The Trinity Detonation time-lapse from 8.1 to 18.1 seconds.
James B. Conant’s Eyewitness Account: “The Whole Sky Suddenly Full of White Light Like the End of the World”
1,100 Square Miles in New Mexico Exposed to Radioactive Contamination
UCLA Report Suspected “Many Potential Long-Term Insidious Hazards” From Trinity Test Radiation
Washington, D.C., July 16, 2025 - Early in the morning of 16 July 1945, 80 years ago, the U.S. Manhattan Project staged the first test of a nuclear weapon in the New Mexican desert. It was the first trial of a plutonium implosion weapon—the same weapon type that devastated Nagasaki a few weeks later. The explosion on the ground produced radioactive fallout contaminating over 1,100 square miles of the state, with some debris spreading as far north as Canada. Six weeks after the test, a “swath of fairly high radioactivity on the ground cover[ed] an area of about 100 miles long by 30 miles wide,” according to a Los Alamos Laboratory report published here for first time by the National Security Archive, while “gamma radiation was found in measurable but very low intensities in Santa Fe, Las Vegas, Raton and even in Trinidad, Colorado,” 260 miles from the point of detonation.
To mark the anniversary of this world-historic event, the National Security Archive today published a collection of essential declassified documents on the first atomic bomb test and the radioactive contamination that preoccupied government officials and medical experts during the years that followed. The new posting builds upon an Electronic Briefing Book published last year, fortifying it with a number of significant new records, including:
For the top scientists and military officials who organized and witnessed the 16 July 1945 Trinity test, the central issue was to determine whether an implosion weapon could be successfully detonated for use in the war with Japan. The test at Alamogordo confirmed that prospect, yet it would have possibly unexpected environmental consequences that would be studied in the years ahead. The Trinity Test planners prepared for possible adverse public health effects but did not know how far radioactive debris would spread, and the biological and public health impact of low-level radiation remains a contested issue. During the years after Trinity, researchers with the Atomic Energy Project at the Medical School of the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) collected evidence to help determine whether the fallout produced a health hazard. While the studies drew no firm conclusions, a 1951 report by the Project found that there were “many potential long term insidious hazards from the present low level contamination which is the focal point of these studies.” The possibility that the test’s hazards could eventually inspire legal action was concerning to medical experts who were also interested in learning more about the military implications of low levels of radiation contaminating “large land areas,” leading the Atomic Energy Commission to fund a research program at UCLA to determine the scope and impact of the contamination.
The posting also includes several period films, such as footage from the “100-ton test,” considered a “dress rehearsal” for the atomic test, and on the Trinity test itself. Other documents show that Trinity test planners knew the detonation could create radioactive fallout that could spread to nearby areas and create public health risks. To prepare for that possibility, they made arrangements for fallout monitoring and possible evacuations. They eventually discovered that nearby people were indeed exposed to potentially hazardous levels of contamination and also that farm animals exposed to fallout experienced beta burns on their skin.
The Trinity test took place 80 years ago, but it is not entirely in the past. Researchers at the National Cancer Institute have determined that the test’s fallout contributed to excess numbers of thyroid cancers. To this his day, “down winders” in New Mexico seek federal compensation under the Radiation Exposure and Compensation Act (RECA), which so far has excluded that state, even though 33 of its counties, including tribal areas, experienced levels of radiation exposure that were higher than other U.S. counties covered by the Act.
The test was of a plutonium implosion device, the same technology that would be deployed in the weapon that exploded over Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August 1945. Oppenheimer and his colleagues believed that a test was necessary because the implosion technology device was so complex. Moreover, if it failed during a combat operation, the adversary could gain control over the weapon’s costly fissile material. By contrast, Oppenheimer saw no reason to test the “gun type” highly enriched uranium fueled weapon that exploded over Hiroshima because its components had been tested; for example, the first “Dragon’s Tail” experiment confirmed the amount of highly-enriched uranium needed for detonation. [1]
Before the 16 July test, medical specialists working at Los Alamos alerted senior officials to the risk of contaminated dust and other particles—fallout—that it would produce and the possibility that dangerous levels could necessitate evacuation. With plutonium understood to be a serious health hazard, its dispersal along with other radioactive products was the subject of discussion weeks before the test. A memorandum by J. O. Hirschfelder and John Magee forecast the “definite danger of dust containing active material and fission products falling on towns near Trinity and necessitating their evacuation.”
While safety was not a top priority, Manhattan Project chief General Leslie Groves wanted to avoid legal problems, which gave the need for precautions some prominence, but his commitment to maintaining secrecy and averting publicity was paramount. To avoid legal problems, Groves agreed to a radiation monitoring system and an evacuation plan. No protective measures were to be taken unless people suffered serious injuries.[2]
On 7 May 1945, two months before the16 July test, Los Alamos scientists staged a “dress rehearsal” by detonating 108 tons of high explosives. The “100-ton test,” the largest explosion ever up to that point, included an experiment for measuring the dispersal of radioactive materials. Interlaced in the pile of high explosives was flexible tubing containing a small amount of plutonium that had been dissolved in chemicals. According to a later evaluation by Los Alamos medical expert Louis Hempelmann, the risks were “slight” that the dispersed plutonium could have adverse consequences, but this was the first time that an explosion had spread plutonium.
Six days before the Trinity test, Los Alamos laboratory director J. Robert Oppenheimer approved a recommendation that evacuation would take place if the total amount of radiation absorbed by people living in the area was in the range of 60-100 roentgen, some 50 times the daily limit of 0.1 r. The focus of the monitoring was external radiation, not the risk that people might inhale or ingest radioactive material.[3] When the test occurred, a U.S. Army detachment was ready with tents, food and water supplies, stoves, and vehicles to evacuate several hundred nearby people. Contingency planning included a press release justifying evacuation: the hazard caused by “gas shells” in an exploded ammunition dump. [See Document 16]
When the Trinity test occurred early in the morning of 16 July 1945, it created a fireball whose temperature reached 8430 kelvin, or 14,710 F, hotter than the sun’s surface temperature (5778 K). Enrico Fermi estimated that the explosive yield was 10 kilotons (TNT equivalent), but that was incorrect by a factor of 2 and Groves later reported that the yield was between 15 and 20 kilotons. In recent years, the Department of Energy’s official estimate became 21 kilotons, although a recent unofficial assessment postulates 24.8 kilotons. Whatever the exact yield was, the explosion spewed dust and other particles, including unfissioned plutonium, into the air and the fallout spread northeast of Ground Zero.[4]
After the test occurred there were worrisome moments. On 16 July 1945, radiation monitor Arthur Breslow wrote that there was the “danger of an immediate evacuation and the [radiation] count was rising rapidly.” [Document 17] He decided otherwise, and the consensus was that radiation levels were not high enough to necessitate evacuation. The special detachment was disbanded. All the same, a few days after the test, Dr. Stafford Warren wrote to General Groves that “the dust outfall from the various portions of the cloud was potentially a very serious hazard over a band almost 30 miles wide extending almost 90 miles northeast of the site.” [Document 20]
Warren and others discovered that pre-test organizers had overlooked nearby people who were at risk of over-exposure. Notably, the Ratliff family, grandparents and their grandson, lived near a “Hot Canyon” where radiation levels were high. Los Alamos medical staffers would visit this downwinder family and a few others during the months that followed the test and quietly checked on them. They concluded that they were healthy, although cattle and other farm animals in the area, including the Chupadera Mesa, had been exposed to fallout and experienced burns on their skin because they had been out in the open. The cattle would be the subject of clinical studies. [See Document 25] Unnoticed, however, was that other downwinders, including young girls at nearby camp, had also been exposed to dangerous levels of fallout.
