This image of Vice President George H. W. Bush meeting with Manuel Noriega in 1983 surfaced in the media during the 1988 presidential campaign.
1989 legal memos said President had “inherent constitutional authority”
to act unilaterally and “contravene customary international law”
CIA warned that Noriega could produce “credible new evidence...that
would incriminate US government officials in the Iran-Contra affair”
Washington, D.C., January 16, 2026 - The Justice Department official who wrote the legal opinion determining that President Donald Trump had the constitutional authority to “unilaterally order” the “extraordinary rendition” of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro relied heavily on secret legal architecture authored 36 years ago by William P. Barr to justify the U.S. invasion of Panama, according to declassified documents uncovered by the National Security Archive. These include secret White House memos, highly classified intelligence reports, and sensitive legal opinions recently discovered among the George H. W. Bush presidential papers and that are published here today for the first time.
In 1989, Barr, who was then Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), wrote at least five legal opinions—at least two of which remain classified—related to U.S. efforts to remove Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega from power. Chief among them was a finding that the President had the “inherent constitutional authority” to arrest individuals abroad “even if those actions contravene customary international law” and “even if they contravene unexecuted treaties or treaty provisions, such as Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,” which bars threats and use of force among member states except in self-defense. Barr later served as U.S. Attorney General during Trump’s first term and authorized the original U.S. indictment of Maduro in 2020.
On December 23, 2025, Assistant Attorney General T. Elliot Gaiser cited two of those Barr opinions (Documents 11 and 15 below) in determining that the President can use the military for law enforcement purposes without regard to international law and without congressional authorization. While the Gaiser opinion is heavily redacted, context suggests that he also relied on a third, still classified, opinion, also written by Barr in 1989 (the conclusions of which were described in a 1996 article published in the CIA’s internal journal, Studies in Intelligence) in determining that the inadvertent killing of a head of state during a rendition operation does not carry a significant legal risk. (Document 20)
In this Electronic Briefing Book, National Security Archive research fellow Dr. Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi takes a detailed look at the U.S. decision-making process in the runup to the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, focusing on Barr’s pivotal 1989 legal opinions, arguing that they should be understood as the “Barr Doctrine.” Barr’s opinions justifying the removal of Noriega established a comprehensive, secret legal framework asserting the President’s “inherent constitutional authority” to conduct foreign policy unilaterally, including through military force, covert action, and in law enforcement operations.
According to Jimenez-Bacardi, the Barr Doctrine “dismantled legal constraints” on the Executive Branch in determining that the President was “not bound by customary international law, may violate the non-intervention principle, can deploy military forces for law enforcement abroad, has a constitutional right to act secretly internationally, and is not constitutionally required to provide prior notification to Congress regarding covert actions.”
Other declassified highlights from today’s posting include:
A fully unredacted essay published in Studies in Intelligence by CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman that sheds light on a still classified 1989 OLC opinion in which Barr argued that the ban on assassinations did not preclude U.S. government personnel from supporting a coup against a repressive foreign government even if the death of the head of state was likely. (Document 20)
* * *
By Dr. Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi
On January 3 of this year, the United States executed a “snatch” operation against Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro, removing him from power. Two days later, Maduro was arraigned in a federal court in Manhattan on drug-trafficking charges.[1] These events bear striking resemblance to the U.S. invasion of Panama, which began on December 20, 1989, and culminated with the surrender of Panama’s strongman, Manuel Noriega, to U.S. forces on January 3, 1990—exactly 36 years to the day before Maduro’s capture.[2] Noriega would spend the next two decades in federal prison for his involvement in the drug trade.[3]
The parallels between these two episodes extend beyond their timing and stated purposes. Both operations provoked intense criticism for violating U.S. and international law. On December 22, 1989, the Organization of American States (OAS) voted 20-1 (with the U.S. as the sole dissenting vote) to condemn the unilateral use of force against Panama as a breach of the non-intervention principle codified in the OAS Charter.[4] The following week, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution by a vote of 75–20 that said the institution “Strongly deplores the intervention in Panama by the armed forces of the United States of America” and which characterized the invasion as “a flagrant violation of international law.”[5] Today, the intervention against Venezuela faces similar critiques.[6]
Despite public rhetoric emphasizing democracy and narcotics enforcement, Noriega’s downfall stemmed from two critical mistakes. First, his pervasive corruption eroded the unconditional loyalty Washington sought. As Colin Powell reflected in his memoirs, “You could not buy Manuel Noriega, but you could rent him.”[7] This transactional loyalty ultimately proved fatal to Noriega’s grip on power. Second, Noriega became a political liability for George H. W. Bush during his presidential campaign and early months in office (Document 5).
With a target on his back, Noriega’s fate became entangled with Bush’s ambitions and the efforts of executive branch lawyers—led by Assistant Attorney General and head of the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), William P. Barr—to reassert what historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. famously termed “The Imperial Presidency,” or the unconstitutional usurpation of executive power at the expense of congress and the courts.[8] Bush and Barr also reclaimed another imperial prerogative: the right to violate international law. As Barr later explained in a 2001 oral history interview regarding deliberations over the use of force against Noriega: “Sometimes there were issues coming up about whether we could support coups, and the extent to which violence was involved, and though it was directed against Noriega, was that assassination? There was a lot of consulting me about those kinds of issues, but basically I was a big proponent of a successful operation there.”[9]
Documents in this posting provide context for a series of OLC legal opinions that collectively form what should be understood as the “Barr Doctrine.” These opinions established a comprehensive, secret legal framework asserting the President’s “inherent constitutional authority” to conduct foreign policy unilaterally—including through military force, covert action, or law enforcement operations (Document 11 and 15). Gaiser’s 2025 OLC opinion, which offers the legal rationale for the U.S. snatch operation against Maduro, draws heavily on these earlier opinions. Regarding international law, Gaiser acknowledges, “To be clear, we have not reached a definitive conclusion about how international law would apply to ABSOLUTE RESOLVE,” the name given to the Venezuela operation. The uncertainty on this point was not due to a lack of time or resources but because it was “unnecessary to address the issue” given longstanding OLC precedents—originating with Barr—holding that Presidents may authorize overseas law enforcement operations even when they conflict with international law.[10]
The Barr Doctrine went further as it dismantled domestic and international legal constraints on the Executive Branch by determining that the President is not bound by customary international law, may violate the non-intervention principle, can deploy military forces for law enforcement abroad without Congressional approval, has a constitutional right to act secretly internationally, and is not constitutionally required to provide prior notification to Congress regarding covert actions.[11]
Gaiser’s 2025 legal opinion also addressed questions surrounding assassination. Although it states that “we probably could not target him [Maduro] directly for a lethal strike,” it also explains that the proposed military operation to capture Maduro “anticipates significant resistance in reaching the target,” implying that Maduro could be inadvertently killed in the process.[12] Ultimately, because the objective of the mission was to capture rather than kill Maduro, U.S. personnel would not—according to this reasoning—bear criminal liability if the Venezuelan leader were to become a casualty during the raid.
