Cover of CIA Pamphlet “Intelligence in the War of Independence”
CIA and Ford Administration Used Bicentennial to Justify Covert Intelligence Operations
Washington, D.C., July 1, 2026 - A pamphlet published 50 years ago by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to celebrate the United States Bicentennial and highlight the role of secret intelligence operations in the U.S. Revolutionary War was part of an effort by the Agency and the White House to push back against wide-ranging congressional investigations of CIA abuses, according to declassified records recently discovered at the Gerald Ford presidential library and the CIA’s online reading room.
The new Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George H. W. Bush, introduced the pamphlet, “Intelligence in the War of Independence,” explaining that, while much had been written about the revolutionaries who fought overtly, “Less has been written and is known of the equally courageous group of patriots who served quietly and without recognition in a more secret war—the battle for intelligence on the enemy’s ‘designs and motions.’” (Document 1)
The CIA distributed copies to members of the Cabinet, Congress, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, CIA employees, and the Virginia chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution, among others. A memo from the CIA’s Office of Administration explained how, “interestingly enough,” the Deputy Director for Operations, in charge of CIA covert operations, “continues to ask for copies to give to liaison services and foreign visitors.” (Document 12) Over the decades, the pamphlet went through several printings, and its popularity soared on July 4, 2014, after the CIA shared it on its newly launched Twitter account, garnering nearly a million impressions worldwide. (Document 14)
At first glance, the pamphlet appears to be one of the many innocuous publications, trinkets and events produced and coordinated by the congressionally mandated American Revolution Bicentennial Administration (ARBA) to celebrate the founding of the U.S.[1] But the documents featured here today make clear that there was an ulterior motive: to improve the Agency’s public image amid ongoing investigations into CIA misdeeds and to stifle congressional efforts to curtail the President’s unilateral power to conduct covert operations.
Congress created the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission (ARBC) in 1966 to give the government a decade to prepare for the celebrations. However, by 1973, the group had accomplished little, and perceptions of “ineptitude and partisan politics” pushed Congress to replace the ARBC with the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration (ARBA). With 160 employees, ARBA’s role was to help coordinate nearly 2,800 projects nationwide, including 148 activities with an international scope. The official Bicentennial period was to begin in March 1975 and continue until the end of 1976. (Document 2)
At first, the CIA was not keen on participating in the Bicentennial celebrations. Since 1970, the ARBC had struggled to get input from the CIA and other agencies, with President Richard Nixon at one point noting that Agency cooperation with the Bicentennial committee had been “inadequate.” In the summer of 1972, William Colby, then the CIA’s Executive Director-Comptroller (and who would become DCI in September 1973) said in a letter to the ARBC that the “nature of CIA offers little to contribute to [the] Bicentennial program.” (Document 11)
But everything changed on December 22, 1974, when journalist Seymour Hersh published a historic exposé of CIA abuses in the New York Times that sparked what the Agency would refer to as “The Time of Troubles.” Throughout the Bicentennial period, the CIA and the executive branch would come under intense scrutiny from the press and from a series of government investigations of U.S. intelligence activities, including the Rockefeller Commission (established by President Gerald Ford), and especially the Senate’s Church Committee and the Pike Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. Within a few months, executive branch officials began to see the Bicentennial as an element of their strategy to limit the calls for reform and accountability of the U.S. intelligence community.