Six weeks after the test, Victor Weisskopf and other radiation experts corroborated Warren’s findings about the scope of fallout exposure. They found a “swath of fairly high radioactivity on the ground covering an area of about 100 miles long by 30 miles wide” [See Document 23]. In a likely reference to the Ratliffs, they reported that, “One ranch house east of Bingham received an initial radiation intensity calculated to be 7 r/hr [roentgen per hour],” although the intensities reached “tolerance” within a month. Moreover, after the test, “gamma radiation was found in measurable but very low intensities in Santa Fe, Las Vegas, Raton and even in Trinidad, Colorado (260 miles from zero point).” The report concluded that the radiation levels near the ranch house and elsewhere were not high enough to be dangerous.
The fact that the Trinity test site itself was an enduring hot spot and that the long-term biological effects of extensive “low grade” radioactivity were unknown made health experts and policymakers interested in supporting systematic research. Dr. Joseph Hamilton, then with the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory, saw two justifications for further work. One was a potential legal question: the “immediately practical questions” relating to the “possibilities of biological injury to flora and fauna of the area and to man so as to provide whatever data may be necessary to meet any medical legal considerations which may arise.” Hamilton saw another purpose as “more important” because of its broad military implications. That involved the “accumulation and analysis of sufficient data [to] make possible the prediction of the various chains of events which may take place following the contamination of large land areas with the release of fission products” whether by accident or military action. [See Document 26]
To foster such research, Hamilton sent a proposal to Stafford Warren, then Dean of UCLA’s Medical School. Three years after Trinity, with funding from the Atomic Energy Commission, the newly-created Atomic Energy Project at UCLA began a research effort to measure and evaluate the scope and impact of the Trinity fallout. The Atomic Energy Commission underwrote the “Alamogordo” research, which produced a number of studies during the late 1940s and the 1950s. The studies had limited circulation and are obscure to this day, although historian Janet Farrell Brodie has shed light on them in her publications.[5] Today’s compilation includes several of the UCLA reports, copies of which have become difficult to secure due to recent policy changes by the Department of Energy (see sidebar). The reports are highly technical, but some of their conclusions are clear enough and readers with scientific aptitudes and interests may find them useful for further study.
The project director at UCLA, Dr. Albert W. Bellamy, was concerned about possible hazards from “wind-blown dust that is in the air, which is of frequent occurrence... especially as regards alpha emitters,” which in the aggregate could “in time induce lung tumors in mice.” But he believed that more data was necessary. Detecting alpha radiation was an understood method of discovering plutonium in the human body, but the technology in use at the time was imprecise at best. While plutonium was a known toxin and understood to accumulate in bones, its impact on humans was far from understood.
Published in 1949, the first UCLA Alamogordo study discussed a 1948 survey of a 1,130 square mile area extending northeast from the Trinity site, the “swathe” of land discussed in the September 1945 Los Alamos report. The detonation area itself had levels of radioactivity that “create a strong presumption of hazard to living things that remain continuously in this area.” Otherwise, “the amount of radioactive fission product to be found in any one place throughout this area are relatively small.” The exception was the Chupadera Mesa, 28 miles northeast of Ground Zero, where “enough radioactive material [had] settled out … to produce superficial skin ‘burns’ on cattle grazing there.”
The report found that “the greatest concentration of radioactive fission products are not great enough anywhere in the contaminated region and especially outside the Crater Area to present a significant immediate hazard to man or his domestic animals from total body exposure to beta gamma contamination.” As “gratifying” as that conclusion was, the authors left open the possibility of long-term health risks. It “would be rash to conclude … that no hazards associated with products of the bomb detonation exist in this area, the harmful effects of which may not appear for a number of years.”
Like the 1948 survey, the reports that followed raised questions that it could not answer. The report from early 1951 discussed findings for the area “along the line of Fall-out for at least a distance of eighty-five miles from the Fenced Area.” There the research team found plutonium in soil and plants and “Alpha emitters, presumably plutonium … in airborne material from the Crater Region and the --Chupadera Mesa.” The scientists suggested that the “air-borne material ... which because of its particle size and level of alpha activity appear[ed] at this time, to be of greatest concern.” Yet the “biological significance” of that and other data could not be evaluated: it was not “possible under the present circumstances ... to assess the potential hazard of plutonium found to the people and cattle living” on the Mesa.
Another UCLA report from 1951 was also unsettling. For example, the “fission product contamination of the Chupadera Mesa is relatively greater now than in the past.” While the researchers found “no hazard from external total body exposure to penetrating ionizing radiation (gamma rays)” outside of the restricted area at Ground Zero, they did not “assume at this point that that no hazard exists … from the widespread fission product contamination.” They reported that there are “many potential long term insidious hazards from the present low level contamination which is the focal point of these studies.” Evidence from the annual biological surveys was “beginning to accumulate … that such hazards exist.”
A UCLA report from 1957 provided little comfort that radioactive contamination had dissipated. Drawing on new data, researchers found that that “the area originally contaminated by fall-out from the Trinity detonation was greater than the 1,100 square miles estimated by the 1948 survey” (although an updated square mile estimate was not provided). The researchers found plutonium “in amounts up to 0.007 micrograms per square foot of soil, one-half inch deep, at a distance of 88 miles northeast of the site of detonation,” with even more, l07 micrograms per square foot, on the Chupadera Mesa. Thus, there had been “no appreciable decrease in plutonium content of the soils … due to erosional factors.”
That radioactive contamination persisted in the Trinity area and in New Mexico was detailed in other reports. None of the UCLA studies pointed to a specific public health impact from the contamination. Even though most of the reports were unclassified, they were closely held and unavailable for many years. By contrast, the Center for Disease Control published a major study in 2010, the Los Alamos Historical Document Retrieval and Assessment, based on wide ranging research in the Los Alamos Laboratory archives, which sought to determine the impact on New Mexico of the Laboratory’s radioactive releases, including the Trinity test.[6]
The LAHDRA report provided much information, including the startling finding that the Trinity test produced radiation “exposure rates in public areas [that] were measured at levels 10,000-times higher than currently allowed” (p. 22-3). Nevertheless, it refrained from drawing conclusions about the health impact. Even though “internal radiation doses could have posed significant health risks for individuals exposed after the blast … [too] much remained undetermined about exposures from the Trinity test to put the event in perspective as a source of public radiation exposure or defensibly address the extent to which people were harmed.” (p. 10-50).