A still classified legal opinion by Barr likely helped establish the basis for this view. Notably, accounts from two Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) lawyers, together with documents included in this posting, shed light on that classified opinion, which reportedly concluded that the President could overthrow foreign governments even when such actions incidentally result in the death of a foreign head of state (Document 20). This interpretation undercuts both the non-intervention principle and the executive branch’s own prohibition on assassination under Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, while also facilitating the current administration’s secret legal justifications for killing suspected drug smugglers at sea and abducting Maduro in ways that contravene international law. Earlier this year, Barr—now a private citizen—publicly offered an unwavering legal defense of the Trump administration’s actions toward Venezuela.[13]
William P. Barr’s trajectory within the U.S. government began in 1973 when he joined the CIA. In 1975, during what the CIA termed “The Time of Troubles”—a period sparked by explosive revelations from Seymour M. Hersh of the New York Times alleging illegal and immoral CIA activities—Barr was reassigned to the CIA’s Office of Legislative Counsel to manage the accountability demands of the Church and Pike Committees.[14] Barr first encountered George H. W. Bush when the latter became Director of CIA in 1976, and the two bonded over efforts to counter what Barr later described as the “intensity of the Hill oversight” and “a lot of legislation that curtailed the powers of the CIA.”[15]
Following Bush’s victory in the 1988 presidential election, Boydon Gray, who would soon be appointed White House Counsel—offered Barr the influential position of Assistant Attorney General to lead the Department of Justice OLC. In Barr’s telling, Gray “was intent on getting someone in that position who believed in executive authority.”[16] Barr did not disappoint. For Barr, Gray, and Bush, the prosecutions and legislation that followed Watergate and the Iran-Contra scandal represented an existential threat to executive authority. As Barr explained in his oral history interview, he not only supported pardoning Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger but also recommended pardons for five additional individuals implicated in Iran-Contra, particularly insisting that Elliott Abrams—a key figure in Noriega’s overthrow—avoid accountability.[17] Barr summarized their mission succinctly: “We set up some things because of Boyden’s and my own interest in the powers of the Presidency and President Bush’s, too, because I think Bush felt that the powers of the Presidency had been severely eroded since Watergate and the tactics of the Hill Democrats over an extended period of time when they were in power.”[18]
As the head of OLC, Barr became a member of two key interagency bodies that would play crucial roles in ousting Noriega and reasserting the imperial presidency. First, Barr served on the NSC Deputies Committee, a crisis-management body central to decision-making about U.S. policy toward Panama.[19] Second, Barr chaired the influential “Lawyers Group,” comprising general counsels from the top executive agencies.[20] In his oral history, Barr explained that the Lawyers Group sought to “police” congressional attempts to curtail presidential power, recalling an OLC opinion he wrote that “impinged on congressional prerogatives.”[21] Barr was likely referring to Document 11 of National Security Archive EBB 659 where he argued that the President had “virtually unfettered discretion” in foreign policy, had the prerogative to “act secretly” internationally, and claimed that Congress’s power of the purse was “by no means limitless,” opening the door for the CIA to continue to spend money from its contingency reserve fund regardless of congressional challenge. That constitutional crisis was triggered by a covert operation in early 1989 against Noriega that is discussed below (Document 6 ).
The power of OLC lies in its issuance of authoritative legal opinions on the law that are binding on the executive branch.[22] When national security or foreign affairs are implicated, these opinions are classified. Press reports indicate that the current OLC has issued at least two classified opinions authorizing lethal force against suspected drug smugglers at sea and the Maduro operation—echoing Barr’s earlier precedents.[23]
Classified OLC opinions are controversial because their secrecy makes it unlikely that courts would declare such interpretations unlawful due to the State Secrets Doctrine (along with other judicial doctrines that defer to the executive on national security matters). As a result, these opinions effectively allow the law to be violated in secret. Furthermore, as secret interpretations of law by the department that makes prosecutorial decisions, they function as what Jack Goldsmith, former OLC head under George W. Bush, termed “get-out-of-jail-free cards.”[24] This dynamic was evident when the Department of Justice declined to prosecute individuals involved in the post-9/11 torture program. Executive branch officials have come to understand this impunity-conferring power. John Rizzo, the CIA’s top lawyer during that era, explained his obsession with securing OLC opinions for torture: “An OLC legal memorandum—the Executive Branch’s functional equivalent of a Supreme Court opinion—would protect the Agency and its people forevermore. It would be as good as gold.”[25]
Once Barr assumed power, Noriega became an expedient foil for advancing the Barr Doctrine—quietly and in secret.
Manuel Noriega rose through the ranks of the National Guard as an intelligence officer under the military dictatorship of Brigadier General Omar Torrijos.[26] Noriega received U.S. military training and, according to reports, began collecting CIA payments during the Eisenhower era in exchange for intelligence on leftist student groups.[27] In August 1970, he was promoted to lead the intelligence branch of the National Guard, G-2, making him a member of Torrijos’s inner circle and his main enforcer.[28] Noriega quickly developed a reputation for ruthlessness and corruption, engaging in arms smuggling and money laundering while deepening his connections to the drug trade.[29] Yet, as chief of G-2, Noriega significantly strengthened his connections with the CIA, Army Intelligence, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In his role as Panama’s top intelligence officer, he became the primary “liaison” to the CIA, securing his position as a long-term asset on their payroll.[30]
In January 1976, George H. W. Bush became CIA Director. Later that year the two intelligence chiefs met for the first time.[31] In hindsight, that meeting proved consequential: In the years to come, as Bush’s political career ascended and Noriega’s sordid ways came to light in the United States, the Panamanian strongman became a political liability for Bush during his presidential campaign and early months in office.[32]
Before becoming entangled in U.S. domestic politics, Noriega consolidated his grip on power in Panama. In 1983, two years after Torrijos was killed in a plane crash, Noriega became the head of the military as National Guard Commander—soon renamed the Panama Defense Force (PDF)—making him the de facto ruler of Panama (Document 3 ). That December, Bush—then Vice President and head of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, an interagency effort to combat the expanding cocaine trade—met with Noriega once again in Panama.[33] That meeting also proved consequential when photographs of the encounter resurfaced during Bush’s 1988 presidential campaign, prompting scrutiny, fueling accusations of hypocrisy, and raising doubts about his claims of ignorance regarding Noriega’s illicit activities.[34]
By 1985, cracks began to appear in Noriega’s relationship with Reagan administration officials as labor strikes and protests swept Panama, fueling fears of instability in the strategically vital isthmus. Hugo Spodafora, a rival of Noriega who was providing information to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) on Noriega’s ties to the drug trade—and anyone else willing to listen—was brutally murdered.[35] Finally, in late September, Nicolas Barletta, the nominal President of Panama was forced to resign by Noriega for his support of an investigation into Spodafora’s assassination (Document 3 ). Despite having won the presidency in a fraudulent election, Barletta had strong backing in Washington from figures such as Ambassador Everett Briggs and Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, providing him with a façade of democratic governance.[36] Meanwhile, Noriega continued to play both sides of the Cuban-American rivalry.[37] In December, National Security Adviser John Poindexter, joined by Abrams and Briggs, met with Noriega to deliver the first formal warning about his authoritarianism and involvement in the drug trade.[38]
In 1986, U.S. relations with Noriega improved as Noriega proposed to step up something key figures in the Reagan administration highly prioritized: the contra war against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.[39] This was surprising, as Seymour Hersh had written a front-page story for the New York Times that made public Noriega’s ties to the drug-trade, money laundering, and the assassination of Spodafora.[40] The U.S. Senate quickly took up an anti-Noriega stance.[41] Noriega was about to become a domestic political liability for Reagan and Bush.