On April 12, after attending a party hosted by NBC journalist David Brinkley, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger shared his frustrations about how DCI William Colby was handling the fallout from the intelligence inquiries with President Ford, recommending that “Colby must go.” The problem was that Colby was unwilling to play hardball to the degree desired by Kissinger, evident in his unwillingness to “deny there had been any assassinations or plans for them.” Ford wanted to give a foreign policy speech to show strength and inquired if he could not “weave into the bicentennial something about our foreign policy?” (Document 3)
The CIA was slower to see the political value of the Bicentennial. This would change in late June when M. Graham Clark, the President General of the National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution (SAR) invited DCI Colby to give the principal address at the organization’s 85th annual congress.[2] Colby was unavailable, but the National Security Council was able to convince the deputy DCI, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, to give the keynote address on July 1, 1975. SAR gave Walters its Gold Good Citizenship Medal and issued a resolution criticizing an apparent “concerted effort among certain groups, including part of the news media, either to abolish the Central Intelligence Agency or to so restrict its activities as to prevent it from performing its functions effectively.”[3] More importantly, Edward F. Sayle, curator of the CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection—which includes more than 22,000 manuscripts on intelligence history—happened to attend Walters’ speech. (Document 4)[4]
Sayle had a love of history, particularly the Revolutionary War, and was a member of the George Mason chapter of the SAR and the Chair of the Arlington County Bicentennial Commission.[5] A couple of weeks after the Walters speech, Sayle wrote a memo seeking a meeting with the Deputy Director to present his and a colleague’s thoughts on “exploiting the Bicentennial.” The idea came to him after witnessing “the value of the ‘carry-home’ reactions to the General’s [Walters’] talk by some admittedly significant community leaders.” Sayle explained that “the Agency might derive significant p.r. benefit by fulfilling a role in the national Bicentennial celebration” through the publication of an “honor role [sic]” of American intelligence officers of the Revolutionary War. Then, organizations like the SAR would “propagandize, favorably, the role of those men,” helping to legitimize the idea of secret intelligence operations that were then under severe scrutiny. (Document 4) Sayle was able to convince a still hesitant Agency leadership that a pamphlet on intelligence during the American Revolution was “appropriate in terms of today’s negative publicity.” (Document 6)
The White House was reaching a similar conclusion. John O. (“Jack”) Marsh, the Counselor to President Ford, whose responsibilities included helping to coordinate the executive branch’s role in the Bicentennial and dealings with the Church Committee, explained to his aide, Wes Clark: “My thought is that working perhaps with CIA you can use their resources to develop interesting historical background as precedent for what we are doing today.” Marsh explained that “you will find in the American Revolution a tremendous reliance on intelligence and psychological warfare to include black propaganda. Washington actually ran the operations… Jefferson and Franklin were also active and developed a desertion plan aimed at the Hessians.” Marsh, who was one of the strongest opponents of congressional attempts to rein in the President’s powers to unilaterally wage covert operations, saw the Bicentennial as a way to “help build public understanding and support” for intelligence operations. (Document 5; on Marsh’s role in pushing back congressional legislation, see a forthcoming EBB) In a memo, John Blake, the Deputy Director for Administration, explained to his colleagues that Clark “strongly urges” the publication of an article in the New York Times Magazine on intelligence in the Revolutionary War “for widest possible distribution.” The problem with the White House plan was the difficulty in persuading the New York Times to publish an article written by the CIA, prompting Clark to suggest that “perhaps this could be avoided by having an Agency staffer writing independently as a non-CIA attributable author” or by convincing an outside scholar to write the article with Agency assistance. (Document 7)
In late October or early November, the CIA settled on an official Agency pamphlet that DCI Colby “enthusiastically endorsed” and “desperately wanted” to see “published prior to his leaving the Agency.” (Document 11) Colby’s successor as DCI, George Bush, wanted the Agency’s research to be broken down into “useful excerpts for speeches for CIA people and for White House people showing that intelligence made a remarkable contribution to the freedom of this country.” (Document 11) There would be no shortage of political speeches and press interviews by high-ranking agency officials.