To fill the gaps in the LAHDRA report, the National Cancer Institute assessed the health impact of the Trinity radiation, eventually producing studies estimating radiation doses and projecting cancer risks from fission products. A recent study summarized the NCI’s findings: significant exposures to fallout “were limited to five counties (Guadalupe, Lincoln, San Miguel, Socorro, and Torrance), with those counties “projected to account for more than 70% of the excess cancer cases.” Specifically because thyroid glands concentrate radioidine (one of the radionuclides created by the detonation), “thyroid cancer was estimated to be the most common cancer type that could possibly be attributed to fallout exposure.” The “attributable fraction of Thyroid cancers among the 1945 population in New Mexico was 9.7%” compared to 0.3% for all types of cancer generally. How other health experts have evaluated these findings has not yet surfaced.[7]
The findings about excess thyroid cancers has supported apprehension about Trinity among New Mexican downwinders, who have undertaken long-standing efforts to seek federal compensation.[8] When Congress passed the 1990 Radiation Exposure and Compensation Act (RECA) it excluded populations in New Mexico despite their exposure to the test’s radiation.[9] This exclusion was remarkable when one considers the extent of radioactive contamination caused by the Trinity fallout. A recent study underlines that point by finding that 28 of 33 New Mexican counties, including federally recognized tribal areas, experienced levels of radionuclide deposition that were higher than counties elsewhere that already had RECA coverage. Socorro Country, where the Trinity test occurred, had the 5th highest deposition per county of all counties in the U.S. To make up for the discrepancy, the U.S. Senate has passed legislation that covers counties in New Mexico and other U.S. areas, but the opposition of Speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA) has prevented consideration by the House of Representatives.
Note: Thanks to Janet Farrell Brodie, professor emeritus, History Claremont Graduate University, for providing document copies and information about her research; to archivists at the University of New Mexico’s Center for Southwestern Research for documents from the Ferenc Szasz papers and permission to use them; to Peter Kuran, for permission to use footage of the “100-ton” test; to archivists at Los Alamos Laboratory for copies of films and photographs; to John Fratis Tobin, Pennsylvania State University, for research assistance; and to James Hershberg (George Washington University) and Alex Wellerstein (Stevens Institute of Technology) for sharing transcripts of the James B. Conant notes and other material.
Document 1 New
RG 77, General Correspondence, 1942-1948, box 56, 319.1 (Trinity Test Reports)
Soon after the 100-ton test, Richard Tolman sent General Groves a detailed report with the conclusion that it was “successful as a trial run.” It was an accomplishment in terms of Tolman’s original goals: to provide “preliminary information, from the detonation of.100 tons of ordinary high explosive, as to the success to be expected from observational methods and from administrative procedures proposed for the final test with nuclear explosives.” According to Tolman, the “detonation was evidently high order. It led to the production of a highly luminous sphere which then spread out into an oval form,” which was “followed by the ascent of the expected hot column which mushroomed out at a height of some 15,000 feet.”
Document 2
Los Alamos National Laboratory Website
To prepare for the Trinity Test, especially to help scientists and technicians calibrate and prepare measuring instruments and communications systems, Kenneth Bainbridge supervised a test on 7 May 1945 that exploded 108 tons of high explosives stacked in a tower at the Alamogordo site. Because there had been no previous tests with massive blast effects, Bainbridge saw it as a necessary “dress rehearsal.”[10]
With Los Alamos health and safety experts already concerned about fallout that the Trinity test would produce, a major purpose of the 100-ton test was to estimate the dispersal of fission products. To make that possible, the scientists obtained from the Hanford reprocessing plant a “slug” of plutonium that they dissolved in chemicals and then placed in flexible tubing that technicians strung through the stack of high explosives [See Film 1].
In his report to General Groves on the test, Richard T. Tolman observed that it produced a “highly luminous sphere, which then spread out into an oval form,” that was followed by the “ascent of the expected hot column which mushroomed out at a height of some 15000 ft.”[11] Herbert Anderson, one of the scientists who worked on the 100-ton test, later reported that of the 9,500 cubic feet of earth displaced and loosened by the blast, 40 percent was dispersed outside the crater. Pulverized earth carried most of the radioactivity with the finest particles being three times more radioactive than the larger ones. As Brodie has observed, “This should have raised alarms given the serious windstorms that swept through the New Mexico plains, but apparently did not.”[12]
Document 3
Los Alamos National Laboratory Website
Anderson reported on the latest survey of radiation above the crater 41 days after the test. The purpose was to determine the “permanence of the [radio]active deposit exclusive of the effect of the radioactive decay.” There was substantially less radioactive material “due to the effect of the wind in dispersing the ... material outside the region in which there was measurable activity.”
Document 4
Dr. Louis Hempelmann, the director of medical and health affairs at Los Alamos, found that there were “slight” risks from the test’s dispersal of radioactive products. The explosion produced a cloud that lofted 98 percent of the material rising to a height of 13,000 to 15,000 feet. Project meteorologists concluded that thermal air currents contributed to the cloud’s “rapid dispersion.”
Document 5
Department of Energy [DOE] Open-Net
With the first atomic test approaching, doctors and scientists at Los Alamos began looking closely at precautions and radiation safety measures. Louis Hempelmann prepared the first part of a memorandum that described the effects that could pose dangers, such as blast, radiation, and radioactive materials. Discussing what later became known as fallout, Hempelmann wrote that the “worst possible hazard from radioactive dust would seem to be the one in which the explosion is of sufficient energy to only get the material in the form of a cloud of fine dust.” If the particles fell on a nearby shelter, it would be “dangerous … to breathe for more than 6 minutes.”
To make it possible for real-time measurements of beta and gamma radiation and airborne fission products and to protect staff from radiation, the second part of the memorandum, prepared by electronics specialist Richard Watts, recommended deploying measuring instruments at shelters and mobile units and the organizational structure needed for this work.
Document 6 New
RG 77, General Correspondence, 1942-1948, box 55, 319.1 Program for Trinity Test April 17, 1945
Richard C. Tolman, the vice chair of the National Defense Research Committee, was General Groves’ principle scientific adviser. He explained why a test at the Trinity site was important: to get as much information as possible from “proof testing” of an implosion bomb—the “fat man” type as he later remarked—that was “substantially identical with the first models which are being designed for combat use.” A proof test was not necessary for the gun type nuclear bomb, but with the implosion design there were “unavoidable uncertainties” that made a test necessary. The test of the implosion design with a solid core of plutonium, “the so-called Christy type” (named after Robert F. Christy), was then scheduled for 4 July 1945.[13]
Tolman provided Groves with detail on the program for measuring and observing the test and the organization that would carry it out. Measurement would include the “behavior of the implosion,” “detonator simultaneity,” the time interval between detonation and nuclear action, the nuclear energy released, damage effects produced, the overall behavior of the explosion and its aftereffects, the size, shape, and behavior path of the fire ball, meteorological observations, and health control.
According to Tolman, if the bomb failed to detonate to “high order,” it would be necessary to have “extremely good information as to its actual behavior.” That would make it possible to develop modifications “which will lead to a successful design.” A test of the implosion design was essential in part because it would use stocks of plutonium that were becoming available. “We can no longer regard the implosion design as merely an alternative to the gun type since we know that the latter cannot be used with 49 [plutonium] manufactured at Hanford.” By contrast, if the test was successful, “we shall still be interested in its implosive and nuclear behavior but will now also be concerned for military reasons with its damage and upper air effects.” That meant that “duplication of experimental methods is needed to assure successful collection of the needed data.”