Yet, Noriega still had strong allies in Washington, foremost among them were CIA Director William Casey, and NSC staffer Oliver North.[42] Noriega made a quid pro quo proposal to North: Help improve my image in the U.S. and lift a ban on U.S. military sales to the PDF, and I will “take care of” the Sandinista leadership.[43] North tweaked Noriega’s proposal by dropping any reference to assassinations, but the agreement was accepted. Poindexter and Abrams concurred with the plan.[44]
Then, in early June 1987, Colonel Roberto Díaz Herrera, Chief of Staff of the Panama Defense Force, publicly leveled explosive accusations against Noriega after losing an internal power struggle and facing forced retirement (Document 3). Díaz Herrera asserted that Noriega had orchestrated the assassination of Spadafora, manipulated the 1984 presidential elections to secure Barletta’s victory, and intimated that the death of Torrijos constituted a politically motivated assassination facilitated with CIA complicity.[45] His revelations ignited widespread protests and political turmoil across Panama, which were met with severe repression by the Panamanian police (Document 3 ). Concurrently, the United States Senate adopted a resolution urging Noriega’s removal from power.[46] To address the escalating crisis, the Reagan administration convened the inter-agency Panama Policy Review Group (PRG) to undertake a comprehensive reassessment of U.S. policy toward Panama.
Abrams drafted a key memorandum in preparation for a PRG meeting scheduled for July 22, outlining the critical stakes involved in reassessing U.S. policy towards Panama (Document 1). In Abrams’s assessment, Noriega was “STILL THE PROBLEM” that needed to be dealt with. He viewed the Panamanian strongman as a destabilizing force in a strategically significant state and an emerging political liability that threatened to weaken the imperial presidency. Abrams cautioned that growing congressional opposition to Noriega meant that a “lack of swift response will put [the] Administration on [the] defensive with Congress.” To counter this, he advocated for an “all-out effort to dump Noriega” and for DOD and CIA “to take actions that visibly weaken Noreiga’s position.” Among his recommendations was the termination of CIA’s financial ties to Noriega: “We want a cut-off of intelligence relationships with [the] PDF, and an end to Noriega’s subsidy.”
Abrams anticipated resistance from both CIA and DOD to such an aggressive posture—a prediction that proved accurate (For CIA views see Document 3). Following the PRG meeting, Abrams expressed frustration in an action memorandum to Secretary of State George Shultz, noting that most participants “balked at endorsing a policy aimed at dumping General Noriega,” favoring instead a cautious “wait-and-see approach” (Document 2). He attributed this reluctance to risk aversion that stemmed from limited intelligence on the internal dynamics of the PDF and uncertainty regarding the resilience of the political opposition. Abrams observed that there was “little enthusiasm to rush actions which could lead to wholesale violence and the imposition of an even harsher military dictatorship.”
For Abrams, Noriega’s eventual removal was “the sine qua non” for weakening the PDF’s influence and advancing Panama’s democratization and stabilization. Equally important, he warned that a less assertive policy “encourages the Congress further to usurp the foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive Branch with new initiatives of its own” (Document 2). In Abrams’s view, the stakes extended beyond Panama; they implicated the very authority of the imperial presidency.
The policy disagreement between the State Department and the intelligence and defense establishments was ultimately addressed during an August 4 meeting of the National Security Planning Group—the highest decision-making body within the National Security Council. The CIA argued that an aggressive strategy to remove Noriega would likely fail, provoke retaliation against U.S. interests, and, even if successful, result in another military dictatorship rather than a democratic government (Document 3). Instead, the Agency recommended discreet engagement and continued cooperation with Panama’s military, cautioning that a public confrontation would likely backfire. While acknowledging that Noriega’s regime might be most vulnerable to domestic economic pressures, the CIA expressed skepticism about the impact of cutting economic and military assistance, noting that it “amounts to less than $40 million per year. Moreover, Panama has alternative sources” (Document 3).
While not adopting Abrams’s aggressive recommendations, the administration adopted a public economic pressure strategy, suspending both economic and military assistance to Panama’s government (Document 8). Noriega responded in December by expelling the U.S. Agency for International Development. Congress escalated the confrontation by prohibiting further assistance to Panama and suspending its sugar quota (Document 8). This tit-for-tat dynamic unfolded alongside two significant developments. First, federal prosecutors in Florida were developing a case against Noriega for drug trafficking and racketeering.[47] Second, in October, Vice President Bush announced his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination, placing U.S.-Panama relations under the shadow of domestic politics.
By early February 1988, federal prosecutors sought authorization from both DOJ and the White House to proceed with an indictment against Noriega. As Barr later noted in his oral history interview, “The Department [of Justice] had a black eye on that, so to speak, because the whole national security apparatus was really ticked off that the attorney had gone off and indicted a head of state, and all the problems that caused.”[48] Given the election year and heightened congressional scrutiny, it was improbable that the administration would shield the Panamanian dictator. Approval was granted, and the indictments were announced on February 5.[49]
Amid rising tensions, Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle attempted to remove Noriega as head of the PDF. The U.S. tepidly endeavored to support Delvalle but failed miserably.[50] Noriega retained power and ousted Delvalle. With Congress closely monitoring events, President Reagan determined that Panama was not cooperating with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts (Document 8). This decision proved pivotal, triggering a series of sanctions and intensifying the economic confrontation.
The CIA assessed that Noriega would likely respond cautiously to U.S. sanctions, refraining from actions such as demanding the removal of U.S. forces or disrupting canal operations “to avoid giving Washington a pretext to renege on the Canal Treaties” which mandated the transfer of the Canal to Panamanian control and the withdrawal of U.S. forces by the year 2000 (Document 3 and 8). However, the agency warned that Noriega was expected to pursue a managed escalation strategy with the United States, including harassment of U.S. personnel in Panama and the exposure of some of America’s own sordid secrets: “Noriega probably believes he would have little to lose by exposing certain US activities in an attempt to discredit the current US administration.” Exploiting his long ties with CIA operations in the region, Noriega “might try to provide credible new evidence to the US media or Special Prosecutor Walsh that would incriminate US government officials in the Iran-Contra affair” (Document 4). Noriega was not merely emerging as a political liability; his actions threatened to impose accountability costs by elevating the stakes for powerful U.S. officials.
