Ivory Item: Carter First U.S. President to Participate in Nuclear Drill

During a conversation with Joint Staff Director General Ray Sitton, Odom found corroboration for his “assessment of the vulnerability of the NCA in a short warning situation.” Sitton further observed that “NEACP is good for command and control but not really where the President wants to be” [in a crisis]. Sitton said that he was “delighted that President Carter has shown interest in the SIOP and related command matters.” While Henry Kissinger had shown “great interest” in SIOP issues, “Nixon avoided them and Ford was hardly enthusiastic.”

Brzezinski reported that the NSC’s “investigation of the White House Emergency Procedures for short warning nuclear attack has thrown up the question of our nuclear war doctrine.” Discussing problems relating to the SIOP, NSDM 242, policy guidance for preparing Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs), “war fighting procedures,” and the “vulnerability of the National Command Authority,” he recommended asking Secretary of Defense Brown and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for an explanation of such matters as current “nuclear war doctrine” and the “procedures they envisage for actually conducting a nuclear war, limited or total, beyond the initial attack phase.” Carter approved the recommendation, and that same day Brzezinski wrote to Brown about several requests, one of which was for a “brief statement of the procedures for actually conducting a nuclear war, limited or total, beyond the initial phase.” That would include information on “command procedures for the conduct of such a war, including such operational aspects as the location and procedures for effective exercise of control.”

With the White House’s interest in strategic decision-making, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman were encouraged to develop a program for providing the President with practical training in the mechanisms of nuclear war. JCS Chair Brown informed the Chiefs about the plan for Ivory Item, a “no-notice SIOP execution exercise to test Missile Attack conference procedures” using “secure telephone circuits.” Brown explained that the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the JCS Chair could initiate an Ivory Item exercise, first by using non-secure lines to provide notice and to conduct a roll call, which would be followed by the use of secure lines and another roll call. After explaining to the participants that the call’s purpose was to “simulate a missile attack conference procedure,” the Deputy Director for Operations for the National Military Command Center would “talk through the response procedures contained in the [SIOP] Decision Handbook.” Brown noted that at a later stage Ivory Item “may be expanded to include a threat scenario and discussion of possible recommendations to the President.”

The first Ivory Item exercise took place on 12 May at the initiative of Secretary of Defense Brown. JCS Chairman Brown proposed ways to streamline the next one and cautioned the Chiefs about avoiding the use of speakers or extension phones, which can “degrade the quality of the secure conference.” The exercise could involve “a brief threat scenario” introduced by the Commander-in-Chief NORAD/Air Defense Command. A memorandum by one of Brown’s aides proposed a scenario involving an “attack of over 250 simulated ICBMs en route against U.S. targets including the Washington area.” The DDO “would read the major SIOP alternative responses and senior conferee[s] would terminate the scenario portion of the conference.”

“Problems” experienced during an Ivory Item exercise on 1 June 1977 led the Joint Staff to recommend that Secretary of Defense Brown and other principals receive briefings on warning systems and SIOP and “decision handbook procedures.” During the exercise, the NMCC’s Deputy Director for Operations was to be “conference manager” and lead a discussion of SIOP execution procedures from a “bolt out of the blue” perspective. There was confidence that the DDO could do that well, but it was less clear whether “they can answer questions on the ‘consequences of execution details’” or about the SIOP’s nuances. Smith reported that he had spoken with Admiral Staser Holcomb about Harold Brown’s thoughts on “exercises involving the President.”

According to the attached material, the SIOP included three alternatives in the event of a surprise attack situation. To estimate fatalities for the surprise attack alternative responses, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff used the Comprehensive Blast and Radiation Assessment (COBRA) computer program that “predicts the expected fatalities from both prompt effects (blast and initial radiation) and delayed effects (fallout for a six-month period) for the specific attack option executed.”

Other scenarios concerned “non-time constrained” situations involving a developing international crisis where nuclear employment options could be considered. On the latter, Harold Brown commented that “it would be useful for the President and the VP to spend a morning (at NMCC or ANCC) going through such a scenario.”