Document 7
DOE Open-Net
Kenneth Bainbridge, the chief planner for the Trinity test, likely saw the Hempelman-Watts memorandum and spoke with General Groves about the “medical legal” problem. Point by point, Bainbridge reviewed the nearby human settlements and installations that radiation could affect, including ranches, towns, and military personnel. In the event that evacuation was necessary, Groves believed that officers would have to accompany military police along with some physicists who would take measurements. Groves also wanted to involve experts on earth shock, blast effects, and the spread of radioactivity, all of whom could be consulted. Owing to the risk of contamination by various fission products, “certain legal problems will arise because some of this land is homestead entry land, some is vacant land, and some is state grazing land.”
Document 8
DOE Open-Net
Two Los Alamos scientists, John Magee, a physical chemist, and Joseph Hirschfelder, a physicist working in the Ordnance and Engineering Division, reinforced Hempelmann’s message about likely hazards. Perhaps influenced by Anderson’s finding about fine particles, Hirschfelder and Magee cited the “definite danger of dust containing active material and fission products falling on towns near Trinity and necessitating their evacuation.”[14] Looking at what could happen to people in the area, they suggested that an individual could receive “approximately 22 R” in the hours after the explosion. That was over 100 times higher than the then-current official safety standard of 0.1 R.[15] To mitigate the risk and curtail the spread of radioactive dust, they proposed deploying crushed rock, concrete slurry and a film of oil at the test site.
Hirschfelder and Magee experienced pushback very quickly—no one wanted to credit their forecast, but they were prescient. Hirschfelder later recalled that “very few people believed us when we predicted radiation fallout from the atom bomb,” observing that the government “acted very cavalierly toward the danger.”[16]
Document 9
DOE Open-Net
Captain James F. Nolan, Hempelmann’s deputy, prepared a report on plans for monitoring radiation and the evacuation of nearby towns in the event of an emergency. The premise was that no individual should “receive more than five (5) r[oentgen] at one exposure.” Five was an arbitrary figure and possibly dangerous in itself, as it was fifty times higher than the prevailing safety standard.[17]
Document 10
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Lansing Lamont Papers, box 1, Notes (Rough Research)
Requiring high-level approval for the safety plan, Los Alamos Medical Group Deputy Director Nolan flew to “Site X” to meet with General Groves on 19 July. “Site X” was the gaseous diffusion plant in Clinton, TN (later known as Oak Ridge Laboratory), that produced the highly-enriched uranium used in the “Little Boy” weapon. Years later, Nolan recounted the difficult encounter to Lansing Lamont (author of Day of Trinity). After waiting outside Groves’ office, Nolan was ushered in. According to his account, after Groves read the report, he “sniffed,” saying, “What's the matter with you, are you a Hearst propagandist?” Nolan recounted that Groves “seemed genuinely sore at [him] for bringing up the prospects of radioactive contamination.” It later took the intervention of the higher-level official Stafford Warren to convince Groves to approve the plan.[18] What upset Groves was the prospect that evacuations could put MED security at risk by attracting the attention of the media, although he may also have been unsettled by the subject of bomb-connected radiation.
Document 11
DOE Open-Net
A few days after meeting with Groves, Nolan and Hempelmann jointly responded to the Hirschfelder/Magee memorandum (Document 6). Their response has been controversial, with some historians believing that it downplayed the radiation danger while others took the opposite view. Compared to Hirschfelder and Magee, Nolan and Hempelmann saw “less likelihood of serious damage to individuals in neighboring towns,” but they allowed for the possibility of “serious” hazards and the necessity for evacuation. Certainly, the efforts to get Groves to approve a monitoring system suggested recognition of the need for safeguards, but it is possible that the higher-level downplaying of radiation dangers encouraged Nolan and Hempelmann to find a middle position. Informing the decisions to monitor Trinity-produced radiation was the need to gather evidence in the event of future legal claims against the government.[19]
Document 12
DOE Open-Net
A week before the test, Los Alamos lab director Robert Oppenheimer met with radiation experts, including Stafford Warren, James F. Nolan, Louis Hempelmann, and Victor Weisskopf. After reviewing the mechanisms that produced fallout and its dispersal, they heard a briefing on optimum weather conditions: the wind velocity should not be too “too high” and a wind to the south would be best because there were no nearby towns and the mountains that would block the spread. A tolerance dose (maximum level) of up to a 100 roentgen was acceptable unless there was further exposure. If the total “integral dose” (total amount absorbed by the body) was in the 60-100 roentgen range, however, evacuations would then be necessary.
Document 13 New
RG 77, General Correspondence, 1942-1948, box 56, 319.1 Trinity Test Reports (Miscellaneous)
Only minutes after the test (05:29 a.m. MT), Groves phoned in an early assessment to his personal secretary Jean M. O'Leary. Groves wanted the information provided to Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s special assistant George L. Harrison [GLH]. According to Groves, the results were certainly “satisfactory,” but “probably results above expectations.” It would take a week before detailed calculations were available, but he provided the estimates of the test’s explosive force made by some of the scientists: Oppenheimer’s “minimum” of 21 kilotons, 10 for Enrico Fermi, and 18 for Isador Rabi. Groves’ own estimate was 5 (which Fermi had seen as a “minimum”). As he thought more about the event, Groves was not sure how best to characterize it, believing the “real answer is certainly satisfactory plus” but possibly ranging “between ‘above expectations,’ ‘excellent,’ and ‘satisfactory plus.” Because officials were concerned that reports of an explosion might reach the press, Groves noted that there was a bright light for about four seconds followed by a glow for a few more seconds.
Groves wanted Harrison to inform his “boss,” Secretary of War Stimson, “of the two things above, [which] are of extreme importance to him to know.” Presumably, the two things were the “satisfactory” character of the test and that the public noticed the lights and the glow. Stimson was in Germany for the Potsdam conference and would inform President Truman.
Later in the morning, Groves told Harrison that he saw the test as “a good excellent” and “above expectations” and that the detonation’s flash could be seen about 180 miles away.
Document 14 New
RG 77, Harrison-Bundy Files Relating to the Development of Atomic Bomb, 1942-1946, file 64
That same day, using the information from Groves, Harrison sent Stimson a brief, oblique message on the test’s success: “Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations… Dr.
Groves pleased.” He also reported that because interest in the explosion “extended great distance,” it was necessary to issue a “local press release” (which noted that an ammunition storage area at Alamogordo air base had exploded).
Harrison sent Stimson a follow-up message on 17 July. Groves further developed his thinking and sent Stimson a detailed report, which included observations by General Thomas Farrell and others. According to Groves, the test was “successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone.” The estimated explosive yield was between 15 and 20 kilotons.