In April, the Reagan administration substantially intensified sanctions against Panama (Document 8). By July, the President had authorized a covert operation aimed at weakening Noriega’s hold on power. During a closed-door briefing to the Senate Intelligence Committee, several senators expressed concern that the plan might contravene the assassination prohibition under E.O. 12333. As one senator reportedly asked, “‘What assurances could the briefers give that Noriega wouldn’t be killed during the kidnap attempt? ... Wouldn’t the covert action be as likely to bring about the assassination of Noriega as his arrest.”[51] Ultimately, plans for the operation leaked to the press, and it never materialized. The White House sought to place blame on Congress for both the leak and the failure of the plan.[52] This episode had two notable implications. First, it intensified a confrontation between the President and Congress over proposed legislation requiring the President to notify Congress of any covert action within 48 hours—a measure Barr would later reject in a legal opinion (See EBB 659). Second, for agency officials, the incident underscored the accountability risks inherent in a regime-change effort against Noriega—issues Barr would also revisit a year later following another failed coup attempt.
Although Noriega retained power, the political stakes escalated on Sunday, September 25. During a televised presidential debate, Michael Dukakis criticized Vice President Bush for failing to use his position of authority to sever U.S. ties with Noriega, accusing him of “in some way being involved in the relationship between this Government and Mr. Noriega and drug trafficking in Panama.”[53] This perceived soft posture toward Noriega threatened to undermine Bush’s political ambitions and continued to cast a shadow over the early months of his presidency.
Two weeks after Bush was declared the winner of the presidential election, DCI William H. Webster met with Secretary of State George Shultz at the State Department to discuss U.S. policy toward Panama in light of the upcoming transfer of power (Document 5 ). Webster noted “some fuzziness as to our objectives in Panama.” The goal was actually clear—to remove Noriega from power—but the strategy was not. The DCI wondered “whether we are attempting to scare Noriega out of office, or whether we are trying to negotiate his departure.” Shultz explained that President Reagan had approved a “negotiating track” that included dropping the indictment against Noriega to induce him to step down. However, Vice President Bush opposed dropping the indictment, and “now [that] the Vice President is President-elect, he thought that President Reagan would defer to him on this, and undoubtedly would not drop the indictment.” Webster added that Bush’s staff was pressing to resolve the issue before inauguration, but Bush’s insistence on keeping the indictment made a resolution unlikely, setting up a future confrontation. The indictment was not dropped. Noriega stayed in power continuing to vex the incoming President.
Within a few weeks of the presidential transition, in early February 1989, the NSC would initiate a “National Security Review of Panama” that would culminate in a Presidential Finding authorizing the CIA to conduct a covert political action to influence the upcoming May 7 elections in Panama (Document 6). Most documents on this operation remain classified, however several press accounts indicate that President Bush authorized the CIA to spend $10 million dollars on the election, including via propaganda radios, and possibly to fund the campaign of the anti-Noriega coalition, the Democratic Opposition Alliance, led by Guillermo Endara, Ricardo Arias Calderón, and Guillermo Ford.[54] At that time, the Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, William S. Cohen (R-ME), pressed the White House to adopt a 48-hour deadline for notifying Congress of covert actions. He further threatened to cut off the CIA’s contingency reserve fund, which allowed the agency to finance projects without prior congressional approval. In response, Barr drafted a legal opinion asserting that such legislation infringed upon the President’s authority over foreign affairs. As the author noted with John Prados in EBB 659, while Barr’s legal opinion concedes “Congress’s right to impose conditions on expenditures, his memo argues that the president’s foreign policy actions supersede the Congress’s limitations on expenditures.” This marked the establishment of the first pillar of the Barr Doctrine.
In late April, the CIA offered a bleak assessment of the situation in Panama: “In the absence of a major US initiative following a fraudulent regime victory in the 7 May elections, we expect Defence Chief Noriega to have little difficulty in consolidating his grip on Panama” (Document 7). The agency further predicted that, once Noriega secured a veneer of legitimacy, he “probably will turn his attention to resolving the political impasse with the United States.”
Anticipating that the elections would be stolen and the crisis would persist, the Bush administration began preparing a series of post-election policy options (Document 8). Officials feared that failure to act decisively would make the administration appear weak at home, creating an opening for Congress to assert greater influence over foreign policy. As one internal warning put it, “[F]ailure to resolve the Panama situation… will confront the Administration with fallout from a perceived foreign policy failure” and challenge “the Administration’s general ability to shape U.S. foreign policy” (Document 8).
With these concerns in mind, the administration considered a wide range of “strategic alternatives.” Options included negotiation, stepped-up sanctions, suspending, abrogating or reasserting U.S. rights under the Panama Canal Treaties, organizing a “PDF coup using covert and other means,” an overt military invasion, or even to “Mount a snatch operation to seize Noriega” (Document 8). Some carried significant risks. To abrogate the Canal Treaties “would play directly into Noriega’s hands,” enabling him to frame the conflict as “Panamanian nationalism versus U.S. imperialism,” a narrative likely to rally support across Panama and Latin America. Conversely, a “Vigorous Assertion” of U.S. treaty rights—such as deploying additional forces or conducting military exercises—might “dampen” domestic criticism but “Crosses the threshold of military force.” A covert coup risked that “Noriega could be killed in the attempt with U.S. blamed,” a possibility that would force CIA officers to weigh the accountability costs carefully and request a legal opinion from Barr. The proposed “snatch” operation, while certain to provoke Latin American and international criticism, was judged to have one advantage: such criticism was “likely to abate quickly if it succeeded.” In short, the administration recognized that violating the principle of non-intervention carried reputational costs but believed these could be mitigated by success. Ultimately, it pursued a combination of measures, including reasserting U.S. treaty rights, planning a covert coup, and preparing for an invasion and “snatch” operation.
The May 7 election was widely regarded as a sham (Document 9).[55] The following day, the NSC convened to review policy options. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney raised a critical concern, observing that a strategy to assert U.S. rights under the Panama Canal Treaties by deploying additional troops “looks like we are preparing for military action. But are we really prepared for it?” Brent Scowcroft summarized the prevailing view: “The consensus was that we won’t get rid of him [Noriega] except by force and pressure.” President Bush concurred, emphasizing that “it must be clear from our policy that we will not continue business as usual and that we will ratchet up.” While Bush acknowledged that asserting treaty rights alone would not remove Noriega, he considered it a “starting point,” adding, “The only option he could see is more U.S. actions and hope that there would be some other thing happening to get this man out” (Document 9). Scowcroft explained that Noriega “may harass the [American] families [in Panama],” though Cheney cautioned that Noriega would be careful not to give the U.S. a pretext to escalate: “[Noriega] has to be careful not to create an incident.” Bush, wary of appearing as an imperialist aggressor, insisted, “We should make it clear that we are protecting a Treaty right. Otherwise, force could be counterproductive.” Still, Scowcroft cautioned that “the Latin Americans still might not understand”—an assessment that proved correct.