On page three of this document, a 16 June handwritten note by Lieutenant General William Y. Smith, Chairman Brown’s assistant, relayed “some thoughts Sec Def has about exercises involving the President.” Using another term for the “Decision Handbook,” Smith wrote, “It boils down to Sec Def, you, Dep Sec Def, Brzezinski getting together to discuss various Soviet attack options and possible US responses, how the ‘Black Book’ helps and is used, etc.” (Note: After his retirement from the military, General Smith became a member of the National Security Archive’s original advisory board.)

Brown sent the Secretary of Defense detailed briefing charts on warning systems and “SIOP Execution Considerations.” Apparently, the charts would be made available to President Carter, who had seen some of them during his meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 12 January 1977.[11]

Several systems for warning of missile launches were mentioned, but not discussed. They were PARCS (Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization System), the satellite-based Defense Support Program (DSP) and the Cobra Dane radar system at Shemya in the Aleutian Islands.

According to the SIOP material, of the three possible responses to an ICBM-only surprise attack, one was a “minimum execution” of Major Attack Option [MAO] 1, while another was a “complete execution” of MAO 1. The “minimum” MAO 1 option was designed to “minimize economic damage and fatalities” and to avoid attacks on the Soviet Government structure, which would make negotiations possible. Thus, for the maximum MAO 1 response, there were no Soviet targets slated for withholds. For a “non-time constrained” situation, where there had been intimations of crisis, the two MAO options would have involved the SAC bomber/ICBM alert force as well as any specially generated additional forces, along with SLBMs. According to the briefing material, the “minimum” option had two “major disadvantages,” neither of which is described. The implication was a preference for the larger attack option, perhaps because MAO 1’s emphasis on minimizing casualties meant excluding some military installations and government control structures that were co-located with population centers.

The third undescribed surprise attack response, likely for a “bolt out of the blue” situation, would have involved the bomber/ICBM forces on alert at the time, although SLBMs would have played a role in any retaliatory action.[12] In the event of a “mounting crisis,” Selected Attack Options (SAO), for which there were five, would be possible.

Renshaw informed Brown that a new Ivory Item scenario had been prepared and that J-3 had proposed coordination with the White House Communications Agency if “Presidential participation” was anticipated. In comments on the scenario, Air Force Chief of Staff Jones mentioned the “need [for] more alternatives” or “sub options” within the alternatives and the lack of discussion about China.

Brzezinski cited South Korea, PRM-10, the B-1 bomber and cruise missiles, and SALT as major issues for discussion in this meeting. Brown’s memo included “command and control exercises” as a topic for discussion, which was a reference to “missile attack conferencing” and Ivory Item. The Chiefs may well have briefed Carter and Brzezinski on the developing Ivory Item arrangements.

Chairman Brown sent the Secretary of Defense a revised Ivory Item scenario that was shorter than the 1 June exercise with “less instruction,” making it more suitable for presidential or vice-presidential participation. According to Colonel Renshaw’s memorandum, the scenario involved an ICBM attack only, with succeeding scenarios involving SLBMs only and a mix of ICBM and SLBMs.

Odom recounted that an Ivory Item simulation was scheduled to occur that day but did not because Secretary of Defense Brown could not assemble all of the Joint Chiefs and Commanders-in-Chief of various unified and specified commands (SAC, European Command, etc.) on a secure conference call. Odom said that the failure did not mean that the system would not work in a “real event,” because non-secure lines could be used, but it indicated the limitations of the secure call network and pointed to the necessity for Ivory Item to give the “NCA a sense of timing and communication realities.”

Odom reported that the Department of Defense held another Ivory Item exercise that reportedly went “very well,” except that Brzezinski was not included because the NMCC duty officer did not call the White House Communications Agency switch at the beginning of the exercise. When the Secretary of Defense asked that Brzezinski be called, it was too late. They were going to try again the following Monday (3 October).