Document 15 New
RG 77, Harrison-Bundy Files Relating to the Development of Atomic Bomb, 1942-1946, file 49
For the Manhattan Project, University of California physicist and inventor of the cyclotron Ernest O. Lawrence had a major responsibility: overseeing the development of the electromagnetic process used to enrich uranium that would eventually fuel the “Little Boy” weapon used on Hiroshima. Lawrence initially opposed military use of the bomb and argued for a demonstration shot, but his report on the test certainly conveyed enthusiasm: “a great milestone in human progress.” Lawrence reported what he saw, the fireball and the ascending column of hot gases, but also what he felt and heard: the shock wave, some two minutes after the flash: “The pressure of the shock wave was not great enough to be disturbing but the noise was very loud and sharp,” like a “giant firecracker set off a few yards away.” Lawrence had spoken with Los Alamos scientists about what could happen, and he was “amazed that the whole business went off so exactly as their calculations had predicted.”
Document 16
The Trinity test planners prepared for the evacuation of any endangered civilians by positioning a small force of 140 enlistees, four officers, and 140 vehicles, equipped with tents, drinking water, rations, coffee, sugar, and milk, among other supplies. The shelter and supplies were estimated to be enough for 450 people for two days. The detachment’s headquarters were set up near Bingham, “the center of the area in the most immediate danger.” Two press releases had been prepared: one concerning the explosion of an ammunition dump, the other explaining the presence of “gas shells” at the ammunition dump that necessitated evacuation for 24 hours to protect people “from the gas and degree of contamination.”
Radiation monitors worked from the base near Bingham and reported to Joseph Hoffman and Joseph Hirschfelder. On 16 July at about 1 p.m., when any possibility of “serious contamination” had passed, Hoffman released the special detachment from further duty.
Document 17
University of New Mexico Libraries, Center for Southwestern Research, Ferenc Morton Szasz papers, box 8, folder 38; source for handwritten notes: DOE OpenNet.
Los Alamos staffer Arthur Breslow was in the group monitoring radioactivity after the test. After taking readings from “falling particles from the cloud which had passed overhead,” a radio failure prevented him from communicating the readings. Leaving his crew behind, he drove quickly to find another radio and saw that the valley in front of him was covered “with a strata of sand-like dust” forming clouds. Discovering that he had not taken his respirator, he closed the windows and used a slice of bread as a filter! Once he had reached a radio close to Bingham, Breslow learned that “there was danger of an immediate evacuation and the count was rising rapidly.” He drove back to warn his crew, but by then the readings were lower and no evacuation decision was made.[20]
Document 18 New
RG 227, Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, Records Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, ca.1939 – ca.1947, Bush-Conant File Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1940-1945, microfilm roll 5, file 38 Bush, V [1943-1945]. Transcript prepared by James B. Hershberg attached, as published by Alex Wellerstein in Restricted Data.
The day after the Trinity test, Harvard University President James B. Conant, prepared a firsthand narrative. Conant had played a key role overseeing the Manhattan Project as chair of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and as a member of the advisory Interim Committee. For his undergraduate history thesis on Conant at Harvard College in 1982, and then for his Conant biography, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age, Dr. James Hershberg was the first historian to decipher Conant’s difficult writing and prepare a transcript.[21] Some years later, recognizing the “gripping” character of Conant’s report, Alex Wellerstein published Hershberg’s transcript online for the first time with annotations. A few sentences from the conclusion of Conant’s account confirm its value and convey its apocalyptic tone:
My first impression remains the most vivid, a cosmic phenomena [sic] like an eclipse. The whole sky suddenly full of white light like the end of the world. Perhaps my impression was only premature on a time scale of years!
Professor Hershberg (History Department, George Washington University) recently requested the National Archives to review the few excised words from the opening lines of Conant’s notes. Citing the Atomic Energy Act, the Department of Energy upheld the excision of the 80-year-old information, a decision that Hershberg intends to appeal.
Documents 19 A-B New
United Kingdom National Archives, CAB 126/250
Once copies are available, this posting will include messages on the Trinity test by Nobel-prize winner Sir James Chadwick, the head of the British Mission to the Manhattan Project, which contributed high-grade physics and explosives specialists to Los Alamos. A few days after the atomic bombings of Japan, General Groves wrote to Chadwick to convey to the British Mission his “appreciation for their own great contributions to the success of our project.”[22]
Excerpts from Chadwick’s reports are included below (thanks to Professor Richard Overy, University of Exeter[23]):
Document 19 A
Report from Washington Embassy to War Cabinet, London “Initial Report by Sir James Chadwick,” 16 July 1945
Jul 16, 1945
“The implosion ‘gadget’ ... was fired this morning. The ball of fire was intensely bright, equivalent to several suns by general estimate, so that it seems reasonably certain that the explosion was equivalent to more than 1,000 tons of TNT and possibly several thousand. This I call completely successful. It was [a] wonderful, even fantastic experience.”
Document 19 B
Sir James Chadwick to Sir John Anderson, 25 July 1945
Jul 25, 1945
“A great blinding light lit up the sky and earth as if God himself had appeared among us...Then I saw the ball of flame, the blue and purple luminosities etc. After about 100 seconds there came the report of the explosion, sudden and sharp as if the skies had cracked...the column of gas had risen and continued to rise in a fairly definite cylinder with a mushroom top. It rose with surprising speed. After some minutes, the column had reached a height which I estimated, by rough measurement, to be about 40,000 feet.
My anxieties over the uncertainties of the test had made me somewhat nervous, and the awe-inspiring nature of the outcome quite overwhelmed me. Although everything happened almost exactly as I had imagined it, the reality was shattering. Even now, a week later, I am filled with awe when I look back at this moment. It was a vision from the Book of Revelation...The efficiency of the nuclear reaction is high enough to give a weapon of military significance.”
Document 20
National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District, Top Secret Manhattan Project Files, folder 4, “Trinity Test” (Microfilm Roll 1)
Stafford Warren’s report dovetailed with Breslow’s account because of his serious concern about the radioactive debris: “the dust outfall from the various portions of the cloud was potentially a very serious hazard over a band almost 30 miles wide extending almost 90 miles northeast of the site.” Warren was close to using the term “fallout,” but “outfall” conveyed the idea. He also observed that there was still “a tremendous amount of radioactive dust floating in the air.” These problems informed his recommendation that any future tests should take place not in Alamogordo but in a region “with a radius of at least 150 miles without population.”
The cloud column mass and top reached a phenomenal height, variously estimated as 50,000 to 70,000 feet,” which towered over the northeast corner of the site for several hours.” Referring to a “deserted canyon” 20 miles northeast of Zero, Warren reported that “intensities ... were high enough to cause serious physiological effects.” He further reported to Groves that it was his opinion “that lethal or severe casualties would occur to exposed personnel up to two miles from a variety or combination of causes, i.e., blast, heat, ultraviolet and missiles.” Those were some of the effects that would be demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although Warren did not mention radioactivity as a lethal factor and perhaps confused it with ultraviolet.
Attached to Warren’s memorandum were diagrams showing the “path of the cloud,” information about the “hot canyon” and the nearby “house with family” [See Document 16], and the cover note to a map showing “isodose curves” indicating the spread of radioactivity.