The task then fell to the lawyers to craft a rationale for asserting U.S. treaty rights. Nicholas Rostow, serving as Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, expressed little hesitation about the proposed course of action. He explained that the Panama Canal Treaties “impose on the United States primary responsibility for the defense of the Canal and grant broad rights with respect to the discharge of this responsibility” (Document 10). At the same time, he acknowledged that the Treaties also contained binding “prohibitions on interference in Panama’s internal affairs, including infringement on Panamanian political independence.” Rostow suggested that, with a broad interpretation of U.S. rights, “one might argue that the United States could rightfully move its troops in such a way as to interpose them between Noriega’s forces and the opposition without necessarily violating the principle of nonintervention in Panama’s internal affairs.” This reasoning was tenuous, given that Panama held equal rights under the Treaties. To fully respect the principle of nonintervention, the United States should have sought Panama’s consent and coordination before deploying additional troops. Rostow conceded that the planned mobilization and military exercises “would help the opposition to Noriega without too blatantly interfering in Panama’s internal affairs.”[56] Yet, regarding this less “blatant” violation of the non-intervention principle, Rostow cautioned that, “I believe we would not long be comfortable making the case. Such a course likely would evoke public (if not necessarily private) protests from Latin American governments and fuel calls for abrogation of the Treaties.” Rostow’s concerns over his proposed aggressive interpretation of U.S. rights under the canal treaties remained secret, and Washington proceeded with sending more troops and initiating provocative military exercises.
Bill Barr displayed no such hesitation. In what became the second pillar of the Barr Doctrine, the Assistant Attorney General began to open the door for a potential “snatch” operation at the expense of the non-intervention principle. Barr argued that the President “has the inherent constitutional authority to deploy the FBI to investigate and arrest individuals for violating United States law, even if those actions contravene customary international law… even if they contravene unexecuted treaties or treaty provisions, such as Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter” (Document 11). This OLC opinion overturned a 1980 ruling from the same office, which Barr claimed had “erred” in concluding that the FBI could not violate international law. The Trump administration likely relied on this interpretation to justify its “snatch” operation against Venezuela’s Maduro.[57] Yet the FBI lacked the capacity to enter Panama and seize Noriega; military involvement would be required. Domestic law posed an obstacle: the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which restricted the use of the military for law enforcement. Barr issued a legal opinion asserting that this statute did not apply outside U.S. territory (Document 15). With that, the third pillar of the Barr Doctrine was in place. Having overridden U.S. and international law, the military could now “snatch” Noriega.
On October 3, Major Moises Giroldi of the PDF initiated a coup against Noriega, captured him, and asked Major General Marc Cisneros, Commander of the Army component of SOUTHCOM to take custody of the Panamanian strongman.[58] The U.S. was caught off guard. Intelligence gaps on the ground and inadequate communication between U.S. officers in Panama and Washington compounded the uncertainty (Document 12). Officers hesitated to take Noriega into custody because they were unsure of the operation’s legality (Document 13). Barr’s recollection of this event and his careful legal advice is worth quoting at length:
“I knew that we were looking at ways of ridding ourselves of this guy in a lawful way. So when there was the first spontaneous insurgency there by pro-American types—people we felt were not bad actors—I was sitting over at my office at OLC, and I got this call saying, “Could we intervene right now?... Could we start now putting our troops out into the streets in ways that might help the insurgents and lead to the demise of—in this case, not necessarily his death, although I guess there would have been gunfights and so forth. I was asked for this running opinion on how far we could go. I basically said, ‘Just go out there and do what you have to do…’ After that [coup attempt] fizzled, I was a big supporter of taking decisive action and making sure the next time was completely successful. Sometimes there were issues coming up about whether we could support coups, and the extent to which violence was involved, and though it was directed against Noriega, was that assassination? There was a lot of consulting me about those kinds of issues, but basically I was a big proponent of a successful operation there.”[59]
In mid-October, there were rumors of another impending coup. The Lawyers Group organized a meeting on October 10, where Gray was to stress that “the Administration could have responded faster and with greater assurance to last week's coup attempt had there been more advance thinking by Administration lawyers about the legal issues raised by the coup, such as our authority to arrest Noriega” (Document 13). Several lawyers who helped draft Gray’s talking points agreed that moving forward, it was essential to insert executive branch lawyers into the decision-making process. One prominent concern that was raised were assassinations, or as the talking points for the meeting noted, “operations targeting major drug traffickers.” In such cases, “involvement of Administration lawyers is absolutely essential.”
On October 17, the NSC Deputies Committee organized a meeting—which Barr attented—and legal questions regarding aiding rebels were also raised. The Summary of the meeting noted a request, “that State and Defense lawyers confer on how the U.S. military could legally provide weapons to the coup plotters if that were determined to be in the U.S. interest” (Document 14). Barrset out to draft a still classified OLC opinion to address all the legal concerns (Document 13). Although the fourth pillar of the Barr Doctrine remains secret, Jonathan Fredman—a CIA lawyer at the time of the Panama operation—described its main conclusion in a declassified article he wrote for the CIA’s journal, Studies in Intelligence, in 1996 (Document 20). Fredman explains that OLC examined “whether the provision of US support to a planned coup against a repressive regime would necessarily violate the E.O. if there were no specific intent to kill the foreign leader but the plotters contemplated the use of force and the likelihood of violence were great.” Barr concluded that “E.O. 12333 would not necessarily preclude the US from assisting in such a plan but cautioned that the legality of any particular proposal has to be evaluated on its own merits.” The CIA and the military now had the legal green light to help in the overthrow of a foreign government even if it was likely that violence might kill the foreign head of state.[60]
Perhaps to ease any remaining concerns among operators, in late November, a draft Presidential directive was written authorizing “all United State military, intelligence and law enforcement personnel to use whatever force and to take whatever other actions may be necessary in and around Panama, including preemptive action, to prevent any such terrorist or criminal acts from being carried out.” The draft directive ended with a striking sentence: “This order shall supersede any conflicting Executive Branch regulation not required by law, and shall remain in effect until explicitly revoked by me” (emphasis added, Document 16). The President was making it clear than any DOD or CIA directives that prohibited assassination to comply with Executive Order 12333 did not apply.
On December 16, an incident between three off-duty American military officers and the PDF led to the mortal wounding of one American soldier who died the following day. The administration had its long-awaited pretext. On December 20, the U.S. invaded Panama (Document 17). Barr wrote at least two more legal opinions related to Panama. The first dealt with the administration’s declaration of a $1 million reward for information leading to the apprehension and arrest of Noriega (Document 18). The problem was that the State Department only had $600,000 available for such an expense. Barr interpreted the State Department Basic Authorities Act as not “flatly prohibiting the Secretary of State and the Department of Justice from both offering rewards with respect to the same individual.” DOJ would chip in an additional $250,000. Barr then concluded that the DEA could contribute the remaining $150,000.[61] According to Barr, another classified opinion provided the necessary legal justification for the invasion under international law: “We got papers ready for deputizing people as U.S. marshals, the President implementing the arrest of Noriega, and the various legal theories as to why this was a justifiable defensive act by the United States, which of course it was. We had five or six different theories why this was okay under international law.”[62]
As U.S. forces invaded Panama, Noriega sought refuge in the Papal Nunciatura (the Vatican Embassy in Panama). The U.S. military famously decided to blast loud rock music for several days to pressure Noriega to surrender. (In a previous posting, the National Security Archive published the list of the songs that were played by the U.S. military outside of the Vatican Embassy.) In his oral history, Barr was jokingly asked if the rock music was his idea, “No,” he replied, but “that was a cool one.”[63] Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990.
