Virtual Reading Room
Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel
CIA Mandatory Declassification Review release in 2017
State Department Policy Planning Staff director Gerard C. Smith had been working closely with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in trying to develop alternatives to massive retaliation which both believed was becoming less and less credible as the "primary deterrent to all kinds of Communist aggression." In this paper, Smith fleshed out proposals for a minimum deterrence force that he believed was consistent with the direction of Dulles' thinking. But Smith's suggestions for an alternative nuclear strategy met formidable resistance at the Pentagon, although some of his ideas would dovetail with the policies of the Democratic administrations during the 1960s.[18]
Navy Archives, Arleigh Burke Papers, SIOP/NSTL Briefing Folder; DNSA
DNSA; from RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, box 7, Apr 1974 Nodis Memcons
Carter Presidential Library
Gorbachev Foundation
RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 20, Envelope G Tinian Files, Top Secret
This summary included several intercepted messages from Sato, who conveyed his despair and exasperation over what he saw as Tokyo’s inability to develop terms for ending the war: “[I]f the Government and the Military dilly-dally in bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes.” Sato remained skeptical that the Soviets would have any interest in discussions with Tokyo: “it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Three Power Proclamation and then engage in conversations with our special envoy.”
RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, Files no. 5b and 5e (copies from microfilm)