On 22 July 1945, Warren wrote privately to Nolan, giving him far more alarming impressions: radiation monitors “found radiation at levels as high as thirty to forty roentgens ‘near a lot of houses’ and, in ‘one hot canyon’ northeast of Bingham, radiation ‘totaling 230r.’” Warren further wrote: “Boy what a narrow escape. If we had laid it down in a steady wind as planned when you left we would have had a high mortality!! It was terrific.”[24]
Document 21
National Archives, Donated Records of General Leslie R. Groves, Visitations and Telephone Call Diaries, box 3
The information in Warren’s report may have prompted Groves to call Warren and ask him about a “certain family there.” Groves received a follow-up call informing him that Hymer Friedell’s “boys had made some further observations and are “concerned about one family [no doubt the Ratliffs] to the extent that they want to get in touch with [them] to see how they feel” [See Documents 15 and 16]. While Friedell’s group wanted advice on the “legal end,” Groves said that “there was nothing I could do about it” and that they should confer with Warren. All that was done was to keep an eye on the Ratliff family.
Document 22 New
RG 77, General Correspondence, 1942-1948, box 56, 319.1 Trinity Test Reports (Miscellaneous)
Over five weeks after the Trinity test, Hempelman reported to Groves on the changing levels of radiation at the site, from 650 r per hour on 17 July to 15 r per hour 30 days later. According to Hempelman, “The radiation was due to both induced radioactivity of the soil resulting from the action of neutrons and the deposition of fission products on the ground.” He further declared that “Radioactive materials did not fall from the cloud outside the above area in amounts which would be considered dangerous,” although later reports would raise questions about the level of risk.
Document 23
DOE Open-Net
After providing measurements for the test itself, Victor Weisskopf and his colleagues described the “extremely high” radioactivity in and around the crater but which “decreased rapidly during the first few days.” The final section discussed the fallout on northeastern New Mexico, for which there was a “swath of fairly high radioactivity on the ground covering an area of about 100 miles long by 30 miles wide.” In what was likely a reference to the Ratliff family [See Document 16], “One ranch house east of Bingham received an initial radiation intensity calculated to be 7 r/hr [roentgen per hour].” Moreover, “gamma radiation was found in measurable but very low intensities in Santa Fe, Los Vegas, Raton and even in Trinidad, Colorado (260 miles from zero point).”
Document 24
DOE Open-Net
Joseph Hoffman, who directed the radiation monitoring activities for the area beyond the Trinity site, produced a detailed account of the monitoring immediately at the time of the July 1945 test. According to Hoffman, “one half of all the [radio]activity available was precipitated in the two weeks after the explosion” and 90 percent of it was in New Mexico. As Brodie noted, Hoffman acknowledged “that a localized ‘hot spot’ might have occurred, none was found, and the actual contamination indicated a uniform distribution at a concentration which is considered not to constitute a health hazard.” No monitoring occurred near the Mescalero Apache Reservation or at Ruidoso, the location of a girls camp that “received significant fallout.” With respect to the Apache reservation, Brodie suggests that the test planners chose a day when the “most likely wind direction blew to the north,” thus avoiding the area around that territory.
Almost all of the names of the radiation monitors and other officials mentioned in this report were excised for “privacy reasons.” For example, Arthur Breslow’s name was excised (and Hoffman did not mention his vivid account). Given that the excisions were probably made decades after Hoffman produced this report, they were likely a misuse of the Privacy Act; the individuals mentioned were probably long retired from government service. The National Security Archive has requested an unredacted copy of the report.
Document 25
During the weeks and months after Trinity, Dr. Louis Hempelmann and Los Alamos colleagues visited people who lived near the test site and collected data on beta burns on dogs and ranch cattle. In July 1947, Los Alamos published a compilation of the reports and memoranda that Hempelmann had prepared after the test.
One downwinder family that Hempelmann and others visited several times were the Ratliffs, a pair of grandparents and their grandson, who had been completely unnoticed during the pre-test surveys. They lived near the “Hot Canyon” where fallout levels had been high. The grandson was at school on 16 July so he had less exposure during those hours. The grandparents did not report anything unusual about that day, although during his initial visit, Hempelmann wrote that there was “rain in this area on the night after the shot: this means that some of the [radio]activity was carried into their drinking water and may have been drunk on the following day and thereafter.” [Page 7] During a subsequent visit, on 11 November, Mr. Ratliff told Hempelmann something that he had not mentioned before: “an interesting story of the appearance of the ground immediately after the shot.” The “ground and fence posts had the appearance of being covered with light snow, or of being ‘frosted’ for several days after the shot” [Page 69].
The Los Alamos staffers took samples of the drinking water but apparently none of them mentioned possible health risks to the Ratliffs or others. According to Hempelmann’s calculations during the two weeks after Trinity, the Ratliffs received an estimated 47.0 roentgens of gamma radiation when the “allowable limit” was 1.4 roentgens (Page 9). In any event, during the weeks after the test, Hempelmann reported that the Ratliffs appeared to be in “excellent health.” Other nearby families who experienced the fallout were completely overlooked.[25] Years later, Hempelmann observed, “a few people were probably overexposed, but they couldn’t prove it and we couldn’t prove it. So we just assumed we got away with it.”[26]
Much of this compilation consists of reports, some highly clinical, focusing on the fallout exposure of farm animals, mostly cattle, but also cats and dogs on the Ratliff ranch and elsewhere. With respect to cattle, Hempelmann and others reported lesions on the skin and hair loss, although the cattle appeared normal in other respects. Data collected by the Army indicated that up to 600 cattle in the Trinity area “showed signs of beta rays damage” [Page III-8, after page 69]. The Army purchased 75 of the most affected cattle, with 17 going to Los Alamos and 61 shipped to “Site X.” At Oak Ridge, they experienced various health problems, including skin cancer, with the last surviving member, “Granny,” living until she was euthanized in 1964.[27]
Document 26
Copy courtesy of Janet Farrell Brodie
Medical doctor and radiation expert Joseph Hamilton was participating in human radiation experiments by the time he presented Stafford Warren (who had become a dean at UCLA) with a proposal for long-term studies of the impact on New Mexico of the Trinity explosion. After providing some “sketchy information” concerning the presence of “fission product activity” in a 100 square mile area adjacent to the test site, he suggested a research program divided into two areas.
One area was the “immediately practical questions which relate to the possibilities of biological injury to flora and fauna of the area and to man so as to provide whatever data may be necessary to meet any medical legal considerations which may arise.” The other and “more important” area of research had military implications. It involved the “accumulation and analysis of sufficient data which make possible the prediction of the various chains of events which may take place following the contamination of large land areas with the release of fission products” whether by accident or military action.
From Hamilton’s perspective, the long-range need was to “secure as wide a fund as possible of general information about the contaminated region and any adjacent area which may possess a comparable degree of radioactivity.” Thus, major items for detailed study would be the distribution of fission products in plant life and livestock as well as studies of soil samples. In the meantime, the U.S. “should not open any new areas for grazing until two points are settled, first, the degree of uptake of radioactivity by the livestock, and second, adequate monitoring of all areas which may be contaminated by fission product and plutonium activity.”