On this day, President Carter participated in the Ivory Item exercise. According to his personal diary, “This was a busy day, putting out fires,” although he did not mention Ivory Item in the published diary. The only reference to the Joint Chiefs was a meeting to discuss SALT II.[13] The White House daily diary showed periods of time when a conference call could have occurred, for example, when he was meeting with Brzezinski or with Vice President Mondale.

In these rough notes on the Ivory Item conference—perhaps questions he had for Brzezinski—Odom wrote “who listens” and noted what the President said about the “choice of alternatives,” “evacuation,” and having “everybody’s ex/asst [on the] line.” The latter was a reference to the fact that so many people were listening in or trying to participate in the call that David Aaron remembered President Carter asking, “How can I take advice from these people if I don't even know who they are?”

The following week, Charles Duncan wrote to President Carter that he had heard that the President had been “generally pleased” with the Ivory Item exercise. Noting that the scenario had been devised to “give time for dialogue,” Duncan stressed that in an actual crisis “time may be quite short, particularly if SLBMs are involved.” Warning time for ICBMs was 17 minutes, while warning times for an SLBM launch was only five minutes plus. [See Document 23] Duncan mentioned some details, excised from the text, about ICBM launch times that would be taken into account in the “implementing message,” presumably of SIOP options.

At what point in the simulation President Carter chose to retaliate remains to be learned, for example, whether he launched “on warning” or chose to “ride out” the attack before retaliating. It is possible that he chose one of the Major Attack Options from the SIOP’s three choices for responding to surprise attacks.

Brzezinski’s directive led quickly to a message for the CINCs of the unified and specified nuclear commands (SAC, European, Pacific, etc.) that they had to answer the phone personally during the Ivory Item exercises, that no speaker phones, extensions, or tape recorders were to be used, and that any transcripts or tapes of the 6 October conference were to be destroyed. “All personnel having access to the discussions during that conference must be briefed that presidential participation in the exercise is highly sensitive and the president’s comments are even more so.”

Attached was a draft instructions message on Ivory Item procedures, with provisions for a “Backup” conference telephone that would be monitored by a “knowledgeable individual with immediate access to the principal.”

A memorandum from George S. Brown to Harold Brown indicated actions taken in response to Brzezinski’s edict including a “revised Surprise Attack Response procedure” depicting “key elements” of U.S. decision-making including “decision time” against “strategic forces launched.” A less complex version of the “three alternative responses” to surprise attack would also be developed. [See Document 6 for some earlier information on those alternatives]

In his response, Brown mentioned the decisions to tighten up participation in Ivory Item to principals only and to create a backup circuit for future conferences, and his readiness to discuss “a proposed format for the condensed decision guide” when he flew with the President to Omaha for their visit to SAC headquarters.

Drawing on the draft text [See Document 16] Brown sent the chiefs the updated instructions for Ivory Item telephone conferences, including prohibitions on the use of “extension phones, speakers, recorders, or other external devices.”

This memorandum indicated that Secretary of Defense Brown proposed exercise scenarios “that introduce SLBM launch after a few minutes; and that involve loss of sensors,” presumably BMEWs radar or Defense Support System satellites.

In a memo for Brzezinski on his upcoming meeting with Harold Brown, Odom said that Brown would bring the “Revised SIOP Format” that President Carter sought—something close to what Air Force Chief of Staff David Jones had shown to Brzezinski en route to SAC. Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNOs) would also be a topic for the meeting. Odom saw creating them as a “useful staff exercise” but did not see them as “products for actual presidential choice.” Odom said the “real issue, if the President wants a number of options short of the SIOP variants, is the speed with which lesser strikes (i.e. LNOs) could be staffed by JCS/SAC in a crisis and in response to the unique political guidance at that time.”

