the verbs, “abandoning, if not subordinating, integration to NATO expansion.” The cable goes on to report, “Russian leaders and officials … affirmed that NATO enlargement poses difficulties for them because NATO is still perceived in Russia as a military alliance system which is either directed at them, or is maintained and plans to expand pending the failure of Russian democracy and Russian economic reform” – a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy.

On the eve of the 50th anniversary celebrations of Victory in World War II, and Clinton’s coming to Moscow for V-Day, the Duma held hearings on U.S.-Russian relations at a time when the initial high expectations of strategic partnership had started to give way to disillusionment. Although defining cooperation with the United States as a high priority, the deputies express concern that the U.S. is taking advantage of Russian weakness and the changed balance of power in Europe. This summary (written by Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Duma and former Russian Ambassador to the United States Vladimir Lukin) labels U.S. willingness to take into account Russian interests in the area of European security as a test of the sincerity of American stated intentions to be a partner with Russia. NATO expansion is seen as the biggest area of disagreement. In the opinion of the hearings’ participants, Lukin writes, “U.S. actions to expand NATO […] directly contradict Russia’s national interests and are not in the interest of strengthening security and stability in Europe.” Ignoring these Russian interests shows the U.S. desire to isolate Russia and prevent its integration into the European space. The second major area of concern is U.S. efforts to weaken Russian influence in the CIS space and prevent its re-integration. The summary notes, “in its policies towards the post-Soviet states, the United States often departs from its declared priority for the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and openly puts its geopolitical goals first.”

Yeltsin is very appreciative that Clinton has come to Moscow to celebrate the 50th anniversary of victory in World War II. This long and wide-ranging conversation is remarkable as a glimpse into the Bill-Boris relationship. Here Yeltsin presents his real cri de coeur on NATO. He sees “nothing but humiliation” for Russia if NATO expands, calling it a “new encirclement.” He argues that what they need is a new European security system, not old blocs. He says emotionally, “for me to agree to the borders of NATO expanding toward those of Russia—that would constitute a betrayal on my part of the Russian people.”

In response, Clinton patiently and clearly explains the U.S. position on NATO expansion—it should be seen in the context of continuing U.S. involvement in European security and an effort to create a fully integrated Europe. He hints at trade-offs if Yeltsin accepts NATO expansion—Russia would be a founding member of the post-COCOM regime, join the G-7, have a special relationship with NATO—but only if Russia “walk[s] through the doors that we open for you.” Yeltsin’s urgent priority is the upcoming elections; he confides in the U.S. president that his “position heading into 1996 elections is not exactly brilliant.” He asks the president to postpone the expansion discussion at least until after the election. Clinton is very straightforward about his own electoral pressures with the Republicans and voters in Wisconsin, Illinois and Ohio pushing for NATO expansion. Yeltsin eventually agrees reluctantly to Clinton’s offer—no NATO decisions until after elections are over, only a study of expansion; but he also consents to no anti-NATO rhetoric from Russia, and that the Russians will sign the PFP before the end of May. Yeltsin needs Clinton’s support to win the 1996 elections and he sees no alternatives other than relying on the American’s assurances.

After the successful Moscow summit, as promised by Yeltsin, Kozyrev indeed signed the PFP documents and Russia officially joined the program. In his next meeting with the U.S. president, Yeltsin wants to return to the subject of NATO to emphasize Russian priorities. He wants a treaty or some special mechanism between NATO and Russia, but most importantly, he sees OSCE “as the principal mechanism to build new security order in Europe. NATO is a factor, too, of course, but NATO should evolve into a political organization.” He sees success in building the new European security order as the most important priority. Clinton does not directly respond to this, but talks about the importance of Russia’s and NATO’s militaries working together and engaging in peacekeeping.

The meeting is extremely laid-back and cordial, and the two leaders find understanding on other difficult issues such as sales of reactors to Iran, North Korea, nuclear testing, START and CFE—although these understandings are mostly on U.S. terms with Clinton proposing and Yeltsin accepting. Yeltsin believes that their personal partnership is crucial to their success: “We’ll build the partnership on the basis of our friendship, yours and mine, and we’ll do so for the sake of world peace.” At one point the Russian leader even reaches out and pats Clinton on his knee.

Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev meet the day after the NAC meeting that discussed implementation of the Bosnia peace agreement and NATO expansion. The discussion centers on developing the NATO-Russia MOU that would specify and formalize NATO-Russian interaction in peacekeeping in Bosnia. Kozyrev suggests no additional paper is needed, they can rely on existing “beyond P4P” documents. On NATO expansion, Kozyrev describes the debate within the Russian government on how to approach NATO as consisting of three schools: one prepared to defend Russian interests through “activism and threats,” one that believes Russia should “ignore NATO,” and one, to which he and President Yeltsin belong, believing in cooperation with NATO even “while argument, dialogue and disagreement over enlargement continues.” Christopher asks Kozyrev to “make clear to President Yeltsin that President Clinton had been faithful to the promises he had made on this subject,” referring to what the two presidents agreed on during the May summit.

When Evgeny Primakov becomes foreign minister in January 1996, one of the very first issues he has to deal with is NATO expansion. He requests documents from the Foreign Ministry archive mentioning assurances from Western leaders in 1990-1991 regarding non-expansion of NATO. Having established the documentary record, he often uses it in his memos to government officials, in his speeches, and in conversations. He later publishes excerpts and quotes from them in his 2015 memoir, listing assurances from Baker, Kohl, Major, and Mitterrand and speculates why those countries turned away from their opinions as expressed at the time by their leaders. Strikingly, he concludes that Russians also bear some of the blame for the Central and East Europeans turning away to the West.

The Primakov compilation of Western assurances to Gorbachev may have provided the catalyst for this forceful State Department rebuttal sent to all European posts, after Ambassador Collins reported that a “senior Kremlin official” was complaining that NATO expansion would violate the “spirit” of the German unification treaty (just as Yeltsin had argued in his September 15, 1993 letter to Clinton). This cable transmits a memo written by acting Assistant Secretary of State for Europe John Kornblum, together with John Herbst, then at State’s office on the Newly Independent States (NIS) and a future ambassador to Ukraine, characterizing the Russian claims about NATO as “specious” and “unfounded.” The Kornblum-Herbst memo focuses on the Two-Plus-Four negotiations that developed the German unification treaty, arguing that the treaty only applied to the territory of the former East Germany, and provided no precedent for limits on any new NATO members. The memo inaccurately describes one comment by Hans-Dietrich Genscher as “unilateral” and only applying to the former GDR, when in fact State Department and British diplomatic cables at the time (February 1990) show Genscher specifically and repeatedly referring both to the former GDR and to Poland and Hungary as countries that might want to join NATO.

But otherwise, the memo does not address the high-level assurances about Soviet security (such as “not one inch eastward”) provided to Gorbachev by a wide range of Western leaders (James Baker, Helmut Kohl, Douglas Hurd, John Major, and George H.W. Bush, among others). Instead, the memo digresses into a confusing consideration of alleged “legally binding declarations by Eastern European leaders” at the time. Even Vaclav Havel’s famous February 1990 speech to the U.S. Congress calling for all foreign troops to come home could hardly count as legally binding, so this will remain unclear until the underlying “reftels” are declassified.

In this excerpt, Senator Sam Nunn responds to Russian concerns about NATO expansion saying that in his view “expansion of NATO must follow, and not be ahead of, the process of expansion of the EU membership,” which corresponds to the Russian vision of a long-term horizon of expansion. He believes that at present Russia is not a threat to Eastern Europe and seconds Havel’s belief that CEE countries want to join NATO for different reasons—shared values and support for democratic development. But he also quotes Napoleon saying that “if you succeed in attracting the opponent to your side, that is already a guarantee of success,” which is what the Russians see happening in the geopolitical sense. Nunn tells Seleznev that the U.S. military is not excited about the prospect of NATO expansion either as it would not increase battle readiness. Importantly, the senator, whom the Russians hold in high regard, thinks that “our two countries should focus their attention on political and psychological aspects connected to the problems of NATO expansion."

Now foreign minister, Evgeny Primakov prepares this memo for the speaker of the Duma in advance of the official announcement of the first round of NATO expansion at the Madrid Summit. The memo begins by stating Russia’s “invariably negative” position toward NATO expansion, especially to the extension of NATO’s military infrastructure to the East. He emphasizes that NATO expansion is not at the moment perceived as a military threat, but as an “establishment of new dividing lines in Europe,” which will inevitably lead to “ a slide into a new confrontation, undermining of trust between Russia and the Western States.” He disagrees with the rationale for expansion and refers to the assurances that were given to Soviet and Russian leaders in 1990-1991 that NATO would not expand “an inch to the East.” Primakov concludes rather forcefully: “We are talking about a decision, consequences of which will define the European configuration for decades in the future. Politicians who are in power today will bear historic responsibility [for that].”