Among Hamilton’s conclusions was that the “basic knowledge gained from such studies is indispensable to an evaluation of what the future may bring and the steps which may be taken to meet these problems.” Warren accepted Hamilton’s proposal, and within months the AEC was funding studies at UCLA of the long-term impact of the Trinity test.[28]
Document 27
University of New Mexico, Center for Southwest Research, Ferenc Szasz Papers, box 8, folder 48
Albert W. Bellamy, a professor of zoology and biophysics at UCLA, became the director of the Atomic Energy Project’s research on the effects of the Trinity Test. Having attended a conference on the radiation effects at Socorro, NM, he sent a senior AEC official some of the “more significant impressions and conclusions” concerning the area contaminated by the test. He did not see a “total body radiation” hazard in the area “unless someone should chose to spend about two days or more lying in the ground in the most active area.” There were, however, possible hazards from “wind-blown dust that is in the air, which is of frequent occurrence ... especially as regards alpha emitters,” which in the aggregate could “in time induce lung tumors in mice.” But more data was needed. He also mentioned “evidence that certain plants will take certain elements from very low concentrations in the soil and concentrate them in high degree.”
One of the conference’s conclusions was the need to “determine, with a minimum of time and expense, whether or not biological hazards still exist in the area.” That would involve a “bioassay” of livestock that had grazed in the “active area” for over two years. He suggested “bringing in about 20 head of young stuff from outside the Socorro region” with one group to be “maintained in the most active area on the Chupadera” and the other “in a nearby uncontaminated area.” Also recommended was “greenhouse-laboratory work on plants … to estimate the probability of long range hazards.”
With respect to the trinitite—the soil that the explosion turned into a glass-like substance—at the test site, the conference discussed the “feasibility of preparing a release for the Socorro paper to give the local population some idea of the dangers of getting too familiar with the greenglass and beads.”
Document 28
Radioactive contamination at the test site continued to invite discussion. During a meeting of the AEC’s Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine, James Herbert Jensen, chief of the AEC’s biology staff, discussed a recent visit to the Trinity site. “The question whether the area should be fenced off as a hazardous area was thoroughly discussed.” With the grasses showing “a fairly high level of activity,” he proposed purchasing 10 head of cattle to determine whether “anything of a detrimental nature accumulated in these animals.” With respect to the trinitite found on the test site, the Committee decided that “active measures should be taken to remove this as a potential hazard.”
Document 29
DOE Open-Net
This is the first report on Trinity radiation prepared by Albert Bellamy’s Alamogordo Project at UCLA in keeping with the AEC’s authorization to “conduct a systematic survey of the area ... to estimate the probability that hazards now exist or may arise in the future as a result of widespread low grade radioactivity.” The territory in New Mexico surveyed was the area around Trinity, the Red and Grey Hills Region, the Oscuro Mountains, the Chupadera Mesa, and the Rolling Plains Region, an area comprising 1130 square miles.
According to the report, “all [radio]activities outside the Crater are found in the upper two inches of soil,” and “spread by wind and water, particularly in the Trinity Region.” A radiological survey of 402 small animals “found that activity when present was associated with the digestive tract,” with “no substantial indication of tissue accumulation.” At the detonation point area “radioactivity is still present to create a strong presumption of hazard to living things that remain continuously in this area.” That made it necessary to enclose 145 acres with a fence. Otherwise, “the amount of radioactive fission product to be found in any one place throughout this area are relatively small.”
On the Chupadera Mesa, a grazing area controlled mainly by four ranch owners, “there is a larger amount of radioactivity than in any other place except near the Crater”: “enough radioactive material … settled out over this area to produce superficial skin ‘burns’ on cattle grazing there.” Nevertheless, the report found that “the greatest concentration of radioactive fission products are not great enough anywhere in the contaminated region and especially outside the Crater Area to present a significant immediate hazard to man or his domestic animals from total body exposure to beta gamma contamination.” That conclusion was “gratifying … but it would be rash to conclude, in the absence of specific information, that no hazards associated with products of the bomb detonation exist in this area, the harmful effects of which may not appear for a number of years.”
Document 30
University of New Mexico, Center for Southwest Research, Ferenc Szasz Papers, box 7, folder 34
This study is listed on OpenNet as being in the NTA collection and the editor has requested a PDF from the Department of Energy. Only the excerpts collected by Ferenc Szasz and his notes are available at present.
In this research update, the UCLA scientists reported that they had found plutonium in soil and plants collected from various locations “along the line of Fall-out for at least a distance of eighty-five miles from the Fenced Area.” They also found “alpha emitters, presumably plutonium, … in airborne material from the Crater Region and the Chupadera Mesa.” While concentrations in the soil were variable, the “maximum concentrations ... outside the Fenced Area are found approximately twenty-eight miles from Zero in the downwind trail of the Fall-out.” The scientists suggested that the “air-borne material ... because of its particle size and level of alpha activity appear[ed] at this time, to be of greatest concern.”
The researchers studied rodents that had been collected 28 to 30 miles from the Crater and found alpha activity in their bones, liver, muscle and connective tissue. By contrast, they did not find alpha activity in rodents that were collected in and near the Crater. With respect to the data’s “biological significance,” they could not evaluate it because it was not “possible under the present circumstances ... to assess the potential hazard of plutonium found to the people and cattle living on the Chupadera Mesa.” According to the report, “this area is not suitable for the collection of field data on food ordinarily consumed by humans and no good study has been possible with cattle in the area.”
Document 31
University of New Mexico, Center for Southwest Research Szasz Papers, Box 14, Folder 5, Field Reports of Trinity, 1951
Open-Net provides details on this report, but like the previous UCLA study, DOE has yet to provide a PDF. Based on 1949 and 1950 radiological surveys of soil and plant life and their interrelations, this detailed report included disquieting findings concerning the residual radioactivity of the Trinity Fall-out. For example, “measurable amounts of radioactive fission products ... still are present” in the Ratliff area (near the “Hot Canyon”), the Chupadera Mesa, and “Area 21” (28 miles northeast of Zero). On the Mesa, radioactive contamination was “still concentrated in the upper one or two inches of soil,” while “downward migration of the radioactive fission products may be taking place.” Further, “the relatively greater uptake observed in 1950, compared to 1949, points out that as a potential biological hazard the remaining … fission product contamination of the Chupadera Mesa is relatively greater now than in the past.”
The researchers found “no hazard from external total body exposure to penetrating ionizing radiation (gamma rays) exists any place outside of the Fenced Area,” but they would not “assume at this point that that no hazard exists outside of the Fenced area from the widespread fission product contamination.” In addition, outside the Fenced Area there are “many potential long term insidious hazards from the present low level contamination which is the focal point of these studies.” Evidence from the annual biological surveys was “beginning to accumulate … that such hazards exist.”
The degree of danger, specifically the “absence, presence, or magnitude of the biological hazard” was nevertheless indeterminate because the area was in “flux.” Before conclusions could be drawn, annual surveys and related laboratory research were necessary to “determine the mechanisms by which the long and medium half-life fission products and the important alpha emitters are absorbed and metabolized by important crops and animals.”