For future Ivory Item exercises, Brown granted CINCSAC Ellis’s request for the participation of the Vice CINCSAC in the Airborne Command Post as well as to use the speaker on the balcony of the Command Center during the conference. The restrictions concerning recorders and other speakers remain in place and CINCSAC should keep the number of officers on the balcony to a “minimum” during the exercise.

In keeping with his significant role in national security policy, which included having a nuclear “Football” assigned to his military aide, Vice President Mondale participated in the October Ivory Item exercise and met with President Carter and Secretary of Defense Brown to discuss emergency procedures and the SIOP. According to the White House diary, the President met with Mondale, JCS Chairman Brown, Secretary of Defense Brown, and Zbigniew Brzezinski on 17 November 1977.

The briefing memorandum for this meeting mentioned the President’s criticism of the SIOP “decision handbook” noting that he wanted a “more succinct checklist.” Besides discussing the role of attacks on Warsaw Pact forces during a strategic war, Matheny and Clift referred to the short time for decisions that Duncan had mentioned: 17 minutes for a Soviet ICBM attack and five-plus minutes for a Soviet SLBM strike.

Apparently, the meeting on 17 November resolved the complications involving the surprise attack procedures in the SIOP “decision handbook” that had concerned President Carter. On 28 November, he met again with the same senior officials and went through the SIOP step by step. Carter briefly described the meeting in his personal diary, where he wrote:

[We] went through the SIOP procedures, walking through several drills. This is the first time that any president has done this, which is unbelievable. We’ve tried to simplify the process greatly since I’ve been in office.

Carter did not mention Ivory Item or his participation in the simulation, which had led to the changes in the SIOP “decision handbook.” In his comments on the 28 November meeting, President Carter wrote that it had “taken eleven months to schedule this detailed drill procedure—which rehearsed our response to the use of nuclear weapons” and involved all of the principals, including the Vice President.[14]

During a 28 November discussion with Harold Brown and the Chiefs about Ivory Item scenarios, the President raised questions about the use of the “real world missile attack conference procedure” to report “hostilities in your areas of interest” [e.g., Europe, Pacific]. As a result, Brown informed the CINCs that the “Missile Attack Conference procedure” was “being changed to affirm the desire for reports of this nature which bear on the decisionmaking process.” There will be no need for “negative reports on area hostilities.” As for future scenarios, “inputs regarding regional hostilities will be provided in scenario scripts.”

This report by the NSC “Crisis Management Staff”—in which William Odom likely had a hand, given his responsibility for crisis management issues—provided an overview of the Carter White House’s efforts to enhance its capabilities to meet emergency situations. One such effort, following up on Brzezinski’s emphasis on familiarizing the President with “U.S. doctrine for nuclear ‘crisis management,’” was the October 1977 Ivory Item exercise. According to the report, presidential participation in a missile attack simulation “had never been done before, and the event triggered revisions and changes in the SIOP based on Presidential guidance for the first time in history. Before the drill “SIOP designers have had to imagine what the President would want to see and know in an emergency” [italics in original]. “Without a single clue from the President,” they had produced a “thick ‘Decision Handbook”—presumably, the compendium carried in the nuclear “Football,” which was “the product of years of speculating in J-3 about the President’s needs.” That would begin to change.

The NSC staff found that Ivory Item had “monumental” implications for strategic planning doctrine, including “refinement” of SIOP options, greater presidential awareness of the limitations of the escalation control concept, and an additional point that remains classified. Given what has been disclosed in other documents, perhaps that excised point concerned the need for presidential experience with exercise scenarios involving different amounts of warning time.

Brown sent the Secretary a draft reply to President Carter concerning their discussions on 28 November. This version of the reply is far more excised than the letter that Brown sent (see below), although one topic, “Reference Warsaw Pact Fatalities,” that may have been excised from Brown’s reply, survived declassification review. Apparently, President Carter wanted information on nuclear casualty levels in Eastern Europe.