On January 8, 1976, Colby went on The Today Show and, when asked about the exposure of (and congressional opposition to) CIA actions in Angola, turned to the founding fathers: “I think the answer is that if you take, in this Bicentennial year, a quotation from the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress in 1776, their comment was that ‘we find, by fatal experience, that the Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets.’ I think that’s a little advice to us. Now we have a new law passed last December which requires us to report to six committees. Almost everything that’s been reported to those six committees has been exposed in the press.” (Document 8)
In a similar manner, DDCI Walters gave a number of speeches throughout 1976 using historical anecdotes from the Revolutionary War to counter critiques of CIA intelligence operations. In a speech in Houston, Walters declared that “intelligence is a great tradition in the United States” and explained how “George Washington staged three separate kidnap attempts on Benedict Arnold and I think we all know what he was going to do with Benedict Arnold when he got him. He also attempted to kidnap Prince William of Britain, George III’s fourth son.” Benjamin Franklin “was opening British mail like crazy, and they caught him and fired him. So, he went off and joined the Revolution and he went to France where he represented the Revolution. And while in France he designed a printing press. What did he print on the printing press? Well, he printed British currency, British passports, and fabricated atrocity stories.” Finally, Walters got to the point, “As I say, we tend to have this feeling that all this spying and dirty work is fine for those dirty old disreputable British, French, Germans, Russians, but not we pure Americans; we don't do that sort of thing. Well, that’s just not true. We do.” (Document 9)
As Sayles expected, organizations like SAR showed their unflinching support for such declarations. An article in the winter issue of SAR Magazine describing another Walters speech chastised, “Those Congressional panels investigating U.S. intelligence activities might do a little bicentennial reading to get their well-publicized seizure of moral outrage in better perspective.”[6] (The SAR Magazine, Winter 1976, p. 5)
Sayle would later be awarded a Special Achievement Award for writing “Intelligence in the War of Independence.” His research was praised for having been used by “Some White House speakers at Bicentennial events” and for the “extensive use” by senior officials “of the data he compiled on the uses and significance of intelligence in American history.” (Document 13)
The pamphlet was published in the fall of 1976. Not everyone was happy with it. In a journal entry, the CIA’s Office of Legislative Counsel noted that Representative Ronald Dellums (D., Calif.) had complained about the $4,500 expense to publish 10,000 copies of a pamphlet he said “may be a lobbying activity by the Agency of questionable propriety.” (Document 10)
You can read the pamphlet and related documents below.
Document 1
This pamphlet represents the CIA’s primary contribution to the Bicentennial celebrations. It opens with a quote from General George Washington, who observed, “The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged -- All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible.” The pamphlet repeatedly emphasizes the need for utmost secrecy, noting that Thomas Paine was discharged from the Committee of Secret Correspondence for “divulging information.” In addition to stressing the importance of maintaining government secrecy, the pamphlet provides examples of revolutionaries engaging in controversial acts that Americans were becoming familiar with due to congressional investigations, including political action, covert action, foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, wartime special operations, deception operations, and propaganda.
Document 2
Gerald R. Ford Library (GRFL), John Marsh Files, Box 64, Folder, “Armstrong, Anne”
As the Bicentennial celebrations approached, Anne Armstrong, Counselor to President Ford, wrote this memo to update John Marsh, Ford’s trusted advisor, on the establishment and latest efforts of the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration (ARBA). Armstrong and Marsh would play key roles in ensuring that the ARBA and executive branch agencies aligned with White House priorities.
Document 3
GRFL, White House Office Files, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversation, Box 10, folder, “April 12, Ford, Kissinger”
This memorandum of conversation captures President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger sharing their concerns over mounting congressional and press scrutiny. The discussion highlights frustrations following the pardoning of Richard Nixon, ongoing investigations into the intelligence community, and the impending fall of Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam. To counter these pressures, Kissinger proposed replacing DCI Colby with a more assertive leader, while President Ford considered exploiting the upcoming Bicentennial in a speech meant to regain public support for a more robust foreign policy.
Document 4
CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP80R01731R001900020029-3
In this telling document, the curator of the CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection, Edward Sayle, shares his “thoughts on exploiting the Bicentennial” after witnessing the positive reception to DDCI Walters’ speech at the annual convention of the Sons of the American Revolution. Among his suggestions, Sayle proposes publishing a brief work that highlights the exploits of the American Revolution’s top intelligence officers.
Document 5
GRFL, John Marsh Files, Bicentennial Subject File, Box 65, folder, “CIA Bicentennial Publication”
This memorandum highlights John Marsh’s extensive role in Bicentennial planning, and his desire for the CIA to provide a clear contribution that would “help build public understanding and support” in light of the investigatory scrutiny facing the Agency. Marsh even provides several anecdotes of the intelligence exploits undertaken by Washington, Jefferson, and Franklin as a starting point for an article.