Document 1
National Security Archive FOIA, MORI DocID: 176250.
In this passionate memorandum, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams argues for a dramatic shift in U.S. policy toward Panama, calling for an “All out effort to dump Noriega.” He recommends cutting off the CIA subsidy to Noriega. Abrams accurately predicts that both the CIA and the Department of Defense will resist any significant change to the status quo and view his aggressive approach as premature.
Document 2
National Security Archive FOIA, MORI DocID: 176251.
This memorandum captures Abrams’s frustrations following a meeting in which the Panama Policy Review Group “balked at endorsing a policy aimed at dumping General Noriega. Instead, most PRG participants preferred a wait-and-see approach while we gathered additional information on the evolving situation.” Abrams wants Secretary of State Shultz to lead an effort to force the administration to deal with what he sees as “the central issue”: Noriega. “The decision we must still address is whether to move now to convince Noriega to step down as de facto ruler, or to hold back, seek incremental improvements, and go with the flow of events.” The document makes clear that Abrams remains strongly in favor of regime change.
Document 3
CIA-FOIA, CIA-RDP89B00224R000501730007-4
This briefing book to prepare Director of Central Intelligence William Casey for a meeting of the National Security Planning Group shows that the CIA was skeptical about the prospects of deposing Noriega. The agency assessed, “The government probably will be able to sustain its position by keeping the pressure on until the opposition falters. In this situation Noriega probably will remain until at least 1989, when he claims he will step down.” Instead of a public confrontational policy, the CIA believes that while not likely to succeed at achieving U.S. objectives, the best course remains secret diplomacy, “We believe Noriega will respond best to direct, honest, private communications that suggest his taking a particular course of action that is in his personal interest.”
Document 4
CIA-FOIA, CIA-RDP04T00990R000100470001-9
Amid escalating tensions between the U.S. and Panama, this intelligence assessment concludes that Noriega would likely respond cautiously to proposed U.S. sanctions to avoid giving Washington a pretext to abrogate the Panama Canal treaties. However, the CIA warns that “Noriega probably would increase harassment of US diplomatic and military personnel” and might expose “credible new evidence” implicating U.S. officials in the Iran-Contra affair or other secret dealings between the U.S. and Panama.
Document 5
CIA-FOIA, CIA-RDP89G01321R000500140006-7
This record of the meeting between Director of Central Intelligence William H. Webster, Secretary of State Shultz, and other officials offers key insight into President-elect Bush’s approach to the Noriega question. Bush wanted the matter resolved before his inauguration but refused to drop the indictment that could have facilitated Noriega’s departure. As Webster explained to Shultz, “the indictment appears to be a major problem, with the White House now apparently having no interest in dropping it.” Shultz acknowledged the dilemma but noted, “there was still some hope that by increasing the pressure they could get Noriega to go to Spain if we would promise not to go after him.” That “promise,” however, did not include dropping the indictment, which carried no statute of limitations.
Document 6
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Council H-Files, NSC/DC Meeting Files, Folder “NSC/DC 003 - February 17, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama.”
This memorandum shows that the NSC was embarking on a “National Security Review on Panama” within a few short weeks of the presidential transition. To oversee this process, the NSC Deputies Committee was scheduled to convene on February 17 to examine a covert action proposal concerning Panama. At the same time, Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates is cautioned that “the proposed Finding has not yet arrived in final form from CIA.” Under existing law, the president must sign a Presidential “finding” to authorize any new covert action. Furthermore, legislation requires that the relevant congressional committees be notified of such a finding in a timely manner. The covert action authorized by this finding would ultimately provoke a crisis in presidential–congressional relations, as discussed in EBB 659.
Document 7
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Council H-Files, NSC/DC Meeting Files, Folder “NSC00I2 - April 28, 1989 - Panama [2].”
This pessimistic CIA intelligence analysis concludes that Noriega would have little difficulty maintaining power following the May 7 presidential elections in Panama. Even if the vote proved to be clearly fraudulent, the agency judged that the opposition was too weak and intimidated to mount any significant protest or armed resistance against Noriega, and would instead revert to lobbying the United States for intervention. Furthermore, “We believe a peaceful election—even a blatantly stolen one—will buttress Noriega's support in the military,” given that the officers of the Panamanian Defense Forces shared Noriega’s determination to maintain control over politics in Panama. Once Noriega secured this veneer of legitimacy, the agency expected that the defense chief would seek to improve relations with Washington.
Document 8
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Council H-Files, NSC/DC Meeting Files, Folder “NSC00I2 - April 28, 1989 - Panama [2].”
This addendum to a State Department paper on U.S. policy toward Panama evaluates a wide range of options for addressing the escalating crisis—from accommodating Noriega to launching a full-scale invasion. Among the most notable proposals are measures to exploit the Panama Canal Treaties. These include suspending the treaties, threatening to abrogate them, or, conversely, a “Vigorous Assertion” of U.S. rights under the treaty, such as deploying additional military forces or conducting exercises to pressure Noriega. Suspending the treaties, while offering some domestic benefits, “would generate widespread international condemnation and an anti-U.S. backlash in Panama.” Abrogation was considered even more dangerous, as it “would play directly into Noriega's hands,” enabling him to frame the conflict as “Panamanian nationalism versus U.S. imperialism which he could use to gain support within Panama and Latin America.” A more assertive posture in the Canal Zone might “dampen” criticism at home but it “Crosses the threshold of military force.” Other options are far more aggressive. One proposal is to “Mount a snatch operation to seize Noriega,” a plan described as “Risky and complex” and one that “Assumes possibility of U.S. casualties.” Another is to “Organize PDF coup using covert and other means,” though it warns starkly that “Noriega could be killed in the attempt with U.S. blamed.”
Document 9
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Council H-Files, NSC/DC Meeting Files, Folder “NSC0015 - May 08, 1989 – Panama.”
These detailed minutes of an NSC meeting held the day after the Panamanian elections reveals that U.S. officials were seeking to escalate the crisis, hoping that Noriega might make a misstep that could justify an invasion and regime change. Early in the discussion, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney was direct, remarking that a policy asserting U.S. rights under the Panama Canal Treaties by deploying additional troops “looks like we are preparing for military action.” President Bush acknowledged that such measures would not remove Noriega but described them as a “starting point,” adding, “The only option he could see is more U.S. actions and hope that there would be some other thing happening to get this man out.” Scowcroft explained that Noriega “may harass the [American] families [in Panama],” though Cheney believed Noriega would avoid giving Washington a pretext to escalate: “[Noriega] has to be careful not to create an incident.”