Having met with President Carter on 28 November to discuss the SIOP and responses to surprise attack situations, Brown provided information to respond to questions and issues that had arisen. They concerned communications, hardening of command centers, and recalling bombers. Brown welcomed the suggestion that President Carter observe an Ivory Item exercise at the NMCC because it would “provide a useful insight into the procedures and processes that support SIOP decision-making and execution of our nuclear forces.”

During his 28 January 1978 meeting with the Chiefs and Secretary Brown at the NMCC, President Carter raised questions about the vulnerability of the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites (apparently one question had to do with whether lasers could damage or “blind” the DSP). Secretary Brown tasked the Chiefs to prepare Ivory Item scenarios that were responsive to the concerns about DSP vulnerability. [See Document 20] The two scenarios that the Joint Staff developed were identical except for the way that the Soviets tried to “kill” the DSP. In one, “Ivory Item Hotel,” the Soviets disabled the DSP’s ground links with sabotage attacks at Buckley Air Force Base and Lamar, Colorado. In the other, “Ivory Item India,” the Soviets targeted the ground links with SLBMs launched from the Gulf of Mexico. Apparently, the Joint Staff found the “Hotel” scenario more plausible because a Soviet Yankee submarine in the Gulf of Mexico would not go undetected.

Rogers turned down General Hill’s request to use extension speakers during Ivory Item exercises. “Restriction of these sensitive exercise discussions is essential to their ultimate purpose.”

Acting Chairman Jones sent Secretary Brown the Ivory Item “Hotel” scenario along with a precis. One of the enclosed memoranda indicated that the Joint Staff preferred the “Hotel” over the “India” scenario. The scenarios for both are heavily excised, although Document 27, above, summarizes their premises. The Smith memorandum provided questions raised by the President and advisers during their visit to the NMCC with the responsive information included in a report sent to Brzezinski on 9 March.

CINCAD General Hill repeated his request to use speaker phone extensions on the grounds that his “Ivory Item support team” could help him better assist NCA decision-making. JCS Chairman Jones wrote to General William Y. Smith about his concern that this would set a precedent with other CINCs “wanting more people on the line.” The proposed reply granted the request as long as the “privacy requirement for Ivory Item [that] has been imposed by highest authority” was observed, and the matter was handled in a separate message.

The Chiefs discussed holding a military-only (Washington principals and the CINCs) Ivory Item exercise using the “Delta” scenario on 21 July1978. The simulation was delayed because of disagreements over the scenario.

Little comes through from these heavily excised messages and papers except that there was continuing discussion of the CINCAD’s request for permission to use speaker extensions during the Ivory Item exercises.

These memos concerned the possibility of Canadian participation in the Ivory Item exercises with J-3 (operations) supporting and J-5 (strategy and plans) opposing their inclusion, although neither side was 100 percent behind their own position. The issue had been raised at the time of the first exercise in May 1977 because “NORAD Canadians might play key role in real-world surprise attack,” but the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman objected.

Debate over Canadian participation in Ivory Item exercises continued. Apparently, one argument against the idea was the risk of exposure of SIOP information, as suggested by this statement: the “ability to accomplish purpose of Ivory item, i.e. test of [excised words, probably a reference to SIOP] surprise attack procedures, may be impaired.” On the other side of the issue was Chairman Jones, who said in a note to General William Y. Smith that the “big advantage of having them in is that we can use the displays & systems which would be used in a real crisis.” Jones proposed having two kinds of exercises: with and without the Canadians.

According to one of the attachments, General Hill’s question about Canadian participation was still unanswered. Small portions of the scripts for Ivory Item Delta III, which would be a “free play” exercise, and for Prize Ring Delta have been declassified.

These heavily excised documents concerned the latest Ivory Item exercise, “Kilo.” NORAD’s bi-national structure had been addressed because “Kilo” would allow participation by Canadian officers. “Kilo” was a missile warning assessment drill designed to “exercise JCS Emergency Conference Procedures” and provide training in the use of data from warning systems. Apparently, it would be a “no notice” exercise in order to “enhance realism” and let participants react to “real world situations” instead of a script.