Document 32
DOE Open-Net
If any at the AEC had hoped that radiation would dissipate, this UCLA report, Janet Farrell Brodie later explained, “gave even less reassurance as the investigators resurveyed areas studied earlier and corrected earlier findings.” Using new data, the report found that that “the area originally contaminated by fall-out from the Trinity detonation was greater than the 1,100 square miles estimated by the 1948 survey,” although a square mile estimate was not provided. The researchers found plutonium “in amounts up to 0.007 micrograms per square foot of soil, one-half inch deep, at a distance of 88 miles northeast of the site of detonation,” with even more, l07 micrograms per square foot, on the Chupadera Mesa 28 miles northeast of the detonation site. Thus, there had been “no appreciable decrease in plutonium content of the soils … due to erosional factors.”
Document 33
University of New Mexico, Center for Southwest Research, Szasz Papers, Box 8, Folder 8
This 1972 report by Los Alamos scientists several decades after the test found the same overall pattern of plutonium distribution in soil, vegetation and rodents (“as a function of distance from GZ [Ground Zero]”) that Olafson, et al. had observed in 1957. Further, they noted an “increased migration of PU [plutonium] into the soil since the last measurements were made about 20 years ago.”
Document 34
Beginning in 1999, the Center for Disease Control began supporting a detailed study to “identify all available information concerning past releases of radionuclides and chemicals from the Los Alamos National Laboratory.” Based on wide access to a number of archives, the final report, published in 2010, covered a variety of public exposure issues associated with activities at Los Alamos, from plutonium reprocessing and beryllium use to hot cell activities and reactor operations. A major chapter looked closely at the Trinity Test and its “potential doses to members of the public.” As Brodie observed, “For the first time, a publicly available government report provided explanations, tables, and maps of the post-test radiation.” One particularly shocking finding was that radioactive exposure rates in public areas” near the test site “measured at levels 10,000 times higher than currently allowed.”[29]
Despite the data provided on post-test radiation, the report did not draw conclusions about adverse health impacts. According to the report, “Studies of public exposure had been incomplete because they had not “reflected the internal doses received by residents [near the Trinity test] from intakes of airborne radioactivity and contaminated water and food.” Thus, “too much remains undetermined about exposures from the Trinity test to put the event in perspective as a source of public radiation exposure or to defensibly address the extent to which people were harmed” (10-50). A recent study by NCI and DOE researchers attempts to fill the gap by estimating numbers of excess cancers [See endnote 6].
[1] . Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, The Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man ( South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 2002), 395; Alan B. Carr, Alan B. Carr, “Thirty Minutes Before the Dawn,” Nuclear Technology 207 Supplement 1 (2021): S2-S3; Sabine Lee, “’Crucial? Helpful? Practically Nill?’ Reality and Perceptions of Britain’s Contribution to the Development of Nuclear Weapons During the Second World War,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 33 (2022), 31.
[2] . Toshihiro Higuchi, Political Fallout: Nuclear Weapons Testing and the Making of a Global Environmental Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020), 20.
[3] . Higuchi, Political Fallout, 20.
[4] . Nelson Eby, Robert Hermes, Norman Charnley, and John A. Smoliga, “Trinitite—The Atomic Rock,” Geology Today (2010): 181; Carr, “Thirty Minutes Before the Dawn,” S11; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 408.
[5] . Janet Farrell Brodie, The First Atomic Bomb: The Trinity Site in New Mexico (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2023); Brodie, “Radiation Secrecy and Censorship After Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” Journal of Social History 48 (2015): 842-64, and Brodie, “Contested Knowledge: The Trinity Test Radiation Studies,” Brinda Sarathy, Vivien Hamilton, and Janet Farrell Brodie, eds., Inevitably Toxic: Historical Perspectives on Contamination, Exposure, and Expertise (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018), 50-73.
[6] . Apparently what inspired the LAHDRA study were “alarmingly high numbers of brain cancer” on Los Alamos’ west side. Although it was later determined that the numbers were a statistical fluke, continued public concern led the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to undertake a study of Los Alamos Laboratory’s impact on Los Alamos and New Mexico generally. See Ian Hoffman, “Feds To Search for Lab Toxic Releases,” Albuquerque Journal, 24 February 1999.
[7] . Steven L. Simon, André Bouville & Harold L. Beck, “Estimated Radiation Doses and Projected Cancer Risks for New Mexico Residents from Exposure to Radioactive Fallout from the Trinity Nuclear Test,” Nuclear Technology Supplement 1 (2021): S380-S396.
[8] . Brodie, The First Atomic Bomb, 166-174; Nora Wendl, “Trinity Fallout,” Places Journal, June 2024; Lesley M. M. Blume, “Collateral Damage: American Civilian Survivors of the 1945 Trinity Test,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 17 July 2023.
[9] . Brodie, The First Atomic Bomb, 171-173.
[10] . For the 100-ton test, see Carr, “Thirty Minutes Before the Dawn,” S4-S5; Brodie, The First Atomic Bomb, 14-19; and Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 77-83. For “dress rehearsal,” see K[enneth] T. Bainbridge, Trinity, Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-6300-H, May 1976, 7, OpenNet.
[11] . Bainbridge, Trinity, 9.
[12] . Brodie, The First Atomic Bomb, 17.
[13] . Thomas A. Chadwick and M. B. Chadwick, “Who Invented the Trinity Nuclear Test’s Christy Gadget? Patents and Evidence from the Archives,” Nuclear Technology 207:sup1, S356-S373. See also Alex Wellerstein, “Christy’s Gadget: Reflections on a Death”, Restricted Data, 5 October 2012.
[14] . For Hirschfelder’s explanation of how he and Magee concluded that the detonation would produce fallout, see “The Scientific and Technological Miracle at Los Alamos,” in Lawrence Badash et al., eds., Reminisces of Los Alamos, 1943-1945 (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: D. Riedel, 1980), 73-75.
[15] . James L. Nolan, Atomic Doctors: Conscience and Complicity at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020), 49.
[16] . Nolan, Atomic Doctors, 40, 46.
[17] . For the origins of the 0.1 r standard, see Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail, 23-28.
[18] . Nolan, Atomic Doctors, 41-43.
[19] . See Nolan, Atomic Doctors, 43-48, for a review of the issues involving his grandfather’s memorandum and the legal claims problem.
[20] . Brodie, The First Atomic Bomb, 26-27.
[21] . James B. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York: Knopf, 1993), 231-234 and 758-760.
[22] . Quotation from Sabine Lee, “‘Crucial? Helpful? Practically Nil?’ Reality and Perception of Britain’s Contribution to the Development of Nuclear Weapons during the Second World War,” 30.
[23] . Professor Overy cites Chadwick’s reports in his new study, Rain of Ruin; Tokyo, Hiroshima, and the Surrender of Japan (New York: W.W. Norton, 2025).
[24] . In Atomic Doctors, at pages 51-52, Nolan quotes the Warren letter, which is in his personal collection and unavailable to researchers. For further detail on fallout spread after Trinity, see Higuchi, Political Fallout, 19-22, and Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail, 102-108.
[25] . For more on the Ratliffs, see Barton Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail, 104-105, and Brodie, The First Atomic Bomb, 167-169.
[26] . Higuchi, Political Fallout, 21.
[27] . Annamaria Haden, “Radioactive Cows,” Agricultural History Society, 6 November 2023.
[28] . Brodie, “Contested Knowledge: The Trinity Test Radiation Studies.”
[29] . Brodie, The First Atomic Bomb, 169