Document 10
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, Nicholas Rostow Files, Folder, “Panama - Current (Daniel Levin) (6].”
This memorandum written by NSC legal adviser Nicholas Rostow provides a legal justification for the unilateral deployment of U.S. troops to Panama under a broad interpretation of U.S. rights under the Panama Canal Treaties. Rostow presents the legal challenge for the U.S.: “The Treaties elaborate defense rights in terms of defending the neutrality and effective operation of the Canal against all threats as determined to exist in the unilateral judgment of either party. This broad grant of authority to use armed force under the Treaties is limited for the United States by the commitment also set forth in the Treaties themselves not to interfere in the internal affairs of Panama.” Rostow ultimately concludes that the U.S. can legally send U.S. forces to Panama without the latter’s consent but clearly implies that the U.S. is violating the non-intervention principle in doing so.
Document 11
Department of Justice Office Electronic Reading Room, op-olc-v013-p0163_0.
This OLC legal opinion written by Bill Barr asserts that the President “has the inherent constitutional authority to deploy the FBI to investigate and arrest individuals for violating United States law, even if those actions contravene customary international law.” The President can also order the FBI to “contravene unexecuted treaties or treaty provisions, such as Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.” This secret legal opinion contradicted an earlier precedent from OLC.
Document 12
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Council H-Files, NSC/DC Meetings Files, Folder, “NSC/DC 062 - October 06, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama.”
This memorandum summarizes some of the “lessons learned” after a failed coup against Noriega that fizzled in part due to U.S. soldiers’ hesitance to accept custody of Noriega from the coup plotters (See Document 13). In an attached Q&A paper prepared for Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates, it is confirmed that “the rebels had physical control of Noriega” when they offered him to U.S. forces.
Document 13
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, Bush Presidential Records, Office of Counsel to the President, C. Boyden Gray, Confidential Alphabetical Subject File, Folder, “War Powers: Panama.”
This memorandum by Deputy Legal Adviser to the National Security Council Stephen Rademaker outlines several talking points to be raised by White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray for an upcoming Lawyers Group meeting on Panama. The memo notes that “Bill Barr has already begun work on the legal authorities outline” which will culminate in the still classified OLC opinion authorizing the overthrow of a foreign government even if the rebels are likely to kill the head of state. The talking points for the meeting reveal that operators on the ground raised legal concerns during the failed coup plot: “Last week’s coup attempt in Panama revived concerns about the legal implications of steps that we could take to bring Noriega and other narcotics figures to justice.” The memo explains that the problem “with Noriega and the narcotics cartels” is that they have caused “blurring” of the lines between military, covert action, and law enforcement operations, “resulting in confusion about the legal authorities and restrictions applicable to operations that we could undertake.” Rademaker concludes that “the Administration could have responded faster and with greater assurance to last week’s coup attempt had there been more advance thinking by Administration lawyers about the legal issues raised by the coup, such as our authority to arrest Noriega.” Finally, the memo stresses that it is essential to insert executive branch lawyers in the decision-making process of coup attempts and especially in “operations targeting major drug traffickers.”
Document 14
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Council H-Files, NSC/DC Meetings Files, Folder, “NSC/DC 066A - October 17, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama.”
This summary of an NSC Deputies meeting to discuss a report by the U.S. embassy in Panama of a possible new coup attempt against Noriega shows that legal concerns were top of mind for members of the administration. During the meeting, one participant “asked that State and Defense lawyers confer on how the U.S. military could legally provide weapons to the coup plotters if that were determined to be in the U.S. interest.”
Document 15
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, Nicholas Rostow Files, Folder, “Countemarcotics: Legal Issues [1].”
This OLC legal opinion written by Bill Barr argues that the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act that barred the use of the military for law enforcement purposes—such as in the enforcement of U.S. drug laws—did not apply to actions by federal agents outside of the United States.
Document 16
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, Bush Presidential Records, Office of Counsel to the President, Boyden C. Gray, Confidential Alphabetical Subject File, Folder, “War Powers: Panama.”
This draft presidential directive authorized U.S. military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel to “take whatever steps are necessary to protect the interests of the United States in and around Panama.” The last sentence of the directive is especially important, which reads, “This order shall supersede any conflicting Executive Branch regulation not required by law.” In addition to E.O. 12333, the prohibition on assassination is also found in several CIA and DOD directives and regulations.
Document 17
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Council H-Files, NSC/DC Meetings Files, Folder, “NSC/DC 087 - December 20, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama.”
These minutes of an NSC Deputies Committee meeting on the day of the U.S. invasion of Panama provide insights into the evolving operation and how administration officials seem unprepared for some elements of the post-Noriega political transition. At the time of the meeting, the whereabouts of Noriega were unknown. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Richard Kerr suggested that “we should consider a reward for Noriega.” The main concern for Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates was to make sure to secure, support and encourage newly elected President Guillermo Endara “to lean forward to show he is the new government of Panama and is dynamic.” Finally, there is some discussion of who should replace Noriega to lead the PDF.
Document 18
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, Nicholas Rostow Files, Folder, “Panama - Current (Daniel Levin) [6].”
This legal memorandum finds Bill Barr having to interpret several laws to conclude that is is not prohibited to combine State Department, Department of Justice, and Drug Enforcement Agency funds to pay out the ransom promised by the U.S. government for information leading to Noriega’s capture.
Document 19
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Council H-Files, NSC/DC Meetings Files, Folder, “NSC/DC 091 - January 02, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama.”
Several days after Noriega took refuge in the Vatican embassy in Panama, an NSC meeting is to be convened to discuss the latest proposals coming from the Vatican to resolve the situation. “The prevailing (but not unanimous) U.S. view has been to keep the rats with Noriega penned up with him as the best way to put pressure on Noriega.” However, the Nuncio has proposed to separate Noriega from the other people that are hiding with Noriega. The plan is to isolate Noriega with the hope that he will feel more pressure and surrender to U.S. forces.
Document 20
This important article from the CIA’s in-house journal was written by Jonathan Fredman, who worked as a CIA lawyer during the regime change operation against Noriega. In 2022, the CIA released a redacted version of this article via a FOIA request filed by the author of this posting. The 2022 version included the sentence: “After the invasion, many believed that the prohibition on assassination had prevented the United States from availing itself of a cheap and easy way to remove Noriega,” but subsequent sentences were redacted.
Mr. Fredman has since uploaded an unredacted version of his article on his personal webpage, revealing those previously censored sentences: “Responding to that concern, the Justice Department prepared a classified legal opinion examining whether the provision of US support to a planned coup against a repressive regime would necessarily violate the E.O. if there were no specific intent to kill the foreign leader but the plotters contemplated the use of force and the likelihood of violence were great. The Department concluded that E.O. 12333 would not necessarily preclude the US from assisting in such a plan but cautioned that the legality of any particular proposal has to be evaluated on its own merits.”