Document 6
CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP77M00144R000500140012-2
This memorandum by John Blake, the CIA’s Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) shows that the Agency’s leadership was becoming receptive to Sayle’s idea of writing a pamphlet on “Intelligence in the American Revolution.”
Document 7
CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP77-00512R000100040197-7
CIA DDA John Blake wrote this memo to update his colleagues on his office’s conversation with Wes Clark, a staff aide to John Marsh, regarding the Agency’s contribution to the Bicentennial. Blake explains that the White House hoped the CIA could get an article on intelligence in the Revolutionary War published in the New York Times Magazine, but Clark was informed that the CIA was already moving forward with a pamphlet.
Document 8
CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110013-6
In his final days as DCI, William Colby appeared on The Today Show to defend CIA interests against mounting calls for legislative reform. As part of his strategy to limit oversight of the intelligence community, Colby cited the example of the 1776 Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress, which prioritized the need for secrecy—even from members of Congress—to protect intelligence operations and national security.
Document 9
CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP80R01731R002000120010-0
During the official Bicentennial calendar, Deputy DCI Vernon Walters delivered several similar speeches across the country to defend the CIA against ongoing congressional investigations, legitimize its actions, and limit the scope of legislation intended to restrain the Agency. This transcript represents an early version of his speech. Walters' defense is at times contradictory. While he acknowledges that the Agency made mistakes and reaffirms the need to follow the law, he blames previous transgressions on “a small number of kooks in the past." Simultaneously, he attempts to legitimize those same morally and legally dubious actions by claiming such acts have a long history in American tradition, dating back to the founding generation. For instance, as the CIA faced criticism for opening Americans’ mail without a warrant, Walters argued that Benjamin Franklin performed similar actions. Furthermore, after acknowledging the ethical problems associated with assassinations, he implied that George Washington would have ordered the execution of Benedict Arnold had the revolutionaries captured him, and ordered the kidnapping of King George III’s fourth son, Prince William, in order to use him as a bargaining chip for a POW exchange. The “dirty work” of intelligence, Walters concludes, is something the U.S. has always done.
Document 10
CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP78M02660R000300110005-9
This journal entry from the CIA’s Office of Legislative Counsel (OLC) details a tense exchange with Representative Ronald Dellums (D., Calif.). Dellums questioned the propriety of the Agency spending $4,500 to print the “Intelligence in the War of Independence” pamphlet, suggesting it might constitute “lobbying activity by the Agency.” The OLC representative defended the expenditure by stating they were following Executive Branch instructions, noting, “I said I can’t believe that what is being questioned is the propriety and legality of the Executive Branch's efforts in this respect which has been widely publicized.”
Document 11
CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP79-00498A000600040001-0
This series of internal CIA memoranda shows that the new DCI, George H. W. Bush, was under pressure from John Marsh, Counselor to President Ford, to ensure that the Agency contributed to the Bicentennial. The memos provide a useful chronology of the CIA’s shifting views on its participation in the Bicentennial celebrations.
Document 13
CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP81-00142R000300020008-2
This internal CIA newsletter notes that an intelligence officer (Edward Sayle) has been awarded a $1,000 Special Achievement Award for writing “Intelligence in the War of Independence.”
Document 14
CIA Reading Room, CO6468156
This report, which assesses the CIA’s first 30 days on Twitter, notes with enthusiasm that the Agency’s July 4, 2014, post sharing Sayle’s pamphlet became the account’s fifth-most-viewed tweet, with nearly a million impressions.
[1] On July 4, 1966, Congress passed Public Law 89-491 establishing the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission (ARBC). But after several coordination failures, Congress enacted Public Law 93-179 to supersede ARBC with the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration in 1974.
[2] Eighty Fifth Annual Congress, National Society of the American Revolution, CIA-RDP80R01731R002100010014-7.
[3] The Sons of the American Revolution Magazine, CIA-RDP91-00901R000700030022-2.
[4] Ward Warren and Emma Sullivan, “The Historical Intelligence Collection,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 37, No. 1.
[5] “Edward F. Sayle, Retired CIA Curator, Dies at 61,” The Washington Post, October 5, 1989.
[6] The SAR Magazine, Vol. LXX, No. 3, pg. 5.