[1] Michael R. Sisak, Larry Neumeister, and Eric Tucker, “Maduro says 'I was captured' as he pleads not guilty to drug trafficking charges,” The Washington Post, January 5, 2026.
[2] Richard H. Cole, Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988 – January 1990 (Washington D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 63.
[3] Randal C. Archibold, “Manuel Noriega, Dictator Ousted by U.S. in Panama, Dies at 83,” The New York Times, May 30, 2017.
[4] Brian Loveman, No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 339.
[5] United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/44/240, 28 December 1989
[6] Farnaz Fassihi, “At the U.N., Even Allies Condemn U.S. Action in Venezuela,” The New York Times, January 5, 2026.
[7] This phrase appears to be a common refrain among U.S. policymakers. See, Colin L. Powell and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 544; Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA (New York: Viking, 1990), 479.
[8] To be fair, the rise of the Imperial Presidency is the result of both presidential usurpation and congressional abdication of their prerogatives. Arthur M. Jr. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (New York: Mariner, 2004).
[9] William P. Barr, “Interview with William P. Barr,” interview by James S. Young et al., George H. W. Bush Oral History Project, 2001, 29.
[10] T. Elliot Gaiser, Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for Legal Adviser, National Security Council, “Re: Proposed War Department Operation to Support Law Enforcement Efforts in Venezuela,” December 23, 2025, 7.
[11] In addition to the legal memoranda discussed in this posting, Barr wrote one more OLC opinion related to Panama that will not be discussed here. See, William P. Barr, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Dick Thornburgh, “Extension of Prisoner of War Treatment to Defendants Noriega and Del Cid Under the Geneva Convention,” February 1, 1999.
[12] Gaiser, “Re: Proposed War Department Operation to Support Law Enforcement Efforts in Venezuela,” 9.
[13] Fox News, “Former Attorney General Bill Barr breaks down the case against Maduro,” January 5, 2026.
[14] Barr, interview., 2; For the impact of the Hersh revelations and the sucsequent Rockefeller Commission, Church and Pike Committees see, Harold P. Ford, William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, 1973-1976 (Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1993); On the “Time of Troubles” see, Central Intelligence Agency, “George H.W. Bush—the 11th Director of Central Intelligence,” (2018).
[15] Barr, interview., 2-3; For a classic account of executive branch efforts to limit legislation to curtail the powers of the executive branch's use of covert action see, Kathryn S Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: the post-Watergate investigations of the CIA and FBI (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2000); For a more ressent assessment see, Luca Trenta, President's Kill List: Assassination and US Foreign Policy since 1945 (Edinburgh University Press, 2024).
[16] Barr, interview.
[17] Barr, interview., 22-23.
[18] Barr, interview., 11. See also the following OLC opinion where Barr sets out an agenda to combat what he views as congressional encroachments on executive power. William P. Barr, Assistance Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsels’ Consultative Group, “Common Legislative Encroachments On Executive Branch Authority,” July 27, 1989.
[19] Barr, interview., 10.
[20] Barr, interview., 11; On the evolution of the lawyers group see, Oona A Hathaway, “National Security Lawyering in the Post-War Era: Can Law Constrain Power?,” U.C.L.A. Law Review 68, no. 2 (2021).
[21] Barr, interview., 12.
[22] David J. Barron, “Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions,” Department of Justice Electronic Reading Room.
[23] Charlie Savage and Julian E. Barnes, “Memo Approving Boat Strikes Is Said to Rely on Trump’s Claims About Cartels,” The New York Times, November 13, 2025; Charlie Savage, “Justice Dept. Memo Approved Military Incursion Into Venezuela as Lawful,” The New York Times, January 6, 2026 2026.
[24] Savage, “Justice Dept. Memo Approved Military Incursion Into Venezuela as Lawful.”
[25] John Rizzo, Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA (New York: NY: Scribner, 2014), 188.
[26] Cole, Operation Just Cause, 6.
[27] Loveman, No Higher Law, 338; Stephen Engelberg and Jeff Gerth, “Bush and Noriega: Examination of Their Ties,” The New York Times, September 28, 1988.
[28] John Dinges, Our Man in Panama: How General Noriega used the United States and Made Millions in Drugs and Arms (New York: Random House, 1990), 49.
[29] Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 50, 58, 127–28.
[30] Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 51.
[31] Engelberg and Gerth, “Bush and Noriega: Examination of Their Ties.”
[32] Engelberg and Gerth, “Bush and Noriega: Examination of Their Ties.”; Powell and Persico, My American Journey, 510–11.
[33] Engelberg and Gerth, “Bush and Noriega: Examination of Their Ties.”; Dinges, Our Man in Panama: 364, endnote.
[34] Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. (New York, NY: Anchor, 2008), 609.
[35] Britt L. Snider and Richard B. Still, “Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States, Volume II: The Contra Story,” CIA-FOIA No. C06974497, 115–17; Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 215–18.
[36] Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 195, 227–29.
[37] Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA, 479.
[38] Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 235; Cole, Operation Just Cause, 6.
[39] Malcolm Byrne, Iran-Contra: Reagan's Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power (University Press of Kansas, 2014), 346–48.
[40] Seymour M Hersh, “Panama Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, Arms, and Illicit Money,” The New York Times, June 12, 1986.
[41] Powell and Persico, My American Journey, 544.
[42] Powell and Persico, My American Journey, 544; Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA, 478–80.
[43] Byrne, Iran-Contra, 346.
[44] Byrne, Iran-Contra, 347.
[45] Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 264.
[46] Cole, Operation Just Cause, 6.
[47] Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 273.
[48] Barr, interview., 29
[49] Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 292–95.
[50] Dean E. Hoffman, National Intelligence Officer for Economics to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, “Panama,” March 10, 1988, CIA-FOIA CIA-RDP90G01353R000400480018-1; Colin L. Powell Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, “Actions in Support of the Delvalle Government,” March 15, 1988, CIA-FOIA CIA-RDP90M00005R000600040015-1.
[51] Trenta, President's Kill List, 249.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Engelberg and Gerth, “Bush and Noriega: Examination of Their Ties.”
[54] Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 610; Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 303.
[55] Trenta, President's Kill List, 250.
[56] Emphasis added.
[57] Savage, “Justice Dept. Memo Approved Military Incursion Into Venezuela as Lawful.”
[58] For an excellent account see Trenta, President's Kill List, 250.
[59] Emphasis added. Barr, interview., 29
[60] The CIA General Counsel at the time of the regime change operation against Panama, Russell J. Bruemmer, confirms Fredman’s account. See, Russell J. Bruemmer, “The Prohibition on Assassination: A Legal & Ethical Analysis.” In Hayden D. Peake and Samuel Halpern (Eds), In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer (Washington D.C., NIBC Press), 152-53.
[61] It does not appear that anyone claimed the reward.
[62] Barr, interview., 29
[63] Barr interview, 30.